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Sensitive to Norms, Caused by Reasons
PATRIZIA PEDRINI
(University of Florence)
 I
Philosophy has frequently been concerned with the apparent fact that people often seem to conform 
their thinking and behaviour to norms of various kinds. In so doing, they are shown to be responsive 
to reasons for their thinking and actions. This has brought about an intense debate that has in turn 
focused on: 1) clarifying how this can happen, and what else must be true of human beings for this 
to be possible at all; 2) what kind of norms we are sensitive to and how they provide reasons; 3) 
what this implies in terms of our mutual grasping of our actions and thinking; and also 4) whether 
this is genuinely so, that is whether we are really sensitive to norms, or if this appearance has to 
count as another among the innumerable misapprehensions due to the epistemic limitations human 
beings are condemned to. 
The discussion became heated since the early 20th century and the main questions to which such 
concerns gave rise have reverberated onto most of the branches of philosophy, e.g. philosophy of 
science, philosophy of language, metaphysics, epistemology, metaethics, to an extent that one might 
try to work out the genealogy of most recent philosophical ideas in light of the question of whether 
we are sensitive to norms, and how.1 
In what follows, I’ll try to illustrate how Alan Millar’s Understanding People: Normativity and 
Rationalizing  Explanations  securely  belongs  to  this  long-lasting  and  articulated  context  of 
investigation.  I’ll  mainly  do  this  by  focusing  on  3).  Accordingly,  I’ll  first  outline  how  the 
background issues have historically matured, and I’ll then say how the book takes a stand on some 
of  the  core  theses  stemmed  from  that  specific  tradition.  Although  expressly  concentrated  on 
clarifying what understanding people is and how it involves sensitivity to norms and responsiveness 
to reasons in ways to be specified, the author formulates and defends an original set of claims that 
show an  insightful,  wide-ranging  conceptual  appreciation  of  the  import  and  interconnection  of 
problems that have arisen, and still persist, in most of the fields involved in answering the question 
of the nature of sensitivity to norms and responsiveness to reasons. This is undoubtedly to count 
among the many virtues of the book.
I wish to thank Alan Millar for having been willing to write a précis of his book, in which he 
presents with the usual clarity the main claims he defends in the book; the commentators - Mario 
De Caro, Simone Gozzano, Adrian Haddock, and Paul Noordhof - for their engaging discussions on 
them; and, once more, the author for responding. I am especially indebted to Luca Malatesti, the 
chief  editor  of  this  journal,  for  his  thorough  support  to  my editorial  work;  and  to  Alessandro 
Pagnini,  for  useful  discussions  about  the  historical  development  and  the  significance  of  the 
philosophical problems I touch upon. 
1  See Burge (1992).
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II
In a number of remarks  dating from his lectures in Cambridge in the nineteen thirties,  Ludwig 
Wittgenstein suggested that the explanation of what one did was liable to be regarded  either in 
terms of the reasons one had or through the causes that determined one’s deeds.2 Roughly, whilst 
investigation of the former was mainly based upon what a person said - as unrepeatable, individual, 
and semantic-laden as such an event can be - the latter was associated with laws governing the 
allegedly  uniform  realm  of  a  meaningless  nature  and  could  be  explored  through  scientific 
experiment. Although specifically concerned on those occasions for the purpose of making a case 
against the allegedly scientific status of psychoanalysis, Wittgenstein’s reflections passed into the 
philosophical literature, along with others about the nature of psychological narrative in general, as 
opposed to explanatory discourses where no psychological terms figure - typically, the accounts of 
physics. Further discussions then followed (or continued to follow) on the nature .of  psychological 
language and its relation to the scientific one. These debates were mainly due to neo-empiricists, 
who, given their commitments to scientific methodology and scientific language, were fascinated 
by  the  project  of  unifying  the  epistemology  of  comprehension  with  that  of  natural  sciences. 
Moreover, a contribution to the philosophical discussion came from logical behaviourism, fervently 
engaged in clearing philosophy of mind from overt and hidden traces of Cartesian “mentalism”. All 
these  interests  enforced  the  long-term and  to  some  extent  still  unresolved  distinction  between 
reasons on which an agent acts and thinks and causes for her action and thinking. At the level of 
epistemology, they ended up strengthening a parallel widely accepted philosophical intuition: that 
understanding one person’s actions and beliefs in light of the reasons she has for doing and thinking 
what she does have to be completely different a business from the attempt at explaining the physical 
world via the ever-increasing charting of its causal texture, which is the distinctive enterprise of 
science. More specifically, the debate has tended to be so set up that it has appeared plain to some 
philosophers to think of the parallel distinctions between reasons and causes, on the one hand, and 
between understanding and explaining, on the other, as dichotomies: if one  explains a fact or an 
event3, one is invoking or focusing on  causes that brought about that fact or event, whilst if one 
invokes  reasons why  a  fact  or  event  has  taken  place,  one  is  properly  involved  in  attaining 
understanding of  the  fact  or  event  under  scrutiny.  Some  grounded  the  dichotomies  on  the 
specificities of either methodology, independently of its subject-matter; others presented them as 
depending on the nature of the subject-matters:  invoking reasons is epistemically appropriate to 
human beings and their deeds, while causes are the hallmark of physical world. Thus, one can make 
intelligible human facts or events as regarded in terms of their rational status, while investigation of 
nature via causes is necessarily silent on rationality, and has in itself nothing to do with rational 
intelligibility. For the sake of coining catchphrases, nature is in fact arational. Interestingly enough, 
however, whilst an arational nature is appropriately accessed through causes, according to some 
philosophers rationality of human beings would instead prevent us from unpacking their intentions 
and beliefs in terms of causes for the behaviour they bring about, since the rational connection 
between them and the resulting action and thinking would fail to be causal.
One might ask, however, whether such dichotomies should be valid at all. Since the Scientific 
Revolution at least, we have learned that the mechanical, causal point of view is appropriate for the 
investigation of nature. Thus, that natural facts or events are not to be searched through in terms of 
their “reasons” is common sense. After all, scire est scire per causas. But what about human facts 
or events? Most ordinary stories about human behaviour and thinking invoke reasons why people 
act and think in the way they do. We certainly understand (or fail to understand) why they acted as 
they  did  by  taking  into  account  the  reasons  they  put  forward  to  make  their  own  behaviour 
intelligible, and by assessing the quality of these reasons4. But why could not these reasons also be 
2  For a useful discussion of these notes on Freud, see Wollheim & Hopkins (1982).
3  The issue whether causal connections are between facts or events isn’t settled. See Garrett (2006).
4  An interpreter, or the agent herself, may find that what the agent has cited as a good reason for her action fails to be 
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causes  for what they make intelligible? Why should the connection between reasons and actions 
expressed in everyday, folk-psychological parlance fail to be causal, and thus unable to provide an 
explanation of the resulting behaviour?
The rationale for maintaining that reasons cannot be causes for what they “rationalize”, though 
fail to “explain”, was taken to be illuminated by typically illustrative considerations like those that 
follow.5 Suppose that I say that I have raised my arm in a street in the attempt to call for a taxi 
driver’s attention, since I needed to catch a train in a few minutes and I believed the fastest way to 
reach the train station was to go there by taxi. My gesture is made intelligible to observers by my 
expressed motivation and intention, together with my current beliefs about the location of the train 
station and time, so that everyone can understand why I did so. The fact is, however, that I might 
have acted differently. It is intelligible that I raised my arm in order to call for attention, given my 
motivation, intention and beliefs, but nothing in the account given suggests that either everyone or I 
in similar circumstances would necessarily choose the same line of action to reach this goal. That is, 
it is not necessary for me to act in this way in order to reach my goal. Were there to be a causal 
connection between my states of mind and my action, such necessity should instead hold, and a 
good explanation should exactly be able to account for that necessity.6  
The last point was believed to be a crucial one (others will be clarified later) to do justice to the 
dichotomies  between  explaining  and  understanding.  The  impossibility  of  reading  into  human 
behaviour “covering laws”7 as exact and predictable as for instance those formulated in physics, and 
under which the fact or event explained can subsumed, has been for a long time perceived as the 
main obstacle to crediting rationalizing accounts with the status of genuine “explanations”. In other 
words, a standard for explanation was already in play: it came from the “hard” sciences, and it set 
the demanding constraints for other accounts in search for a scientific status. Any genuine causal 
explanation must also prove to be nomic.8
There are in fact other vocabularies that equally apply to the same sequence of gestures, for 
instance  the  vocabulary  of  physics,  which  seems  to  meet  the  requirement  of  issuing  law-like 
connections. Typically, we can describe the sequence of gestures I made to call a taxi in a purely 
physical language, where no intentional states figure. The account specifies every proximal (bodily, 
neurological, or physiological) causes of every resulting bodily movement I made; more notably, it 
connects the states that figure in the chain of events as constrained by empirical  laws discovered 
through experience and upon which predictions can be issued. But how exactly can an explanation 
that invokes laws be valid? 
Hempel (1942; 1965; 1966) developed the idea that genuine explanations are, or are reducible 
to,  accounts  of  facts  or  events  that  conform to  the  so  called  “Deductive-Nomological”  model 
(henceforth DN), currently used by scientists to explain the phenomena that are typical of their 
domain.  The model  had already been formulated by Popper (1934),  and shared by Oppenheim 
(Hempel & Oppenheim,1948). Hempel decisively contributed to make it formally explicit what the 
model amounts to by providing a logical recipe for satisfactory explanation. The recipe specifies the 
the actual reason for her action. 
5 See Anscombe (1957) and Wittgenstein (1953). 
6 It  lies  beyond  the  scope  of  this  introduction  a survey  on whether  the nature  of  causality  is  best  caught  by a 
Regularity theory of a Counterfactual theory. See Mackie (1993), Garrett  (2006, Ch. 4), and Fulford, Thornton & 
Graham,  (2006,  chapters   13-15).  I  am aware  that  the  philosophical  debate  on  the  scientific  explanations  has 
significantly  changes  during  the  eighties  from the  way  the  topic  was  framed  within  the  Humean-Popperean-
Hempelean discussion: see Salmon (1990). For an almost complete analysis of recent discussions on the scientific 
explanation see Ladyman (2002). At the same time, the debate between neo-Wittgensteinians and naturalists showed 
to be little affected by this shift. As to the the new definitions of causality recently developed in the philosophy of 
science, some tries to solve the dichotomy reasons-causes through important reconceptions of causality, see Peruzzi 
(2004) and Gozzano, (2007). 
7  Hempel (1942; 1965, 1999).
8  It has been questioned whether causality and “nomologicity” must necessarily go hand in hand. See Garrett (2006, 
ch. 4). 
4  Sensitive to Norms, Caused by Reasons 
logical structure in which the sentences that comprise an explanation have to stand. Thus, the DN 
model aims to provide necessary and sufficient conditions against which all explanations that aspire 
to be scientific can be tested. The DN model is meant to set a standard whose soundness is, by 
virtue  of  its  logical  properties,  independent  of  the  subject  matter.  This  latter  feature  is  what 
guarantees that the standard can be used across disciplines (whether “of man” or “of nature”). 
Hempel (1966) lists four conditions of adequacy of scientific explanations: 1) the explanations 
must be a valid deductive argument; 2) the explanans must essentially contain at least one general  
law; 3) the explanans must have empirical content; 4) the sentences constituting the explanans must 
be true. Once all the four conditions are satisfied, the explanandum follows from the explanans by 
modus ponens, e.g.: 
(a)  At any location,  the pressure that  the  mercury column in  the  closed  branch of  the 
Torricelli  apparatus  exerts  upon the  mercury  below equals  the  pressure  exerted  on  the 
surface of the mercury in the open vessel by the column of air above it. (b) The pressures 
exerted by the columns of mercury and of air are proportional to their weights; and the 
shorter the columns, the smaller their weights. (c) As Périer carried the apparatus to the top 
of the mountain,  the column of  air  above the open vessel  became steadily shorter.  (d)  
(Therefore),  the  mercury  column  in  the  closed  vessel  grew steadily  shorter  during  the 
ascent.  (...)  The  explanations  just  considered  may  be  conceived,  then,  as  deductive 
arguments whose conclusion is the explanandum sentence,  E, and whose premise-set, the 
explanans, consists of general laws, L1, L2, . . . , Lr and of other statements, C1, C2, . . . , 
Ck, which make assertions about particular facts. The form of such arguments, which thus 
constitute one type of scientific explanation, can be represented by the following schema:
D-N: 
            L1, L2, . . ., Lr                     Explanans sentences
            C1, C2, . . ., Ck
          
E                                        Explanandum sentence
Explanatory accounts of this kind will be called explanations by deductive subsumption 
under  general  laws,  or  deductive-nomological  explanation.  (The  root  of  the  term 
‘nomological’  is  the  Greek  word  ‘nomos’,  for  law.)  The  laws  invoked  in  a  scientific 
explanation will also be called  covering laws  for the explanandum phenomenon, and the 
explanatory argument will be said to subsume the explanandum under those laws (Hempel, 
1999, pp. 301-2). 
This  definition  of  what  an  explanation  is,  however,  proved  to  be  problematic  under  various 
respects.9 One is  particularly  prominent:  if  an explanation  needs  to  rest  upon the  validity  of  a 
general law, it is clear that no one could successfully explain facts or events that fail to be subsumed 
under covering laws. There are sciences that clearly do not make use of general, exceptionless laws, 
but which issue explanations by virtue of mere generalizations that are inductively inferred from 
statistic frequency and contemplate exceptions. For this reason, Hempel had to modify his claim 
9 For the sake of giving one example that will be not explored in the remainder of this introduction, it is not clear that 
the model can distinguish between accidental universal connections (like “All the men wear shirts”) and laws of 
nature (like “All men are mortal”). 
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and acknowledge that DN needed to be coupled with a Inductive Statistical model (IS). Here, the 
explanandum isn’t deduced from a premise that comprise a general law, but rather inferred from an 
empirical regularity of events that follow other events.10 
And what about the extension of the model to rationalizing explanations? These latter clearly 
don’t rest upon anything like a covering law. For example, my intention to raise my arm to call for 
attention is not covered by a general law according to which any time one raises an arm, one is 
calling for attention. By the same token, any “science” that makes use of explanations which don’t 
follow  from exceptionless  laws  cannot  be  said  to  provide  satisfactory  explanations  of  what  it 
purports to explain. Historians, for example, when issuing explanations of historical events, don’t 
operate in the way prescribed by Hempel’s DN four conditions. One justification why this must be 
so is clearly related to a commitment to human freedom. 
Maybe the IP model fares better: after all, it may be thought, rationalizing explanations could 
owe their validity to empirical generalizations on what people tend to do in certain circumstances. 
But  whilst  the  acknowledgement  that  sciences  which  involve  explanations  by  reasons  do  not 
conform to DN was shared by both those who favoured Hempelian account and its detractors, some 
defenders of the opposing view objected to the extension of IP to them as well. It is in fact not to be 
thought that the assimilation between rationalizations and explanations was barred solely by those 
who defended the scientific  methodology as  yielding  valid  explanations.  On the  one hand,  the 
champions of scientific explanations as the only model for genuine explanation tried to extend their 
model  to  other  sciences,  and  to  show to  what  extent  that  could  be  done  (i.e.,  to  what  extent 
rationalizing explanations refer to laws or generalizations, and thus are nomic); on the other hand, 
the proponents of the insuperable and unique specificities  of rationalizing explanations  forcibly 
resisted the assimilation to some extent welcome by the former. These latter put forward arguments 
for demonstrating that there are differences  in kind  between the two types of explanations. Such 
differences made it appear unlikely any reconciliation between them. Among the former are those 
who  independently  opted  for  a  methodological  unity  of  all  sciences,  e.g.  neo-empiricists  like 
Hempel and naturalists in general, whilst among the latter are those who held that any disciplines 
which study man and his deeds are founded and justified in a completely different way from those 
which study nature, e.g. anti-naturalists and Wittgensteinians. 
However, the debate on whether there must be unity or tension between the science of nature 
(Naturwissenschaften)  vs. science of man (Geisteswissenschaften) has a long history indeed. It is 
conventionally traced back to Hume (1748) and developed by Comte (1830-42) and Mill (1863), 
who maintained the virtue of such unity, and to Dilthey (1883), who gave instead a (neo-Kantian) 
foundation  to  the  difference.11 In  the  analytic  tradition  the  contrast  had  already  reappeared  in 
keeping with questions raised within philosophy of history. Collingwood (1940; 1946), for instance, 
suggested that historians’ job isn’t to explain, but to penetrate the significance of past events by 
means of a “re-enactment”: far from looking for regularities that can ground explanations as other 
scientists do, their method is to empathize with men in the past (re-enact those happenings), in order 
to give an interpretation of the facts as if they themselves had been involved in them. 
Hempel  relived  the  debate  just  against  claims  defended  by  philosophers  of  history.  He 
reintroduced a defence of a Humean point of view that is still acknowledged as a seminal starting 
point for tackling the issue, as opposed to a line of thought that includes anti-naturalists reminiscent 
of  Collingwood,  such  as  Gardiner  (1952),  Scriven  (1959),  Dray  (1957),  Ernst  Nagel  (1961), 
Waismann (1965); and Wittgensteinians, whose trend I will spell out more in detail in a moment 
and whose main representatives  are Ryle (1949), Anscombe (1957), Winch (1958), von Wright 
(1963; 1971), and that are echoed by Austin (1956), Strawson (1962), Hampshire (1959), Melden 
(1961), Davidson (1963), Taylor (1964), Apel (1982). Between the ’50s and the ’70s antinaturalist 
10  In that case, one must be independently committed to believing in the validity of the induction. 
11  For the commonality of interests, von Wright  (1971, ch. 1) said that any supposedly division between analytic and 
continental philosophy was likely to become more and more senseless. 
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concerns earlier expressed in philosophy of history found a new idiom and new reason d’etre  in 
philosophy of action and analysis  of ordinary language. From these latter fronts new arguments 
came  for  resistance  to  assimilating  the  two  enterprises.  These  arguments  are  of  paramount 
importance to let us approach Millar’s view more closely.
The main line of challenge employed by anti-naturalists of a Wittgensteinian provenance who 
discussed  Hempel’s  theories  was  associated  with  their  commitment  to  what  makes  a  rational 
connection valid in the first place, apart from establishing whether it must be rival to a causal one. 
They in fact maintained that no IP generalization could ever be explanatory of why people tend to 
raise their arm in order to call for attention. This is so because, however frequently that behaviour 
can be performed by humans,  what  makes  it  intelligible  to  an observer  is  just the logical  link 
between having such an intention and acting in that way. That is, we understand this behaviour in 
light of that intention, and even in the absence of any generalization linking the two events. By the 
same token, knowing about the tendency of people to act in that way when they have the relevant 
intention doesn’t contribute at all to help us understand the link between them. The connection is 
conceptual, not empirical - as instead a Humean interested in searching empirical regularities might 
wish - and it’s not answerable to any regularity from which one can infer the reason why one acts as 
one does. The underlying thought here is twofold: a) it is an analytic truth that the action of Φ-ing is 
intentional, that is, there’s a corresponding intention of Φ-ing that makes the action what it is - 
otherwise it would not be action at all; b) anyone who has the intention of Φ-ing must be prepared 
to do whatever is necessary to Φ-ing. This latter can be regarded as a principle that defines what an 
intention is. The principle is constitutive of the intention. As any principle, its validity depends on 
the norms it specifies, not on the frequency of their application. We a priori understand what an 
intention is by grasping its intrinsic nexus with following a norm like means-end principle, not by 
means of generalizations. This is the so called  “Logical Connection Argument” which establishes 
the source of our understanding: it lies in our grasping a norm, not in generalizations or a laws 
grounded in any empirically recorded regularities. An alien landed on the Earth, who hadn’t the 
capacity to grasp the normative dimension of our mental life, could not understand at all why we 
stop at traffic lights when they are red. He could realize that we actually do that, and presumably 
develop expectations, but he could not realize why we act in this way. 
Wittgenstein (1953, § 325) had also argued against mistaking a mental mechanism that supports 
the transition between some states to others, or to behaviour, for the normative transition between 
there being norms, or “rules”, that one is sensitive to and conforming to them. While the former is 
subject to factual judgments about how the transition  de facto occur, the latter  is answerable in 
terms of correctness / incorrectness, and the judgments that apply to it are evaluative, about how the 
conformity / unconformity is de jure attained. 
But why could not the normative transition also be causal, when we understand it via norms? 
After all, one may say, the alien in the above–mentioned example could not only fail to understand, 
but also to explain why people stop at traffic lights. In other words, sensitivity to norms could have 
a causal import on behaviour. The reason why causality was barred was thought to be provided by 
an argument,  the so-called “Argument from Verification”,  which is strictly related to the above 
considerations. In connection with the “Logical Connection Argument”, this seems to threaten the 
very possibility of our being spelling out causes for actions when we rationalize them by citing the 
reasons  the agent  had.  The thought  runs as follows: Hume’s  lesson on causality  was that  it  is 
requisite that one could identify the cause and its effect independently.  That is to say, since the 
causal connection is an empirical matter, it has to be discovered and verified a posteriori. But then 
this feature of the causal connection rules out the possibility that the cause can ever logically entail 
its effect. The entailment is precisely that on which a reason for action or belief works. If I say that I 
call a taxi because I need to catch a train in few minutes, and I believe that I could do this by calling 
a taxi, my intention to catch a train by using a taxi already logically entails my action of calling a 
taxi. There’s a logical connection between the intention that constitutes my reason for the action I 
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perform and the action itself.  Such logical connection that holds between intentional states, like 
intentions, beliefs, and action itself is thought to be incompatible with the demand of the argument 
from  verification,  and  thus  to  fail  to  be  taken  as  causal.  The  very  “logic”,  or  “grammar”  of 
psychological terms, like intention, prevents us from considering them as causes. 
It is not clear, however, that there is no viable route towards a resolution of the allegedly sharp 
dichotomies. Millar, as we will see, is in fact interested in a solution where such incompatibility 
should be overcome. For if these qualifications was thought to bring some light (and indeed did so) 
onto the specificities of scientific theories vs. theories fostered by the so called “humanities” – or, 
more  loosely,  onto  the  “linguistic  games”  played  in  either  fields  -  a  pressing  question  would 
legitimately loom: since human beings are part of physical nature, like any other physical entities, 
can  the  causal  and  the  rationalizing  points  of  view  be  completely  detached?  What  kind  of 
conceptual vocabulary is appropriate to account for their verbal and non-verbal behaviour? Perhaps 
both languages should happen to be necessary to do so, then what are we to conclude about the 
correct  ontological  nature  of  beings  for  which  such  a  dual  epistemology  might  prove  to  be 
indispensable?  For  the  distinction  between  the  two  linguistic  games  -  the  causal  and  the 
rationalizing  -  doesn’t  tell  us  anything  on  the  metaphysics  of  the  mind,  while  this  interest  is 
legitimate in itself, apart from any Wittgensteinian therapeutic avoidance of discussing such issues. 
Here  is  where  eventually  philosophy  of  science  interfaces  ontology  of  mental  states  and 
metaphysics.  While  Wittgenstein  and  the  Oxford-Cambridge  philosophy  focused  more  on  the 
differences  between  the  intentional  vocabulary  vs.  physical  vocabulary,  and  assigned  to 
philosophers  the  task  of  analysing  ordinary  language  in  order  to  rationally  clarifying  mental 
concepts and their “logic”, many contemporary philosophers more ambitiously tried to say more on 
metaphysical issues as well. 
The tension between norms and facts surfaces here again. The idea that mental  concepts are 
normative has easily led to an interest in whether the corresponding mental states are normatively 
regulated as a matter of fact. It seems obvious that our representational capacities depend, among 
other things, on our having natural capacities that make them possible. When these capacities are 
investigated  by  psychological  sciences  as  de  facto  mechanisms,  they  are  described  as  merely 
conforming to causal patterns. Under a non-intentional language, however, these capacities seem to 
fall short of the normative dimension that ordinary language constitutively attaches to the relevant 
mental states. Perception provides good examples of the problem: we perceive our surroundings by 
virtue of our having sense organs and a suitable brain architecture. This structure operates by being 
caused by stimuli that impinge upon us. This however doesn’t explain how we sometimes attribute 
incorrect  perceptual  representations  to others or to  ourselves.  There’s nothing in the perceptual 
mechanism itself that establishes such answerability to experience. 
Similar problems are provided by language use: although it is widely acknowledged that we 
have complex disposition to language learning and verbal production, what establishes the correct 
use of a concept is not grounded in such capacities. Kripke (1982) made much of the work to show 
how language  use cannot  be a  straightforward  factual  matter.  As to  the problems arising from 
analysis of perceptual knowledge, Quine (1960) famously tried to dissolve them by launching a 
program of reduction of psychological, intentional accounts, with the normative import they seem 
to contain, to natural patterns of stimulation; and Sellars (1956; 1963) forged the metaphor of two 
competing images of man that, respectively, science and intentional psychology offer: a “scientific 
image” according to which man is placed in the realm of law and a “manifest image” that seems 
instead to place him in the “logical space of reason”. 
Davidson (1963; 1980) tackled the same problems. He claimed that our mental life is anomalous 
if compared to the rest of nature. First, it isn’t governed by law-like connections, though it seems 
plain that  mental  states are realized by brain states that  are instead causally and nomologically 
related; secondly, it displays a normative character that has to do with our being rational and having 
propositional  attitudes,  like beliefs,  intentions,  etc. that  are mainly governed by our reasons for 
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holding them. Though irrationality is a real possibility for human beings, there must be limits to the 
amount  of irrationality  we can tolerate  in mutual  understanding,  since by using common sense 
psychological concepts we assume other people to be largely rational agents. (Were it to be the case 
that irrationality is overwhelming, then understanding would fail and the assumption of rationality 
would have to be given up). This however seems an  a priori argument on how epistemology of 
mutual understanding works, and it is far from clear that it solves anything like the metaphysical 
tension  between  facts  and  norms  we  are  facing  -  if  anything  because  it  restates  the  contrast 
contemporary philosophy has left us with. McDowell (1994) found it wanting in various respects 
and tried arguing that rationality and normativity must eventually find a free-tension place in the 
natural world: human beings are naturally placed within a space of reasons, and it is time to stop 
thinking philosophical questions in light of a merely assumed contrast. 
Thus, the dichotomies between causes and reasons, between explaining and understanding, and 
between sciences of nature and sciences of man never cease to reappear, along with their intrinsic 
connection with sensitivity to norms and human rationality. Earlier discussed within philosophy of 
history, they then found a fertile ground in philosophy of science, philosophy of action, language 
and perception; in metaphysics of mind in general, and of mental causation in particular. Let us then 
see what, in Millar’s overall project, is related to this tradition.
III 
Alan  Millar’s  Understanding  People is  observant  of  the  complexities  and  ramifications  of  the 
problems explored, and attentive to recent developments within this complex cluster of neighbour 
fields. Among the main sources of inspiration on normativity are Kripke, Davidson and McDowell. 
Like Kripke, Millar believes that any dispositional, non normative account of our use of concept 
and having propositional attitudes, such as beliefs and intentions, cannot help us with attribution of 
those states to others, which is what understanding consists of. Like Davidson, he views the practice 
of reciprocal understanding as governed by the assumption of human rationality: if this needn’t set 
unrealistic  standards  for  human  thinking  and  behaviour,  nonetheless  normativity  is  implied  by 
having propositional attitudes, such as beliefs and intentions. Like McDowell, he believes that the 
space of reason is  where believing  and intending,  by their  very nature,  place us.  The resulting 
picture is that human reason and its normative regulation is natural enough not to prevent us from 
describing and explaining – and not merely prescribing and understanding - how people on many 
occasions  actually  act,  and  by  virtue  of  what.  This  also  promises  to  put  Millar  in  partial 
disagreement  with  those  who  state  the  peripheral  nature  of  generalizations  for  interpersonal 
understanding.12 
Millar believes that normative considerations that people are sensitive to are central to that very 
description. For this reason he maintains that rationalizing explanations are different from those 
used by science, where sensitivity to norms doesn’t figure. At the same time, he wishes to save the 
idea that  they are  full-blown  explanations.  Thus,  he is  interested in  a  solution where the main 
hypothesis that long lay at the core of the tradition seen above, namely that reasons one has must 
not also be causes for one’s thinking and action, is not taken as compelling. If sensitivity to norms 
has causal and thus explanatory import, the battle is over. 
As to the distinction between explanations that are rationalizing and explanations that are not, he 
claims that the difference lies just in the much-thrown-around “normative dimension of our mental 
life”,  which largely coincides  with our  being  rational  agents.  As to  their  common explanatory 
nature,  he  does  an  admirable  job  in  clarifying  how  we  can  begin  to  rescue  normativity  and 
rationality into a perspective which is at once perceptive of naturalistic demands and unprejudiced 
towards the existence of human rational thinking. 
12 Millar,  however,  claims  that  they  are  compatible,  not  whether  the  generalizations  contribute  in  themselves  to 
understanding (von Wright’s problem, seen above), though perhaps more would be desirable to know about whether 
he also believes that generalizations can specifically contribute to understanding, see Millar 2004, ch. 1 and 7.
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As far as I read his book, Millar achieves this result in terms of a project that overall tends to 
present normativity as sufficiently “psychologized”. That is to say, normativity doesn’t drop from 
the  skies,  nor  is  it  so  alien  to  constitute  an  intractable  problem  for  naturalism.  Normatively 
regulated transitions can in fact be regarded as normal  psychological processes. As Millar put it, 
“(...) any theory that represents believing and intending as lacking an intrinsic normative dimension 
fails to provide an adequate account of the psychological role of beliefs and intentions” (2004, p. 
135).  That  being  so,  Millar’s  view seems  to  suggest  that  there’s  more  factuality  in  our  being 
sensitive to norms than one might have thought. Normative processes, however, are so constituted 
that: 
(i)  understanding  these  processes  is  inextricable  from grasping  the  reasons that  guide 
people as to what they ought to think and do - that which they often in fact think and do; 
(ii) sensitivity to reasons is constitutive of attitudes like believing and intending, on which 
Millar mostly focuses, so that normativity is intrinsic to having those attitudes; 
(iii)  any theoretical  attempt to show that these processes are not intrinsically normative 
could never help us to grasp and ascribe such processes.
Pivotal to fully appreciating this set of claims is the notion of “normative commitment”. As to 
(i),  Millar  argues  that  when  we ascribe  mental  states  like  beliefs  and  intentions  to  others,  we 
essentially ascribe to them some basic  commitments to what they ought to think and do. Human 
beings  are  suitably  equipped  to  appreciate  some  basic,  constitutive implications  of  what  they 
believe and intend, and acquire beliefs and intentions in light of considerations about what ought to 
be  thought  or  done,  given  what  else  they  believe,  desire,  etc.  For  the  attitude  of  belief,  the 
constitutive principle is the Implication Commitment Principle, according to which:
For any x, pi, if x believes pi, then for any θ, if pi implies θ, then x incurs a commitment to 
believing θ, if x gives any verdict on θ.
Intending is instead shaped by the Means-End Commitment Principle, which states: 
For any x, φ, if x intends to φ then x incurs a commitment to doing what is necessary if x is 
to φ.
Millar’s core claim is that such commitments aren’t “extrinsically” attached, as it were, to those 
states; rather, they shape the very phenomenology of believing and intending, by virtue of being 
reflexively incurred by those who believe and intend something. Were they to be treated as extrinsic 
to  the  processes,  then  the  very  psychology  of  believing  and  intending  would  be  mistakenly 
depicted. If Millar is right about (i) and (ii), then (iii) has a point. And it is on the basis of (i) and (ii) 
that  Millar  can  in  fact  object  to  competing  theories  about  normativity  which  deny on  various 
assumptions that normativity is intrinsic to our mental life, e.g. expressivism, deflationist strategies, 
and dispositionalism (see Millar, Précis, this issue, pp. 17-18  and Millar, 2004, ch. 1).
It  is worth saying that Millar’s  analysis  of the relevance of normativity in making sense of 
human behaviour while also explaining it is judicious as to the scope of these explanations. His 
thesis doesn’t aim at ruling out cases where people actually happen to think or do things that don’t 
make sense by their own lights. His analysis of why human rationality needn’t compel one to give 
up normativity constitutes an excellent illustration of how defending normativity and the so called 
“high conception of propositional attitudes” doesn’t necessarily lead one to unrealistic conclusions 
on human mind. The same holds for reflexivity: although it plays an essential role in Millar’s notion 
of commitment, he takes that being reflectively aware of a commitment needn’t often be more than 
an  unconsciously routinized  matter.  Being  normatively  sensitive  is  far  from requiring  an  over-
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intellectualized picture of the mind.
These core claims, other related and their defence have given rise to much debate among the 
commentators: 
• Mario De Caro largely agrees with Millar, though raises the question whether Millar’s view 
on mutual understanding is sufficiently protected against a sceptical challenge first directed 
against  Davidson’s  interpretationalist  theory,  according  to  which  the  practice  of 
interpersonal  interpretation is grounded in the interpreter’s  assumption of “an acceptable 
degree of coherence and cogency” (De Caro, this issue, p. 25) in the reasoning and actions 
of those interpreted. But how can we be sure that they really tend to conform to rationality 
standards? De Caro believes that the challenge can essentially be recast to question Millar’s 
account,  since  this  latter  is  explicitly  Davidsonian  as  well,  in  its  appealing  to  human 
rationality as the basis  for interpersonal  understanding.  Another  point  De Caro raises is 
whether the theory of normativity Millar puts forward in the book could be applied to solve 
the  problem  of  “explanatory  exclusion”,  according  to  which  intentional,  psychological 
vocabulary and the rationalizing explanations it licenses could prove to be superfluous in 
front of a complete account of nature formulated in physical terms.
• Simone  Gozzano is  interested  in  questioning  whether  Millar’s  notion  of  commitment  is 
adequate to specify the available options for discharging such commitment, since there is 
more than one reasoning strategy to do so. These strategies should be specified along with 
the  commitments  incurred,  in  order  to  predict  the  upshot  of  our  epistemic  conduct. 
Furthermore, he asks whether Millar’ notion of belief can “receive a naturalistic reading” (p. 
35), so as not to contrast too sharply with psychology of non-human animals that lack our 
reflexive capacities.  Although Millar’s view is that there is a difference in kind between 
human and other animals’ psychology, Gozzano is inclined to think that the existence and 
operation  of  sub-doxastic  states  in  human  psychology  as  well  is  an  interesting  bridge 
between the two groups of creatures. Another problem attached to this view, he argues, is 
that sub-doxastic states seem to be perfectly accounted for in non-normative terms, though 
this doesn’t exclude their rationality and their playing their causal roles. Another merit of 
aligning  animal  and  human  psychology  is  to  avoid  overloading  our  cognitive  life  by 
requiring  conscious  sensitivity  to  constitutive  norms  for  any  instance  of  believing  and 
intending.  
• Adrian  Haddock  closely  reflects  upon  the  Implication  Commitment  Principle,  which  is 
crucial to Millar’s account of belief. He considers three theses that Millar employs to give 
weight  to  the  Principle,  namely  (i)  a  strong  conceptual  thesis,  according  to  which  the 
Principle is analytically true; (ii)  a weak conceptual thesis, which says that grasping the 
concept of belief commits one to accepting the Principle; and (iii) a constitutive thesis, for 
which the Principle is a partial specification of the very nature of belief. He analyses the 
combination  between  them and provides  an  argument  as  to  whether  there  are  no  other 
alternative explanations of why the Principle is valid, which rely on neither of them. He 
suggests that  the very nature of rationality provides such an alternative.  He also tackles 
issues of irrational beliefs and, more generally,  of beliefs that are recalcitrant to rational 
reflection. They might threaten Millar’s explanation as to why beliefs are incompatible with 
a contemplative stance.  
• Paul Noordhof argues against  Millar’s  idea that not all  normative reasons for action are 
justificatory reasons. He believes, on the contrary, that if there’s no justification for action, 
then “the attitude, and actions that follow from it, fall at least partly outside the ambit of 
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normative explanation” (p. 50). He also questions whether it is safe to claim that reasons – 
understood, as Millar does, as  considerations in favour of attitudes and actions – always 
support  intentional  behaviour.  He  provides  what  he  considers  as  genuine  examples  of 
behaviour that one may want to classify as intentional,  though fails to be consideration-
based. He has doubts concerning Millar’s idea that normativity arises from practices and his 
account of the demands the practices impose upon those who participate in them. Noordhof 
disagrees with Millar’s reading of dispositionalism, as allowing a contemplative stance that 
normative commitments incurred by believing and intending do not license. He argues that 
such a stance is possible in many cases, and that when it is not, this seems more due to 
endorsements of attitudes than to normative commitments. About the high conception of 
propositional attitudes that Millar supports, Noordhof expresses concern as to whether the 
reflexivity it requires may be excessively demanding. Finally, he engages in how Millar’s 
commitments can have an explanatory impact at all. Understanding this, he argues, would 
be of paramount importance to the project,  that Millar  seems to welcome, of integrating 
mentalistic explanations with physical explanations.
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A Précis of Understanding People: Normativity and 
Rationalizing Explanation
ALAN MILLAR 
(University of Stirling)
1. The project
A number  of  philosophers  have  suggested  that  it  is  essential  to  our  mental  life  that  it  has  a 
normative  dimension.  This core  idea appears  in  one  way  in  Saul  Kripke’s  critique  of 
dispositionalist accounts of meaning. For Kripke, meaning something by a word is not simply a 
matter  of how one is  disposed to use the word.  That  one means  plus  by ‘plus’ seems to  have 
implications concerning how one  ought to  use the word. But it is hard to see how merely being 
disposed to use a word in certain ways can, by itself, have such implications. The core idea also 
comes over in John McDowell’s thinking. McDowell (1994) has made much of the idea that to 
think,  desire,  intend,  and so forth  is  to  operate  within the space  of reasons.  As understood by 
McDowell this implies that the possession of propositional attitudes is inextricable from governance 
by reason, which in turn implies that having propositional attitudes is not, as some would put it, a 
straightforwardly factual matter. On the contrary, it would be essential to our mental life that we are 
governed by reason in such a way that we ought to think and act in certain ways. In Understanding 
People I aim to clarify and defend the core idea and to consider its implications for the character of 
our  understanding  of  people.  In  particular,  I  argue  that  understanding  people  is  significantly 
different from scientific understanding, just because it views people as rational agents governed by 
reason.
2. Commitments in three key areas of the discussion
The concept of a normative commitment is central to the perspective developed in the book. This 
concept figures in three areas of discussion. 
(1) Believing and intending
The first concerns the commitments of believing and intending (pp. 72-83). I take it to be intuitively 
plausible, and in keeping with common sense thinking, that believing something commits you to 
believing  other  things  and that  intending  something  commits  you  to  doing certain  things.  The 
relevant concept of commitment is normative. It is not about what people are resolved to do or have 
committed themselves to do. Rather it bears upon what they ought to do. The issue is to explain 
how. 
So far as belief is concerned a natural first thought is that if, for instance, I believe that Tom is 
going to the party, and I also believe that if Tom is going then Sally will go, then I ought to believe 
that Sally will go. Such a view faces two problems. The first is posed by the plausible assumption 
that while crazy beliefs incur commitments, it does not follow that those who have such beliefs 
ought to carry out the commitments they incur. It may be that they ought instead to abandon the 
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beliefs that incur the commitments. The second problem is that it is surely not the case that we 
could believe everything that our beliefs commit us to believing. It is impossible to believe all of 
the infinite propositions entailed by what we believe. I address these problems with the help of the 
notion of a verdict on a proposition. Think of the verdicts on a proposition as being belief, disbelief 
(rejecting the proposition) and suspension of both belief and disbelief. My suggestion is that the 
claim that believing that  p,  q, … commits you to believing that r amounts to the claim that you 
ought to avoid believing p, q, … and giving a verdict on the proposition that r other than belief. You 
can discharge this commitment in one of two ways—either by carrying it out, that is, by ensuring 
that if you give any verdict on the proposition that r then that verdict will be belief, or by giving up 
one of the beliefs that incur the commitment. I apply the conception of a commitment to intentions 
as well. Here the key idea is that intending something commits you to doing what is necessary to do 
what you intend. Obviously, in carrying out this commitment you will be guided by your beliefs 
about the necessary means, but the basic commitment incurred by intentions, I claim, is to do what 
is, as a matter of fact, necessary to do what is intended. There are derivative commitments incurred 
by intentions in combination with the beliefs you have about what is necessary. These may clash 
with the basic commitments. Nonetheless, the derivative commitments are explained by, and are in 
some sense for the sake of, the basic commitment.
(2) Practices
Practices are activities that are essentially rule-governed. When one plays a game of football one is 
not merely subject to the rules of the game. Rather it is essential to the activity in which one is 
engaged that it is governed by those rules. Walking over a grassy area that happens to be a park, one 
might be subject to the rules of the park authority. But is it not essential to the activity of walking 
over that grassy area that one is subject to those rules. The area might never have come under the 
control of the park authority. By contrast, there is no possible world in which you are both a player 
of a game defined by certain rules and not subject to those rules. When you are a participant in a 
practice, how ought you to behave? It would be quite natural to respond by saying that you ought to 
follow the rules, but I claim it is better to represent participants as being committed to following the 
rules (pp. 83-92). The notion of a commitment that is applied here is that already introduced in 
connection with believing and intending. The idea is that participants ought to avoid continuing to 
be participants while not following the rules. The commitment can be discharged either by carrying 
it out—by following the rules—or by withdrawing from the practice. This helps to accommodate a 
point once made by Philippa Foot (1972) in connection with etiquette. Foot remarked that the mere 
fact that there are rules of etiquette does not give anyone a reason to follow them. I think this is 
right. We can accommodate the point if we think of rules of etiquette as governing practices and 
think of participants in such practices as incurring a commitment to following the rules. Perhaps for 
some such practices the rules are silly or even objectionable. It may be that participants ought not to 
follow them and ought to withdraw from the practice. Withdrawal would be one way of discharging 
the commitment incurred by being a participant. 
Practices need not be governed by explicitly formulated rules. In this connection, I discuss a 
practice  of  giving  and  receiving  undertakings  (pp.  87-89).  People  sharing  an  apartment  might 
engage in such a practice. Though they never formulate rules they may show, by the ways in which 
they interact, that a practice is in play among them. Suppose someone says that he will shop for 
food. If this is said in an appropriate context, for instance, in a discussion about the distribution of 
tasks, then it will be treated as an undertaking. In that case the others will expect that the job will be 
done, unless for some good reason it cannot be, and if it is not done, and no reasonable excuse if 
forthcoming, then they would regard this as making some kind of censure appropriate. 
I apply the notion of a practice in connection with offices in institutions. Chief executives of 
companies and officers in armies occupy roles that are defined by certain institutionally devised 
duties.  In effect,  there is a practice of fulfilling the role of chief executive or the role of army 
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officer. The rules of these practices require that the duties defining the office should be carried out. 
Just in virtue of occupying the office one incurs a commitment to carrying out the duties that define 
it. The commitment can be discharged either by carrying out the duties or by withdrawing from the 
office. I offer some reflections on the role of our grasp of practices in understanding people on pp. 
241-47.
(3) Meaning and concepts
The  concept  of  a  practice,  and  the  associated  conception  of  the  commitments  incurred  by 
participating in a practice, move to centre stage in a discussion of meaning (Ch. 6). Discussions of 
normativity in connection with meaning have paid insufficient attention to a distinction between 
two concepts of correctness. So far as terms are concerned the distinction is between correctness in 
the sense of ‘true application’ and correctness in the sense of ‘being in keeping with, or faithful to, 
the term’s meaning’. An application of the term ‘cow’ to something would be correct in the first 
sense if and only if the thing is a cow. Being correct in the second sense contrasts with being a 
misuse.  Suppose  that  I  incorrectly  (=  falsely)  apply  the  term ‘cow’  to  an  animal  I  see  in  the 
distance. It does not follow that I have misused the term in any sense that implies that I have not 
used it in keeping with its meaning. I may have mistaken the animal I see for a cow but I used an 
appropriate word to say what I wanted to say. Or I might have wanted to mislead someone into 
believing that there is a cow over there. In this case too I would have misapplied the term, but I 
have not misused it. I meant to say that the animal is a cow and I used an appropriate term for that 
purpose. Compare this with a situation in which I am in the early stages of learning English and, 
looking at a sheep that is in clear view, and I apply to it the term ‘cow’. The most likely explanation 
is that I have used the term as if it meant sheep and on that account have not used it in keeping with 
its actual meaning. In that case I have used the term incorrectly in the second sense.
I suggest that we should think of the meaning of words as being linked to practices in the sense 
indicated already. Being able to use a word in keeping with its meaning is a matter of participating 
in a practice of using that word. Just in virtue of being a participant in such a practice one incurs a 
commitment to following the rules of the practice. So far as terms are concerned I consider a rule 
the general form of which is: use the term in keeping with the conditions for its correct, in the sense 
of ‘true’, application. Following that rule does not require that  whenever you apply the term you 
should do so correctly in the first sense on which correctness is truth. As I have already observed, 
an intentionally false application may be in keeping with the term’s meaning. It may accord with 
the rule just specified because it respects the conditions for the true application of the term. (If you 
want to tell someone falsely that something over there is cow you cannot do better than use a term 
that means cow (pp. 83-92). 
Considerations similar to those that apply to the meaning of words apply to the employment of 
concepts (pp. 178-191). I show that the distinction between two kinds of correctness applies at the 
level of concepts. This requires me to make sense of the idea that someone may possess a concept 
and yet fail to employ it in keeping with its content. However, an important feature of my view is 
that the commitments incurred by possessing a concept are not to be explained in terms of practices 
(pp. 183-82). There are practices for the use of words and, correspondingly, rules for the use of 
words. A term T in English, say,  has a meaning bound up with a practice that explains why it 
expresses the concept it does express. But the concept is not inextricably tied to that practice since it 
may have a role in the thinking of a person who knows nothing of the meaning of T and who does 
not  participate  in  any practice  of  using  T.  It  is  the  ‘logic’  of  the  concept  that  determines  the 
commitments that are incurred by employing it. 
3. Explaining the commitments incurred by beliefs and intentions
In twentieth century metaethics over the last century or so there has been much discussion of status 
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of moral claims. The issue was framed in terms of a distinction between, on the one hand, factual 
claims, conceived so as not to include normative claims, and, on the other hand, evaluative moral 
claims, understood as having normative implications. The idea that evaluative claims could be true 
or  false  was  thought  to  be  both  metaphysically  and  epistemologically  problematic.  They were 
thought to be metaphysically problematic because it seemed puzzling that there should be facts that 
make  such claims  either  true  or  false.  They were  thought  to  be epistemologically  problematic 
because it seemed that they could not be established either empirically or  a priori and it seemed 
implausible that we have some special cognitive capacity for discerning evaluative truths.1 Parallel 
issues arise in the philosophy of mind. On the one hand, we have psychological statements which 
would be widely held to be factual in some sense that is taken to exclude their having normative 
implications. Ascriptions of belief and intention, for instance, would be widely held to be factual in 
this sense. On the other hand, we have normative claims, for instance, that one ought to take such-
and-such means if one intends to bring about a certain end, or that one ought not to believe P and Q 
if P and Q are inconsistent. It is striking that so little attention has been paid to how exactly these 
kinds of normative claims relate to those psychological statements that are supposed to be non-
normative.2 This is despite the fact that at least some of the problems thought to attach to moral 
statements  seem to  be  due,  not  to  the  fact  that  they  are  moral,  but  to  the  fact  that  they  are 
normative.3 My main concern in the book is not so much about metaphysical or epistemological 
problems that may attach to normative claims, but about how we should think of the relationship 
between certain psychological statements and statements bearing on how people ought to think or 
act.
In  Ch.  IV,  which  I  regard  as  being  at  the  heart  of  the  book,  I  focus  on the  issue  of  how 
statements ascribing a belief or intention relate to the corresponding normative statements ascribing 
commitments incurred by the belief or intention. For instance, I ask how 
(1) Sally intends to buy a present for her brother
relates to 
(2) Sally incurs a commitment to doing what is necessary if she is to buy a present for her 
brother.
(2) is clearly normative. Plausibly if (1) is true then (2) is. I express this by saying that (1) has 
normative import which is captured by (2). The claim that (1) has this normative import is weaker 
than the claim that (1) is itself a normative statement. (1) would be normative, in the strict sense, 
only if it entailed some normative statement. I envisage that theorists who deny that (1) is normative 
will attempt to explain its normative import by invoking a principle connecting having the intention 
in question with incurring the commitment specified by (2). For the sake of having a definite target 
I discuss dispositional conceptions of propositional attitudes, though key points would apply to any 
view on which ascriptions of propositional attitudes are conceived as not being normative.
Dispositionalism about propositional attitudes is the view that propositional attitudes (at least 
conceived  as  standing  states)  are  dispositional  and  that  our  concepts  of  the  attitudes  are 
dispositional  concepts.  It  is  to  be  understood  that  the  relevant  dispositions  are  conceived  as 
analogous to the paradigm cases of dispositions, like flexibility, fragility and the like so that being 
1  Such thinking informs emotivism and prescriptivism as well as the error theory. Mackie (1977) succinctly sets out 
the problems. 
2  Allan Gibbard (1990) is relatively unusual both in homing in on the parallels between normative claims and factual 
ones and in extending an expressivist theory for moral statements to normative statements pertaining to rationality. 
Blackburn (1998) addresses the issue. 
3  Mackie’s argument from relativity seems to turn on considerations that are thought to make it plausible that moral 
beliefs are explicable in psychological and sociological terms, without the need to posit moral facts that suitably 
equipped people can discern. A similar line of thought may be found in Harman (1977). But his argument from 
queerness seems not to turn on assumptions about the distinctively moral content of moral statements.
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in a dispositional  state has no intrinsic  normative import.  Beliefs  on this  view would implicate 
dispositions to form further beliefs, depending on what else the subject believes, and dispositions to 
act in certain ways, depending on what the subject desires or intends. 
Dispositionalists are among those who may wish to explain the normative import of statements 
like (1) above by invoking connecting principles, that is, principles connecting the non-normative to 
the normative. The strategy can be illustrated with the help of an example from ethics. Suppose that 
my neighbour is at my door, in distress, and calling on me for help. The consideration that this is so
—call it C—seems to be non-normative. Prompted by it I may think that I ought to help because I 
take C to give me a reason to help that is not countervailed by other considerations. Thus, in effect, 
I treat  C as having normative import.  It would be some explanation of why I regard C as having 
normative import to point out that I accept, at least implicitly, a principle to the effect that the fact 
that one’s neighbour is in distress and calling on one for help is a reason to help. This principle is a 
reason-specifying principle. It connects a certain type of non-normative consideration with a certain 
type of normative consideration. If the principle holds it goes some way to explaining the normative 
import  of  the  consideration  in  question.   In  the  light  of  my  acceptance  of  the  principle  it  is 
explicable  that  I  should  count  the  consideration  as  providing  me  with  a  reason  to  help  my 
neighbour. 
I  envisage  the  dispositionalist  applying  a  similar  line  of  thought   to  explain  why  (1)  has 
normative import  which is captured by (2).  The idea would be that  we just  need to invoke an 
appropriate connecting principle. The following principle, which I call the Means-End Commitment  
Principle, would fit the bill:
(3) For any x, φ, if x intends to φ then x incurs a commitment to doing what is necessary if 
x is to φ.
The explanation for the normative import of (1) which is captured by (2) would be that (2) follows 
from  (1)  and  (3).  Analogous  considerations  would  apply  to  statements  ascribing  beliefs.  In 
connection with these the following Implication Commitment Principle might be invoked:
(4) For any x, pi, if x believes pi, then for any φ, if pi implies φ, then x incurs a commitment 
to believing φ, if x gives any verdict on φ.
The question now is whether the strategy described is adequate. I suggest that it is not. Invoking 
a principle to the effect that the fact that an action would be a killing is, in the absence of special 
circumstances, a reason against doing it, provides no illumination on what makes killing wrong. 
Moral philosophers have aimed to provide deeper accounts. Consequentialists look for an answer in 
terms of the consequences of individual acts of killing for the general  good, or in terms of the 
consequences  of  there  not  being  widespread  acknowledgement  of  a  strong prescription  against 
killing. Theorists inspired by Kant look for an answer in terms of the view that persons are ends in 
themselves who, as such, are worthy of respect. These strategies explain the wrongness of wrong 
killing in terms of a failure to have due regard to something which is held to be good in itself or 
worthy  of  some  special  kind  of  concern.  For  the  consequentialist  it  is  the  general  good.  For 
Kantians it  is  persons viewed as ends in themselves.  In each case the normative import  of the 
consideration  that  an  action  would  be  a  killing  is  traced  to  a  basic  assumption  about  what  is 
valuable or worthy of special concern. It is not traced to non-normative considerations about what 
killing is but to normative considerations. The same problem arises from the attempt to explain the 
normative import of the fact that my neighbour is calling on me for help. The connecting principle 
that  is  invoked is  not self-explanatory.  If  it  is  acceptable,  its  acceptability will  be grounded in 
considerations about what is of value or worthy of regard. 
I argue that invoking the Means-End Commitment Principle to explain the normative import of 
(1) will not do the trick. The principle itself provides little if any insight into why (1) has normative 
import. And if beliefs and intentions are conceived in non-normative terms it is hard to see what 
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deeper explanation is available. If Sally’s intending to buy a present for her brother simply consists 
in her having various dispositions characteristic of an intention with that content, how is it that she 
incurs a commitment to taking the steps necessary to do so? The answer might seem obvious: if she 
does not take these steps then she will not carry out her intention. That is indeed so, but it does not 
supply what is needed. That she will not carry out her intention unless she takes the necessary 
means is clearly something that is of practical significance to Sally. But it has that significance for 
her only because she has incurred a commitment to travelling to Paris. This practical significance 
presupposes that the commitment has been incurred but does not explain why the commitment has 
been incurred. 
The general  problem about  understanding the relations  between ascriptions  of intention and 
statements ascribing corresponding normative commitments can be made more vivid by thinking 
about a disanalogy between our intentions and our character traits. Suppose I am prone to being 
irritable. It would be sensible for me to do something about this since it would adversely affect my 
relationships with others that I care about. If that is so it is because it matters that I should have 
those good relationships. It is not because of something that is  intrinsic to the character trait in 
question. And because it is not intrinsic to the trait it is conceivable, and indeed possible, that I 
should adopt a purely contemplative attitude to the trait from the standpoint of which I do not try to 
do anything about it, but simply observe how it manifests itself in various situations, and perhaps 
wonder what it will lead me to do in future situations in which I find myself. I might want to see 
what it would be like to observe how my troublesome trait affects me and others. I might want to 
write a short story based on the experience of taking such a stance. It may be irrational or foolish to 
adopt such a stance. It would be reprehensible from a moral point of view. What interests me is that 
it is possible that I should adopt such a stance.
If intentions were like character traits in that they consisted in clusters of dispositions to thought 
and  action,  then  we  should  be  capable  of  adopting  a  contemplative  stance  towards  our  own 
intentions. Yet it is hard to make sense of this. When I ascribe a current intention to myself I do not 
simply take myself to be in a certain dispositionally characterised state. The very thought by which 
I  ascribe  the  intention  to  myself  endorses  that  very  intention  and  seems  to  involve  an 
acknowledgement of the normative import of having the intention—an acknowledge that having the 
intention  commits  one  to  taking  the  necessary  means  to  carry  it  out.  I  do  not  think  that  the 
dispositionalist can account for this peculiar feature of self-ascriptions of intentions. For if having 
an intention is merely a matter of being in a dispositional state then having ascribed to myself an 
intention it would, thus far, be an open question whether I should regard this as requiring anything 
of  me.  Other  considerations—perhaps  a  principle  like  the  Means-End  Commitment  Principle, 
understood as a  principle  connecting  the non-normative  with the normative—would have to be 
invoked to explain why, if at all, I regard my having of the intention as having normative import. I 
do not think that this strategy will help in explaining the normative import of (1). It is problematic 
whether the supposed status of the additional principle would be plausible if having an intention 
were not an essentially normative matter. Why suppose that the principle holds if intentions are not 
intrinsically normative? The connecting principle about killing is supposed to be explained, not just 
by consideration of what killing is in itself, but in terms of something of moral significance about 
killing a human being. Should we not look for some analogue in connection with the Means-End 
Commitment  Principle?  As I  see  it  there  is  nothing  extrinsic  to  intention  that  can  explain  the 
normative import of (1). If there were we could make sense of someone’s accepting (1) yet not view 
it as having the normative import captured by (2). In practice we do not act as if it were an open 
question whether having an intention requires something of us.  In practice we treat  having an 
intention as inextricable from there being certain things that we have to do, where the latter  is 
treated as a normative matter. 
It is important to stress that none of this is at odds with the obvious fact that with regard to any 
intention  that  I  have,  I  can raise  the question whether  it  is  wise to  persist  with that  intention. 
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Suppose, for example, that I plan to travel to exotic places and have taken various steps to this end, 
like booking flights and accommodation, receiving vaccinations, etc. I start to wonder whether I 
should be doing this. If I raise this question then, it might be said, I am surely in a state in which it 
is both clear to me that I have the intention and yet not clear to me whether I shall carry it out. 
Would this not be a case of adopting a contemplative stance to my own intention? I do not think so. 
All of us may wonder whether we shall have the energy, the motivation, or the means to carry out 
intentions that we know we have. Even if we start to have doubts about a planned course of action it 
may still be true of us that we do indeed intend to pursue it to the end. A wavering intention is still 
an intention. But a contemplative stance to my intention would be one in which I think to myself 
that I  (still) have the intention yet treat it as an open question whether this requires anything of me. 
I claim that a peculiar feature of our relationship to our own intentions is that we are not capable of 
adopting such a stance. The issue is how we should account for the phenomenon. 
The phenomenon can be explained if we think of the concept of intending as being in important 
respects like the concept of promising and, correspondingly, think of intending as an intrinsically 
normative matter. Consider this principle. 
Promise  Commitment  Principle: For  any  x,  φ,  if  x  promises  to  φ then  x  incurs  a 
commitment to φ-ing. 
This  principle  does  not  merely  connect  the non-normative  to  the  normative  in  the  way the 
Means-End Commitment Principle is supposed to do on the dispositionalist reading to which I have 
been  objecting.  It  is,  rather,  a  constitutive principle  because  it  partially  specifies  what  it  is  to 
promise something. It is also a  conceptual principle. Grasping the concept of a promise commits 
one to accepting the Promise Commitment Principle. I take the Means-End Commitment Principle 
to be analogous to the Promise Commitment Principle, at least in the respect that it is constitutive 
and conceptual. If this is right then we should think of the ascription of intention (1) above, not 
merely as having normative import, but as being itself an implicitly normative claim. It is not just 
that if (1) is true then (2) is true, but that (1) entails (2). In thinking of Sally as intending to buy a 
present for her brother I thereby represent her to be in a commitment-incurring condition and I am 
myself committed to thinking of her as having incurred a commitment to do what is necessary to 
achieve that end. This has implications for the psychology of intending. Part of what it is for me to 
have an intention to travel is that I am prone to act in ways that I take to be relevant to travelling, 
regulated by the commitment to taking the steps necessary if I am to travel. So, for instance, if I find 
that I have some false beliefs about what is necessary I am likely to alter some of my detailed plans. 
To be regulated by the commitment is to aspire to avoid persisting with the intention while never 
getting around to taking the steps necessary to carry it out. The psychological role of an intention is 
shaped by the commitment it incurs. It is part of my wider picture that intentions perform their 
characteristic role through being recognised, and thus endorsed, as intentions. I pursue this, and a 
related theme concerning belief, in Ch. 5 of the book. But the point that I would like to emphasise 
here is that by treating ascriptions of intentions as being implicitly normative and, correspondingly, 
treating  intentions  themselves  as being intrinsically normative,  we can account  for the peculiar 
character of our thoughts about our own intentions and of our relationship to our own intentions. 
The reason that  we cannot  adopt  a  contemplative  stance towards  our own intentions  is  that  in 
thinking  of  ourselves  as  having  an  intention  we endorse  both  the  intention  and  the  normative 
means-end commitment that having the intention incurs. This accounts for why it is paradoxical to 
think, ‘I intend to travel,  but I shall  not travel’ even although the content of the thought is not 
contradictory.  In  thinking  the  first  conjunct  of  the  thought  I  both  represent  myself  as  having 
incurred  a  commitment  to  doing  what  is  necessary to  travel  and endorse  that  commitment.  In 
thinking the second thought I resolve in effect to flout the very commitment that I have endorsed. 
That  is  a  kind  of  incoherence.  I  do not  think that  a  satisfactory  explanation  of  the  paradox is 
available to those who deny that intentions are intrinsically normative. 
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5. The Problem of Explanatory Relevance
In  Ch.  7  I  consider  a  problem  that  arises  in  connection  with  rationalizing  explanations—
explanations of, for instance, the formation of a belief or the performance of an action in terms of 
the subject’s reason for forming that belief or performing that action. If rationalizing explanations 
are distinctive, qua explanations, then one might suppose that the explanatory insight that they yield 
has something to do with the fact that the relevant propositional attitudes rationalize the belief or 
action to be explained in the way they do. But if,  as  I  claim in Ch. 1,  the explanatory insight 
provided by rationalizing explanations is causal, and tied to appropriate generalizations, then it is 
not clear what is added by the rationalization. If the explanation is causal the insight it yields is 
provided by the information that the attitudes cited in the explanation figured in the aetiology of the 
formation of the belief or the performance of the action. That information provides explanatory 
insight of a limited sort. It implies that the attitudes cited in the explanation are such that, given 
suitable prompting circumstances, someone with attitudes of that sort would be liable to form a 
belief or perform an action of the sort being explained. That insight does not seem to depend on 
anything that has to do with reasons or rationalisation.
One reaction to the problem would be to deny that rationalizing explanations are causal and that 
the insight they provide implicates generalizations. I am interested in a solution to the problem on 
which rationalizing explanations are causal, the insight that they yield implicates generalizations, 
and yet the rationalization in question is, even so, explanatorily relevant to what is being explained. 
My starting point for further reflection on this matter is that facts about the environment that 
people  are  in  enable  us  to  explain  their  behaviour  without  our  having  acquired  independent 
information about what they believe. Knowing what others, given their situation, can hardly fail to 
know is an important guide to what they believe and therefore to what they will do. We can make 
sense of the movements of players in a game of football in part because we see the state of play as 
they do. We see how the players are positioned and orientated, where the ball is, which players are 
moving towards the ball, which players are waiting to receive passes, and so forth. But what enables 
us to connect the state of play to the behaviour of any given player? Obviously our understanding of 
the aim of the game and the rules that govern play is crucial. But a further, and just as crucial, part 
of our understanding of the behaviour of players depends on our grasp of what it makes sense for 
them to believe and intend, and what it makes sense for them to do given what they believe and 
intend. That more general understanding is not tied to any particular practice. It depends on our 
implicit understanding what is involved in believing this or intending that. It rests on requirements 
governing belief and intention in general—requirements that apply to any agent with beliefs and 
intentions.  I  pursue  this  theme  to  the  conclusion  that  people  are  governed  by  normative 
considerations  that  they  recognise  and  that,  accordingly,  understanding  people  requires  us,  as 
interpreters, to view them in the light of the normative considerations by which they are governed. 
This makes understanding people different from understanding states of affairs and events in the 
light of covering generalizations. It is not that generalizations have no role in our understanding of 
people.  They  obviously  do.  But  our  epistemic  route  to  the  generalizations  is  via  normative 
considerations. 
Further reflections on explanation and understanding are pursued in Ch. 8, in which, among 
other things, I take issue with simulation theory, and in Ch. 9 where I argue that there are limits to 
the scope of rationalizing explanation.
6. Normative commitments and normative reasons
I take normative commitments  to be grounded in normative reasons. That is why I explore the 
notions of reasons for belief and reasons for action in Ch. 2. I claim that normative reasons for 
belief depend on belief’s constitutive aim: to believe only what is true. I explore what it means to 
say that this is belief’s constitutive aim (pp. 42-57). In this connection I make use of the idea that 
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believing is governed by the goal of believing only what is true. The story of how belief  is so 
governed brings the notion of sub-intentional, goal-directed activity into the picture. I also argue 
that it is constitutive of the kind of believing that reflective creatures like ourselves go in for that we 
are not indifferent to whether or not our beliefs are true. Some of our believing may be sustained by 
mechanisms that serve psychological needs and deflect our attention from the truth or lead us to 
hold  onto  what  is  false.  But  the  very  fact  that  those  mechanisms  are  in  play  testifies  to  the 
constitutive goal of believing only what is true.
Normative reasons for beliefs must justify those beliefs in the sense of making it appropriate to 
hold them given belief’s constitutive aim. I argue in Ch. 2 that it is far less clear what normative 
reasons for action must be. From reflection on examples it is far from clear that we should think of 
all normative reasons for action as justifying the actions for which they are reasons. All normative 
reasons for action must favour or recommend the action for which they are reasons. But some may 
do  so  simply  by  conferring  an  instrumental  point  on  the  action.  For  instance,  I  may  have  an 
inclination to go for a walk on a sunny afternoon and, being free, intend to satisfy this inclination. 
Having this intention in some sense gives me a reason to go for a walk. But it does so only in the 
sense that it gives an instrumental point to my going for a walk: by going for a walk I can carry out 
an intention to do so that was prompted by my inclination to do so. I make two main points. One is 
that it does not seem appropriate to describe such a reason as a justifying reason for action even 
though  it  favours  or  recommends  the  action.  The  other  is  that  not  all  actions  even  call  for 
justification. In this respect actions differ from beliefs. It is in the nature of beliefs that normative 
reasons for belief should justify those beliefs, but it is not in the nature of action that normative 
reasons for action should justify those actions. No doubt some actions call for justification but we 
should  not  expect  consideration  of  the  nature  of  action  to  establish  that  all  actions  call  for 
justification.  Where  justification  is  called  for  this  will  be  because  some  particular  evaluative 
perspective is in play. In the course of the discussion of these issues I consider the classical theory 
that the good stands to action as the true stands to belief (pp. 63-68). I argue that the classical theory 
is implausible since it fails to accommodate deeply perverse actions in a satisfying way.
7. Intricacies of normativity 
On my account, we incur a normative commitment to doing what is necessary in order to do what 
we intend. We can capture this commitment in terms of ‘ought’ by saying that we ought to avoid 
intending to do something while never getting around to doing the thing we intend. On the picture 
of reason-based normativity that I commend this ‘ought’ is ultimately grounded in a reason that is 
bound up with an ideal of rationality, in particular, the means-end ideal: avoid retaining an intention 
while never getting around to taking the necessary means (pp. 76-83). I call this an ideal rather than 
a requirement. To call it a requirement would suggest that any case in which we retain an intention 
while never getting around to taking all of the necessary means would be a failure of rationality. 
This  is  clearly  not  so.  Such cases  may  be  due  to  non-culpable  ignorance  of  all  of  the  means 
necessary to carry out an intention or to interfering factors that one is powerless to prevent (pp. 
76-77). Nonetheless, there is reason to avoid retaining an intention while never getting around to 
taking the necessary means: to do so would put one in breach of the means-end ideal. The reason is 
strong enough to impose a requirement upon us: to strive to conform to the means end-ideal. 
In Ch. 3, as well as setting out my view of the shape of various normative commitments, along 
the lines  set  out  in  section  2 above,  I  explore some tricky issues  concerning  criteria  for  being 
normative.  A natural  thought  is  that  any statement  is  normative if  it  entails  a  paradigmatically 
normative statement. But what are paradigmatically normative statements? Consider the statement 
that there is milk in the fridge. This is presumably not normative. It entails that either there is milk 
in the fridge or I ought to give up smoking. Suppose that the second disjunct here is normative and 
that the disjunction is normative on that account. It follows that the statement that there is milk in 
the  fridge  is  normative,  which  is  not  a  very  happy  result.  I  argue  that  the  disjunction  is  not 
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normative.  Paradigmatically  normative  statements  are  statements  to  the  effect  that  there  is  a 
(normative) reason for somebody to think or do something. A statement is normative if it entails 
such a statement.  The disjunction just considered is no such statement.  It  does have normative 
subject-matter, as one might say, and thus is in some weaker sense normative, but it is important to 
keep the senses distinct. 
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Not  many  contemporary  philosophers  are  well  acquainted  with  the  work  of  the  Greek  poet 
Archilocus. A lot of them, however, are familiar with one particular  Archilochean fragment, that 
saying, “The fox knows many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing”. This is because that 
fragment was made famous by Isaiah Berlin, who used it for labelling what he thought were the two 
fundamental  species of thinkers.  The scope of Berlin’s taxonomy,  however, can be instructively 
limited to contemporary philosophers. 
In this light, we could say that, on the one hand, there are the hedgehog-philosophers, whose 
reflections  turn  around  a  single  idea,  which  they  analyze  and  discuss  in  all  its  facets  and 
implications  with  a  very  rigorous  (sometimes  even  hair-splitting)  method.  Many contemporary 
analytical philosophers belong to this group. On the other hand, there are the fox-philosophers, who 
are much broader in their interests, and tend to connect different areas in interesting (sometimes 
superficial)  ways.  Most  Continental  philosophers  belong  to  this  group,  but  also  some  analytic 
philosophers (see below). Berlin’s taxonomy, however, does not state the whole truth about what 
kinds of philosophers are around nowadays. There is, in fact, also a third, hybrid species, which 
exhibits  the  features  of  both  the  foxes  and  the  hedgehogs  (we  can  call  them  ‘hedgefox-
philosophers’ – however puzzling this may sound from a purely zoological point of view). In this 
age of either hyperspecialization or superficiality, generally it is a healthy intellectual experience 
when, in exploring the philosophical ecosystem, one runs into a hedgefox-philosopher. They tend to 
be focused upon one specific issue, but they are also interested in studying the relevance and the 
implications that the issue has in different areas. As to their philosophical method, they are both 
analytic and synthetic. 
Alan  Millar  is  one  of  these  philosophers.  In  Understanding  People.  Normativity  and 
Rationalizing Explanation he studies, both in depth and in breadth, one of the hottest philosophical 
issues of the last decades, that which concerns the scope, modalities, conditions and limits of our 
ways of interpreting other human beings. According to an important  tradition – which includes 
Gadamer, Ricoeur and Davidson – this question is the most crucial of all philosophy. Indeed, many 
difficult questions can be asked with regard to it. The method we use for interpreting adult mentally 
unimpaired human beings, by attributing them both thoughts and meanings their utterances they 
produce, is in fact very peculiar and enigmatic. How does it work precisely? How good, really, is it? 
Moreover,  how  does  it  fit  in  our  general  epistemic  framework  –  dominated,  as  it  is,  by  the 
nomological quest of the natural sciences? 
Donald  Davidson  was  perhaps  the  philosopher  who  did  the  most  to  put  the  issue  of 
interpersonal  interpretation  in  the  centre  of  the  philosophical  stage.  In  doing  so,  he  strongly 
connected thought and action with rationality: “To the extent that we fail to discover a coherent and 
plausible pattern in the attitudes and actions of others we simply forgo the chance of treating them 
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as persons (quoted, from Davidson’s “Mental Events”, at p. 222)1. However, Davidson worked on 
this issue in a ‘hedgehogish’ way. He developed very original views (about, for instance, ‘radical 
interpretation’, the role played by the principle of charity and the irreducibility of our interpretive 
practices to the explanations of the natural sciences) that had, and still have, a vast influence on the 
debate.  However,  he  did  not  spend  much  time  and  energy  in  defining  precisely  the  issue,  in 
clarifying its controversial points and in making his arguments rigorous and sharp. Also, Wilfrid 
Sellars, John McDowell and Robert Brandom – the first two, at least, being philosophers also of a 
hedgehogish  orientation  –  offered  important  contributions  to  understanding  the  issue.  A  lot, 
however, still has to be done. 
In Understanding People, Millar argues that the kind of understanding implied when we aim at 
interpreting people is in principle different from, and irreducible to, scientific understanding. This is 
because, as is argued in Chapter 1, interpreting people requires that we see them as rational agents, 
that is, as entities whose actions are governed by normative reasons, so that, from our point of view, 
those agents tend to maintain an acceptable degree of coherence and cogency in their reasoning and 
acting. With Millar’s words, “in thinking of the agent as having come to think something or do 
something for a reason, we think of the agent as taking his or her reason to be one in the light of 
which it makes sense to think or do that thing” (p. 230). 
All this is very reasonable. However, there is, in connection with this, an important issue, which 
Millar does not discuss at length, which gave a lot of trouble to Davidson. Even if one grants that 
from the interpreter’s point of view an interpreted speaker is reasonably consistent and coherent, 
how can we be sure that what he or she thinks is in fact correct? Could the interpreter and the 
interpreted speaker both have gone astray? Could they both be substantially wrong about how the 
world  really  is?  This  is,  of  course,  a  version  of  the  classic  scenario.  In  order  to  answer  this 
challenge, Davidson first tried to appeal to the conceptual possibility of an omniscient interpreter 
who, in his opinion, should be largely in agreement with the non-omniscient interpreters, so proving 
that the latter cannot be largely wrong. This argument, however, sounded unbearably metaphysical 
to most critics, and later in his career Davidson tended not to repeat it. Instead, he proposed a view 
known as “triangular externalism”, with which he offered an answer to the sceptical challenge by 
referring  to  an  externalist  view of  thought.  This  solution,  however,  has  been  judged  by  many 
interpreters as partly circular, and therefore it is not really satisfactory.  The sceptical  challenge, 
therefore, still lurks in the background of any theory of interpersonal interpretation that is centred 
on notions such as coherence or consistency. This is because these are logical properties that  in  
themselves do not seem able to guarantee a reasonable amount of correctness to the conceptual 
systems of both the interpreter and the interpreted speaker. I suspect that Millar sympathizes with 
the externalist attempts to answer that challenge (or to dismiss it as philosophically irrelevant!): in 
this light, for example, one can perhaps read Millar’s remarks that in interpreting a speaker one has 
to consider his or her being or not being in touch with reality. This, however, does not solve the 
problem, since the question is how we, the interpreters, can be sure that the interpreted speaker is 
actually in touch with reality – even if this is what it seems like to us. I would like to know more 
from Alan on this issue. 
Millar’s  view of interpersonal  understanding,  however,  is actually a consequence of a more 
basic thesis that he defends in the first part of his book, according to which thought in general (and, 
therefore, also thought when we attribute it to other human beings) is governed by reason, as long 
as it is intrinsically bound by normative commitments. This also explains why understanding others 
is different from understanding things when one assumes a scientific perspective. In the latter case, 
one  aims  at  (nomologically)  explaining  how things  are;  in  the  former  case,  it  is  necessary  to 
consider how agents should think and act. 
In  Chapter  2,  Millar  argues  the  original  thesis  that  there  is  an  asymmetry  between  the 
1 All quotations are from Alan Millar,  Understanding People. Normativity and Rationalizing Explanation, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2004. 
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justification of belief and that of action. While in the latter case, normative reasons have only an 
instrumental value, in the former case, normative reasons tend to offer a positive contribution to the 
justification of the belief. 
In  Chapter  3,  Millar  discusses  why  normativity  is  essential  for  beliefs  and  intentions,  by 
describing  two  kinds  of  commitments  associated  with  them:  the  “implication  ideal”  (which 
“provides a reason to avoid believing  P while giving verdict to any implication of  P  other than 
belief”, p. 92) and the “means-end ideal” (which “provides a reason to avoid retaining an intention 
while never getting around to doing whatever is necessary if one is to do thing intended”, ibid.). In 
this  light,  beliefs  and  intentions  should  be  considered  to  be,  as  Millar  puts  it,  “psychological 
commitments” (p. 230). 
In Chapter 4, the dispositionalist view of beliefs and intentions is accurately criticized, exactly 
because this view cannot account for the essential  normative components of these propositional 
attitudes. 
In Chapter 5, Millar defends a “high conception of the space of reasons”, which is at odds with 
many of the views that are fashionable nowadays. This is the idea that  reflexivity (the capacity to 
think about our own “claims, beliefs, etc. and about the commitments and responsibilities that they 
incur”, p. viii) is central in thinking. Consequently, we can attribute a genuine capacity of thinking 
only to unimpaired adult human beings. “What about children, chimps and pets, then?” many would 
object. Here Millar’s analysis is very subtle (and clearer and deeper than those offered by other 
philosophers  who  have  defended  views  similar  to  his,  such  as  Davidson  and  Dummett).  This 
chapter should be recommended to anybody who wants to keep thinking that full-blooded language 
and thought are essentially connected – as the founders of the “Linguistic Turn” supposed. 
In  Chapter  6,  Millar  argues,  more  generally,  that  in  virtue  of  their  conceptual  content all 
propositional attitudes, not only beliefs and intentions, have an essential and irreducible normative 
dimension. This chapter begins with a detailed and stimulating discussion, from a normativist point 
of  view,  of  Kripke’s  critique  of  dispositionalism,  and  is  centred  on  the  idea  that  “meaning 
something” by using a linguistic term implies that,  generally,  a speaker participates in practices 
(conceived as  essentially rule-governed activities) that determine what the correct applications of 
that  term are. By paraphrasing Gibbard’s slogan “Means implies ought”, Millar  summarizes his 
view by saying that “Means implies (normatively)  committed” (p. 160). Interesting and original 
remarks about the kind of practices that are relevant for determining the correct applications of 
linguistic items are offered in the rest of the chapter. 
In  Chapter  7,  Millar  discusses  the  problem  of  the  explanatory  relevance  of  rationalizing 
explanations (this discussion is connected with that offered in Chapter 1, section 3). Millar argues 
for three theses, among which, prima facie, there seems to be tension: 
a) Rationalizations are a specific kind of causal explanation.
b) Rationalizations implicate generalizations.
c) The rationalizing component of these explanations is explanatory relevant, i.e., 
it  is essential  to such explanations that the agent acknowledge the normative 
relations that connect the explandum (say, a belief or an action) to the explanans 
(some relevant reasons for having that belief or performing that action).  
The challenge is that of explaining how c) is true once a) and b) are accepted (once, that is, we 
have a causally explanatorily relevant generalization that explains the formation of a belief or the 
performance of an action). Millar does an excellent job in proving that the rationalizing component 
adds a fundamental extra component to the merely causal component of the explanation. The kind 
of  generalization  implied  here  concerns  the  disposition  of  (rational)  agents  to  recognize  the 
normative reasons that rationalize his or her beliefs and actions. As Millar puts it in the case of a 
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formation of a belief, “the conclusion-belief [is] formed at least in part because the considerations 
constituting the contents of the basis-beliefs stand in a reason-giving relation to the conclusion” (p. 
198). 
This  intrinsically  normative  component  of  rationalizing  generalizations  is  what  makes  them 
different from scientific generalizations. As Millar puts it, as opposed to what happens in the case 
of  the  latter  kind  of  generalizations,  our  epistemic  access  to  rationalizations  is  essentially via 
normative considerations.
In Chapter 8, two theories of personal understanding are evaluated, the so-called ‘theory-theory’ 
(according to which commonsense  psychology works as a proto-scientific theory – a very good one 
for some philosophers and a very bad one for others) and ‘simulation theory’ (according to which, 
in order to understand people’s actions and thoughts, we have to simulate them). Millar argues that 
both  these  theories  are  much  less  satisfying  than  his  normative  approach,  according  to  which 
understanding  others  requires  the  interpreter  to  take  into  account  what  the  interpreted  agent  is 
rationally committed to doing. It is true that the upshot of considering what people are committed to 
doing may coincide with the results we would obtain in case we tried to simulate them (that is, in 
case  we tried  to  put  ourselves  in  their  shoes).  However,  as  Millar  notices,  “putting  rationality 
considerations  centre-stage in relation  to personal  understanding does not  commit  us to putting 
simulation  centre-stage” (p.225),  since “it  is  not similarity considerations  that  drive attempts  at 
understanding, but normative considerations” (p. 229). Millar also moves a strong and well argued 
attack  against  the scientism which generally is  implicit  in  the theory-theory.  As he notes,  “the 
theory-theory conceives  of  theories  as  natural  science  conceives  of  theories.  Crudely speaking, 
theories do their  work by representing there to be (non-normatively specifiable)  uniformities in 
nature,  and  explaining  and  predicting  in  terms  of  this”  (p.  223).  According  to  Millar,  on  the 
contrary, “normativity is written into the content of our ascriptions of propositional attitudes and 
actions  … and normative considerations have an indispensable epistemological  and explanatory 
role in personal understanding” (ibid.).
Chapter 9 is the most surprising of the whole book. Given Millar’s insistence on the relevance, 
peculiarity and irreducibility of rationalizations, one would expect to see him in the company of 
those who extol the allegedly vast explanatory and predictive power of rationalization. The most 
famous member of this party is probably Jerry Fodor, who wrote:
It’s  not  possible  to  say,  in  quantitative  terms,  just  how  successfully  commonsense 
psychology allows us to  coordinate  our  behaviours.  But  I  have the impression that  we 
manage pretty well with one another; often rather better than we cope with less complex 
machines (Fodor, from Psychosemantics, quoted by Millar at pp. 241-242). 
Millar thinks that Fodor is way too enthusiastic in this respect. He notices, for example, that 
there may be desires that are not motivated by reasons, but that still have explanations lying outside 
of  commonsense  psychology.  Millar  also  notices  that  the  hyper-enthusiastic  defenders  of  the 
allegedly  formidable  predictive  and  explanatory  powers  of  commonsense  psychology  tend  to 
underestimate the relevance that knowledge of the routines, practices and roles, which are inherent 
to institutions, has for understanding and predicting other people’s actions and thoughts. In general, 
in his opinion, there are not only some kinds of situations in which it is typical, and unsurprising, to 
be  unable  to  find  acceptable  rationalizations,  but  there  are  also  situations  in  which  no  good 
rationalizations are available at all where one could reasonably expect some to exist.  
However, consistent with the previous chapters of the book, Millar’s criticism of the Fodorian 
view  does  not  ally  him  with  Paul  Churchland’s  eliminativist  perspective  with  regard  to 
commonsense.  According  to  Churchland  (in  “Eliminativist  Materialism  and  the  Propositional 
Attitudes”,  quoted  by Millar  at  p.  231),  commonsense  psychology does  not  adequately explain 
many mental  phenomena,  including,  “the nature and dynamics  of mental  illness,  the faculty of 
mental illness, the faculty of creative imagination, .. the ground of intelligence differences between 
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individuals… [Moreover it totally ignores] the functions of sleep, the ability to catch a ball on the 
run, the variety of perceptual illusions, and the ‘miracle of memory’”. As is well known, from these 
premises Churchland draws a very dismissive conclusion about commonsense psychology, since in 
his view it is “a stagnant or degenerating research program” (ibid.). 
Millar disagrees with Churchland as much as he does with Fodor. First of all, as said in Chapter 
8,  he  refuses  Churchland’s  (and  Fodor’s,  as  to  this)  theory-theory  approach  to  commonsense 
psychology. Moreover, and more relevant in this context, he argues that Churchland overstates his 
case. Millar has to be praised for his anti-ideological way of arguing such a delicate issue. In fact, 
he defends three very sensible theses, one of a Churchlandian tone, one of a Fodorian tone, while 
the last is the one that Millar carefully argues for in this book. They respectively are: 
1. There  are  important  limitations  to  the  explanatory  and  predictive  powers  of 
commonsense propositional-attitude-based psychology. 
2. The framework of commonsense psychology has to be preserved.
3. The conceptual  framework of commonsense psychology essentially encompasses 
normativity. 
An interesting point that Millar discusses in arguing for the first thesis is that of an agent who 
makes a choice that is perfectly reasonable for him/her, but could have also made a different but 
still reasonable choice (this is not only true of trivial choices, but also of important ones, such as 
what university a student decides to go to). In general, Millar’s point seems to be that there is no 
reason to think that in such cases  there must be a (potential) intentional explanation of a choice 
based  on  offering  its  sufficient conditions.  If  so,  we  can  very  plausibly  infer  the  falsity  of 
psychological  determinism.  Millar  also  grants  that  these  kinds  of  choices  could  be  perhaps  be 
accounted for by explanations that would be “at the interface between physiology and thought” (p. 
240). This, however, does not mean that such explanations have to exist; and even less, that they 
could deterministically account for those choices.
With regard to this issue, a couple of questions I would like to ask Alan concern the kind of 
relations, both in the ontological and in the epistemological sense, he sees between the space of 
reasons  and  the  physical  world.  As  to  the  ontological  issue,  as  said,  he  refuses  to  consider 
eliminativism of the mental  as a real  option. Once this reasonable move is made,  however, the 
crucial point is to establish what kind of real autonomy, if any, the space of reasons has with regard 
to  the world of  the  nature,  which  is  nomologically  described  by physics  and the  other  natural 
sciences. Such autonomy is not obvious: if is too small, the space of reasons risks to be only given 
an instrumental  value  or to  be regarded a  pale  shadow of  the natural  world;  if  it  is  too wide, 
supernaturalism immediately lurks. As to the first case, for example, one can consider Davidson’s 
anomalous  monism,  which  (as  convincingly  showed  by  Jaegwon  Kim)  fails  in  its  attempt  at 
portraying the mental as really autonomous from the physical. The point is that Davidson tries to 
conjunct  the  (tendentially  anti-reductionist)  claim  that  the  mental  is  anomalous  with  the 
(tendentially very reductionist) principle of the causal closure of the physical world, and the result 
this attempt produces is a view in which the mental is nothing more than epiphenomenal, since no 
mental property is left any causal power. On the opposite side of the philosophical spectrum, there 
are philosophers, such as Jonathan Lowe, who get all the mental causal power one could desire by 
simply dismissing naturalism altogether. But this is a move that I assume Millar is not ready to 
make. What then? 
Notwithstanding Davidson’s failure, one could still try to work on a view in which the mental 
supervenes  on  the  physical.  In  that  case,  however,  the  question  is  whether  and  how 
epiphenomenalism can really be avoided. An alternative is to conceive the relation of the mental 
with  the  physical  as  one  of  ‘constitution’  (as  proposed  by  Lynne  Rudder  Baker)  or  one  of 
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emergence. But of course these options have their own difficulties: most scientific naturalists, for 
example,  insist  that  these  views  have  the  unacceptable  cost  of  contradicting  the  conservation 
principles of physics. Indeed, there are several reasons (and some are, in my view at least, pretty 
convincing) to suspect that the ontologically pervasive interpretation of these principles offered by 
most scientific naturalists,  and especially by physicalists,  is not compelling.  However, I wonder 
what Alan thinks of this crucial issue. 
From an epistemological point of view, one could wonder what, in Millar’s perspective,  the 
relation  between the  intentionalist  explanation  of  an  action  and the  (very often  only potential) 
naturalistic account of the related bodily movements (Benjamin Libet’s famous, and controversial, 
experiments are a typical case-study here) is.  Playing the devil’s advocate,  one could ask what 
would happen if one day, physicists, geneticists, neurophysiologists and evolutionary psychologists, 
by joining their scattered efforts, were able to realize the dreams of all reductionist philosophers, by 
obtaining a complete, and perfectly predictive, theory of our physical movements. What would we 
think, at that point, of our commonsense-based intentionalist account of actions? Would we still 
recognize any epistemic autonomy in them? Possibly this scenario is not really intelligible (and 
surely is absolutely implausible  from an empirical  point of view). However,  it  perhaps raises a 
problem that anti-reductionists cannot simply avoid. 
Summarizing,  in  this  important  work  Alan  Millar  explores  the  issue  of  interpersonal 
understanding.  In  doing  so,  he  shows  a  remarkable  competence  in  at  least  four  different 
philosophical areas – practical philosophy, epistemology, philosophy of mind and philosophy of 
language – which nowadays are, on the contrary, more and more often kept surgically, if unwisely, 
separate. This unusual quality is another reason to recommend this book.  
Rationality, Animals and Causality
SIMONE GOZZANO
(University of L’Aquila)
Human beings are quite talented in understanding, predicting and explaining the behaviour of their 
fellows. Such talent reveals itself not only in familiar situations, but also in novel scenarios. How 
can we make sense of this ability, granting that this is the best way to conceive of it? What are its 
basic features, and how are these connected to one another? Is it a natural endowment or is it rather 
a cultural by-product? To put the same point in a more dramatic form: is this ability exclusively 
human,  or  are  other  species  so  endowed?  These  are  the  fundamental  questions  that  everyone 
interested in the analysis of so-called folk or common sense psychology should consider, the same 
questions that form the core of Alan Millar’s book Understanding People.
The  answer  that  Millar  provides  is  as  clear  as  the  questions  themselves:  the  fundamental 
elements of our psychological life are beliefs and intentions, and these should be conceived of in 
normative terms, that is, as imposing on people commitments of various sorts. Beliefs, at the heart 
of our epistemic life, entail our undertaking epistemic commitments to other beliefs and, I would 
add,  desires;  intentions,  which are fundamental  for action,  impose on us the planning of future 
courses of action in order to realize the intentions themselves. There is no point in having a belief if 
no knowledge is derived from it, if some knowledge deriving from it is needed; and there is no 
value in having an intention if  one never tries,  either  through abstract  planning or by practical 
attempts, to realize it.
Millar’s first problem is to cope with the so-called “rationality assumption”. On what basis does 
the game of ascribing beliefs and intentions to others rest? According to many authors, from Quine 
to Grandy but notably Davidson and Dennett, the ascription of propositional attitudes is based on 
the  assumption  that  the  “system”  (to  use  a  neutral  term  made  famous  by  Dennett)  to  which 
intentionality is attributed is, by and large, rational. Very nice indeed, but how should we interpret 
this predicate? One of the important features of Millar’s book is a detailed interpretative reading of 
this concept vis a vis the work it plays in helping us to understand people.
1. The rationality assumption
Before  getting  into  the  rationality  debate  it  is  useful  to  consider  how intentional  states  are 
construed in Millar’s book. These states are taken, in accordance with Russell’s classical analysis 
(1918),  as comprising  a proposition  within a psychological  attitude,  thus forming propositional 
attitudes.  The  individuating  conditions  of  the  two items  are  different.  The  attitudes  reveal  the 
psychological category of the systems’ thoughts, whether beliefs, desires, intentions or what not. 
Such attitudes are, at least partially by Millar, individuated by considering the causal role they play 
in  the  overall  psychological  life  of  the  system.  So  a  belief,  in  general  is  the  result  of  some 
perceptual  state or the ending state of an inference and generates further beliefs  or desires. An 
intention or a desire, vice versa, can be brought about by a belief and generally leads to action. 
Searle (1983) spoke of “direction to fit” to illustrate that beliefs are fixed by the way the world is, 
while desires are tantamount to having the world “fixed” by the way the desires are. What is to be 
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fixed  or  to  fix,  however,  is  given  by  the  content  of  the  propositional  attitude,  that  is,  by  the 
proposition.
Here we come to the way propositional contents are individuated,  and such individuation is 
where the rationality assumption gains traction. For the content of any given intentional state is the 
result  of  its  “logical”  relation  to  other  contents.  Here  Millar  is  drawing  on  Davidson:  “These 
relations between the attitudes are essentially logical: the content of an attitude cannot be divorced 
from what it entails and what is entailed by it” (Davidson 1995, p. 232). And again, “… a belief is 
identified by its location in a pattern of beliefs; it is this pattern that determines the subject matter of 
the belief,  what the belief is about” (Davidson 1975, p. 168). However, the entailment relations 
among propositional attitudes are not independent from the intentional system (to use a Dennettian 
expression again): if the system believes that p, and p → q, then the system will believe that q only 
if  it  has  to  take  any verdict  toward q  (pp.  73-4).  This  is  a  shareable  way of  avoiding  logical 
omniscience.  Millar  is  quite  cautious  not  to  use too  high a  conception  of  rationality.  Consider 
Dennett: “one gets nowhere with the assumption that entity x has beliefs p, q, r, ...unless one also 
supposes that  x believes what follows from p, q, r,...; otherwise there is no way of ruling out the 
prediction that x will, in the face of its beliefs that p, q, r, ...do something utterly stupid” (Dennett 
1971, p. 229). This is fine, but how far should we go? Dennett has this problem in mind when he 
says: 
A system’s beliefs are those it ought to have, given its perceptual capacities, its epistemic 
needs,  and  its  biography.  (...)  A system’s  desires  are  those  it  ought  to  have,  given  its 
biological  needs  and  the  most  practicable  means  of  satisfying  them.  (...)  A  system’s 
behaviour will consist of those acts it would be rational for an agent with those beliefs and 
desires  to  perform.  (...)  (Here)  ‘ought  to  have’  means  ‘would  have  if  it  were  ideally 
ensconced in its environmental niche’ (Dennett 1987, p. 49).
Now, I think that Dennett’s contribution to setting the agenda which Millar pursues in his work 
is  as  important  as  Davidson’s,  even  if  Millar  is  not  taking  Dennett  as  a  primary  source  of 
inspiration.1 Such an agenda can be depicted as having the following items set for future discussion: 
first,  ascribing propositional  attitudes  entails  getting into a holistic net of interdependent  states. 
Second, these states enforce the, so to say, ascribed systems in assuming some commitments just by 
virtue  of  having  them.  Third,  the  relation  between  the  states  and  the  system  determines  the 
rationality of the system itself. Dennett’s view is that the three items in the agenda can be linked by 
taking the systems to be ideally ensconced in their environment: in such a case any system would 
act in accordance with its best beliefs and intentions given its knowledge and its needs. Davidson’s 
own way to construe the rationality assumption has a more transcendental flavour: ascription entails 
the mastering of the concepts involved in the contents  of the states ascribed.  The standards by 
which  one  has  to  conduct  him  or  herself  are  established  by  various  principles  such  as  the 
requirement of total evidence of inductive reasoning and the like. So, these are the limits of the 
rationality assumption.
The fact is, however, that none is ideally ensconced in its niche, whether this is construed in 
purely naturalistic terms or not; nor does anyone strictly follow the principle of total evidence or 
any other strategy like means-end analysis. Everyone is, at most, sub-ideally ensconced, and the 
degrees and ways in which one is fall short of this ideal may, and in fact do, vary from individual to 
individual and, in the same individual, from time to time. So, we are back to the original problem: 
how should we characterize the rationality assumption?
Millar’s  way consists  in  weakening  the  assumption  without  abandoning it:  “The rationality 
assumption is short-hand for a number of more specific considerations having to do with coherence, 
1  Possibly, because Dennett adopts the rationality assumption and takes a naturalistic stance, one which Millar wants 
to  avoid.  This,  in  passing,  shows that  taking such  an  assumption  is  not  enough  to  take  issue  with respect  to 
naturalism.
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cogency, and being in touch with reality” (p. 25) So, his way to cash out the rationality assumption 
is a  divide et impera: splitting it into a number of different and, hopefully, more tractable issues. 
The unifying theme is that the rationality assumption is the way in which normative considerations 
get into the picture. This is why I considered Dennett’s words as particularly telling (as in this case 
Millar does as well): they show that to be rational is to be (en)forced to act according to one’s own 
internal states. Millar acknowledges that it is tempting to treat this normative link between internal 
states and other states or external behaviour as having to do with logic, with appropriate judgements 
or with regular patterns of behaviour, possibly based on the awareness of the psychological states 
motivating it.2 But he refuses to adopt such guidelines: “I take normative reasons to be constituted 
by considerations, and I take normative reasons to apply only to creatures with the capacity to treat 
considerations  as  reasons”.  (p.  32)  So,  in Millar’s  view  our  psychological  life  is  basically  a 
commitment-making life based on the ability to conceive our psychological states (beliefs, desires, 
intentions) as considerations in favour of or against other psychological states or some course of 
action. (p. 120)
Let us consider beliefs in more detail. These are properly taken by Millar as aiming at truth. So, 
having the belief that p means taking commitments for the reasons that support the belief that p, the 
reasons  that  enforce  us  to  take  p as  representing  a  truth.3 These  reasons,  either  perceptual  or 
epistemic states, may operate at different levels. In one case we may have the sensitivity of our iris 
to light, which determines its shrinking when light increases. This is a sub-intentional capacity of 
the system in that the need to maintain a constant amount of light on the retina strongly governs the 
behaviour of the iris (cf. p. 53). The iris cannot do otherwise unless it is malfunctioning, and saying 
that the iris “believes” that this amount of light asks for this degree of contraction is a mere façon 
de parler. In another case, we have systems, such as ourselves, that can consider the aiming at truth 
of some of their internal states from a first-person perspective, ranking them with respect to their 
goal and interests: “… the agents in question are guided by what strikes them as being necessary to 
achieve the goal.” (p. 54) Our epistemic life works more or less in the same way: given any belief p 
I have, I incur commitment  in accepting (and so believing)  whatever  p entails  and whatever is 
entailed by p, given what else I do believe, if I have to give any verdict on the entailed propositions 
(cf.  p.  73  et  passim).  This  gets  to  an ideal  of  reason that  Millar  considers  without  embracing 
uncritically. This principle says: “For any π, Φ , if  Φ is implied by π, then avoid believing that π 
while giving a verdict on Φ other than belief” (p. 76). As he says, the idea of taking a verdict is his 
way of discharging many problems concerning crazy beliefs and the like (Précis, p. 15).
One of the crucial  elements  of the principle  is  the universal  quantifier  “for any”:  I  think it 
creates some problems for the way in which the principle  should be  interpreted.  Our epistemic 
conduct, the way we proceed from one thought to another, may follow very different strategies. We 
can reason deductively, inductively, abductively, we may perform non-monotonic reasoning, frame 
reasoning,  prototypical  inferences  and  so  forth.  All  these  methods  have  their  own  value  and 
justification. It seems quite difficult, given a set of beliefs, to say in advance what is entailed by this 
set and what this set entails without specifying what kind of epistemic conduct we are to follow and 
what is the aim of our reasoning. Saying that having a belief  entails having many of them, the 
holistic assumption, says nothing about the “logical role” that is in play among these beliefs. Given 
a set of beliefs, I can infer p or not p depending on my reasoning strategy and my interests: I can 
keep holding that  all birds can fly after discovering that penguins cannot and taking them as an 
exception (so concluding that all birds, excluding penguins, can fly) or abandon the general belief 
and revise it accordingly, so concluding that most birds can fly. In this latter case, though, I won’t 
be impressed by the discovery that newborn birds cannot fly,  and I will not modify the revised 
2  Authors that inspire such perspectives are Churchland, Kahnemann and Tversky, Dennett.
3  I say “representing a truth” and not “as being a truth” because, even if propositions are abstract entities, we grasp  
them in a sentential form. That is to say, I think we have sentential attitudes, more than propositional, in that every 
thought we have has a mode of presentation that, as such, represents a truth, one and the same that can be grasped 
through a different mode of presentation. 
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belief. The reason I do not revise the belief again (so not getting to the belief that most adult birds  
can  fly)  depends  on  the  prototypical  assumption  according  to  which  capacities  are  shown  in 
adulthood. Now, the way in which we cope with exceptions is at the heart of non-monotonic logic, 
and our considerations of whether to use non-monotonic reasoning or not may vary from context to 
context. Affirming that having a belief  p entails believing, if a verdict should be taken, what is 
implied  by  p when it  is  not specified  what  the accepted  logical  relations  are,  is  tantamount  to 
affirming the holistic thesis that beliefs are placed in a net of other epistemic states, and cannot 
survive in isolation. But how can we say something specific about what is acceptable to infer? What 
I am suggesting is that there is not a further fact of the matter that determines acceptability. Piling 
up other beliefs by the subject would not create this further fact; it would simply blur the epistemic 
situation.
Millar presents an additional constraint: the entailment relation holds if it holds without further  
ado, that is, without the help of additional assumptions (p. 93). Such a restriction, however, does 
not avoid other potential difficulties: a logical intuitionist rejects the entailment having the form 
not(not p) →  p, while a logical classicist  accepts such an entailment.  Such an entailment holds 
without taking stock of other considerations and assumptions,  so the problem surfaces again. Is 
Millar saying that it does not matter which method you follow as long as, once you have taken one, 
you follow it thoroughly? That is to say,  is Millar ready to confine the validity of his thesis to 
contexts and domains? This option, however, does not make Millar’s point, for in such a case how 
can we be sure that an individual who appears irrational to our eyes is in fact consistently following 
a method that we cannot even understand because, say, it requires very difficult logical structures 
that are beyond our cognitive capacities? The “projectivist” (cf. Fodor and Lepore 1990) strategy 
inaugurated by Davidson and elaborated by Millar is fine as long as normative considerations are 
limited.
These problems have an echo in the thesis by Arthur Prior (1961) according to which the idea of 
having the meaning of a word determined by its inferential rules raises difficulties because one may 
introduce a new logical constant, such as TONK, in a language L, by adopting very explicit rules that, 
as  a  matter  of  fact,  allow  the  generation  of  paradoxes.  Nuel  Belnap  (1962)  has  argued  that 
introducing a constant by fixing the inferential  rules for it  is not enough: these rules must be a 
conservative extension of the rules governing L, where conservative extension requires that the new 
elements neither modify the logical consistency nor the expressibility of L itself. At the heart of the 
Prior-Belnap  discussion  there  was  the  conviction,  by  the  latter,  that  paradoxical  languages  are 
devoid of meaning and hence must be avoided. However, Cesare Cozzo has forcefully argued that 
“it is a fact that we are capable of constructing and of using languages that are paradoxical.  … 
important examples like set theory and the calculus show that in the course of the history of science 
paradoxical  languages  were  fruitfully  and  lastingly  used  even  if  their  paradoxicality  was  well  
known. Moreover we mostly have no guarantee that the languages we now use are not paradoxical.” 
(Cozzo, 1994, p. 144-45) On the same score, we have no warranty that folk psychological talk  is 
paradox free, and we keep using it or base on it normative requirements, as Millar does.
The same point can be somewhat applied to action, where the ideal of reason goes as follows: 
“For any Φ, avoid intending to Φ while never getting around to doing what is necessary if you are 
to Φ” 4 (p. 76). In such a case, you cannot tell what the agent is going to do given her intention to Φ: 
there are many ways of buying a present or preparing to travel, if this is what you intend to do. 
None of them is necessary for having the present bought or the trip arranged; rather they are all 
sufficient. So, if the ideal amounts to saying that if you want to φ then do whatever you think can 
bring about  Φ, then it is equivalent to  giving the  grammar of realizing an action, but it  cannot 
provide any substantial help for giving a normativity condition for an intention, i.e. for delivering 
any correctness condition for meeting the intention to Φ. In fact, if what you intend to do is to buy a 
present and what is necessary to do to buy a present is preparing yourself to go shopping and the 
4  Belief and intention are not perfectly parallel, an interesting difference that Millar notes.
34  Rationality, Animals and Causality 
like, then this is a truism more than an ideal of reason. However, Millar thinks that the only other 
option is dispositionalism, which he deems insufficient to capture the significance of having an 
intention to Φ (more on this later).
These critical considerations on the rationality assumption are quite wide-ranging and can be 
summed up as follows: imposing normativity as a constraint that holds on the entailment relations 
among intentional states, or intentional states and action, means that there are logical, or practical, 
liaisons that are correct and liaisons that are not. However, the logical relations among intentional 
states can be enforced by very different methods, each of which could give rise to very different 
results. These differences may surface not only in case of very complex concepts or words, but also 
in basilar inferences, having to do with fundamental logical  principles, or in the case of logical 
constants.  If  the  situation  is  as  portrayed,  how can  we gain  any normative  force  by the  mere 
acknowledgement that a system or a subject has followed, in a given context or situation, this or 
that method in her/is reasoning, if in other contexts s/he can legitimately use a different one? If we 
cannot give any judgement of correctness on the individual having followed this or that method, the 
normativity  requirement  seems  idle.  I  am  not  saying  that  we  should  discard  the  rationality 
assumption, but it seems to me that the allegation of insufficiency addressed to other accounts can 
be made to Millar’s view as well.
Millar has a (partial?) way out from the previous considerations when he focuses on normativity 
as a primary feature of statements. In so doing he distinguishes between statements that have just a 
normative import and those that are fully normative, the object of his chapter IV. Before getting 
into this I would like to point out that Millar says that “Normativity … is primarily a feature of, for 
instance, judgements, beliefs, statements, claims - the sort of thing that can be true or false” (p. 92). 
Including beliefs in the list is somewhat ambiguous or potentially circular: statements and claims 
are clearly linguistic entities and their normativity would be a semantic feature of language. It is an 
open question whether the semantic value of beliefs (with respect to judgements I leave the issue 
open) is due to their intrinsic participation in the linguistic domain or is rather a basilar feature 
independent of language. This point has very important consequences for the issue of non-speaking 
creatures,  a  point  I  will  explore  later.  So,  I  will  treat  “semantic  entities”,  such  as  beliefs  and 
statements, as those to which the different degrees of normativity apply.
Back to normativity. Millar thinks that there are beliefs/statements with a normative import and 
fully  normative  ones.  He  seems  to  accept  that  there  are  also  beliefs/statements  that  are  not 
normative, as is the case with the belief that Washington, D.C., is the capital of the United States (p. 
93-4). So, we have three kinds of beliefs: the purely descriptive, those with a normative import and 
the  purely  normative,  that  is,  those  that  somewhat  explicitly  mention  reasons  for  the  agent  to 
believe or intend that p. Here are three examples on the belief side:5
1) John believes that is past nine o’clock
2) John believes that he is arriving at the party later than nine o’clock
3) John has reason to believe that he is late for the nine o’clock party.
 The normativity - absent in 1, indirectly present in 2, explicit in 3 – is a reason-linked feature of 
these statements. However, also 1 can be considered as bringing into play reasons: John is ready to 
give us his reasons in support of his belief, as Millar seems to recognize. Moreover, I have set the 
examples to show that 3 can be based on 2 which, in turn, entails 1. So, what is the difference, 
exactly? This lies in that in moving from 1 to 3 the role that reasons play in the fixation of the belief 
are more and more important. Consider a belief (statement) like this:
5  Most of Millar’s examples on this point are on the intention and action side, more than on belief and knowledge. I 
think this is not by chance: his thesis seems more compelling when referred to actions and their ethic values.
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0) John believes that this [pointing] is red
Such a “zero level” belief (statement)  has a very reduced degree of support in other beliefs 
(statements). However, a Davidsonian like Millar would say that the concept of red is not for free: 
you can have it only if you have some idea of being coloured, even if you do not need much else. 
Quite different  is the case with  being nine o’clock,  a  very abstract  relation.  When we consider 
something like 2, we are implicitly relying on other beliefs that John must have: that there is a party 
time, that arriving late is a disvalue etc. In case of 3, the focus is directly on the reason, more than 
on the propositional content that he is late for the nine o’clock party, so the impact this reason has 
on the belief ascription is stronger, but eventually Millar’s strategy is that of having two kinds of 
intentional states. Let me clarify.
Millar thinks that the principle or ideal of reason mentioned (“For any π, Φ, if Φ is implied by π, 
then avoid believing that π while giving a verdict on Φ other than belief”) is acceptable only if one 
takes beliefs and intentions as normative in the sense of being reason-linked (p. 118). In turn, one 
can have such beliefs and intentions only if one can directly or explicitly master the reasons for the 
beliefs and intentions ascribed. Here is Millar:
It is in the nature of the psychological commitment in which believing that p consists that 
the way it impacts on my thought and action is shaped by the implication commitment that 
it incurs –the normative commitment to believing any implication of p  on which I give a 
verdict.  The  normative  commitment  can  have  this  shaping  role  only  if  subject  has  the 
appropriate  reflective  capacities  –including  a  capacity  to  reflect  on  the  implications  of 
things believed. … My point is that, since beliefs in the realm of personal understanding … 
implicate reflective capacities through the exercise of which the impact of those beliefs is 
shaped, we should acknowledge a distinction in psychological kind between those beliefs 
and any belief-like states the impact of which is not so shaped. (p. 123) 
I have mentioned Millar at length because in raising another important topic (do non-human 
animals  have  beliefs?)  he  is  making  evident  a  common  strategy  among  philosophers  such  as 
Davidson, McDowell,  and Brandom,  among others.  According to them,  there are two kinds of 
epistemic  states:  the  “real”  propositional  attitudes  of  language  speakers  and  the  somewhat 
diminished states of dumb creatures. In the background the issue is: how much can the notion of a 
belief  receive  a  naturalistic  reading?  This  is  quite  a  debated  topic  in  the  present  literature  in 
epistemology and in the philosophy of mind. So, let consider such a question.
2. Non-human animals and reflective thoughts
The issue of animal intentionality is taken up by Millar in order to show the difference between 
belief  in  which  there  is  no  normative  import  and  one  that  is  essentially  individuated  by  its 
normative commitments. A few paragraphs ago I noted that Millar considers statements and beliefs 
on a par as to their normativity. If this approach can be somewhat accepted for human beings, it is 
risky to form a petitio principii in case of animal thinking, because it is exactly the linguistic status 
of belief (and intentions) that is at stake. So, where does the difference between human and animal 
beliefs lie? Millar thinks that animals can be credited with some sort of sub-doxastic states that 
guide their behavior in a way directly linked to environmental stimuli, a kind of state that we may 
have  as  well  (see  Stich  1978;  Bermúdez  2003).  However,  belief-intention  psychology  can  be 
credited only to us, because it is solely humans who have the appropriate reflective capacities, those 
that allow us to engage in deliberative thinking about our own beliefs and intentions.  So, there 
seems to be some sort of irreducible gap between sub-doxastic states, those information-bearing 
states that manage our motor behavior in driving the car on a busy road or helping us to catch a 
thrown ball, and beliefs and intentions, those states whose content is  consciously elaborated in a 
linguistic  way (p.135; 150). However,  consider what has happened to anyone when learning to 
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drive the car. We were conscious of our intentions, in a way that seems to meet the conditions set 
by Millar  for the high-view of intentions.  For instance,  we were not only conscious that it  was 
necessary to be smooth in relaxing the gas pedal, but we were conscious of the reasons for acting 
that way: a smooth acceleration would have resulted in a well conducted car, in not losing control 
of it, in not having the engine choking or eventually stalling. It may turn out that in those moments 
we controlled the car quite well. It may turn out that our behavior in that occasion was perfectly 
comparable with the one we presently have. 
However, despite the behavioral similarity in our control of the car, now that we are skilled 
drivers, we do not engage in deliberative thinking about car-conduct any more. While driving we 
may engage in deep philosophical discussions (well, up to a certain extent, I must say…). What has 
changed? It seems that some intentional states are passed from a fully epistemic dimension to a sub-
doxastic  one or,  to  put  it  in  Millar’s  terms,  that  there  has  been a  passage  from the  normative 
dimension  to  the  non-normative  dimension,  where  non-normativity,  or  sub-doxasticity,  is  here 
individuated  by  the  epistemic  isolation  of  the  relevant  states.  So,  the  two  dimensions  are  not 
completely apart, at least not in us. Notice, moreover, that the intentional flow, so to say, may go in 
the other direction as well:  when the situation asks for my full  reflective capacities,  I  stop my 
philosophical discussion and engage myself in thinking what should I do in driving, so letting my 
sub-doxastic states resurface in the conscious dimension.6 A further thing to be noted: a system with 
sub-doxastic states could be, in some sense, perfectly rational: it could employ some means-end 
strategy and some implication strategy even if it  is completely unaware or unconscious of such 
strategies.
This  example  shows,  I  think,  that  the  view  according  to  which  reflective  thoughts  are 
independent from, or at most based on, sub-doxastic states is not necessarily true: we can have sub-
doxastic  states  developed from,  and based on,  reflective  thoughts.  Another  impact  this  kind of 
examples may have for Millar’s view can be found in his discussion of the simulation theory, in 
Chapter 7. Here, in tackling a line of reasoning by Stephen Stich, Millar notes that there can be two 
perfectly functionally specifiable systems sub-serving full propositional attitudes and sub-doxastic 
states respectively (p. 228). These two systems, one is invited to think, are entirely isolated from 
each other, so it seems that there is no way to transfer some epistemic or sub-epistemic content 
from one to the other. Again, such a view does not match with the example given.
Can we support the idea that, as to intentional states generically considered, there can be more 
than two kinds? I think we can.  The view licensed by Davidson and Millar  himself  seems the 
following: animals’  behaviour is directly driven by states that  are not mediated by any kind of 
representation. In this sense the states are sub-doxastic: epistemically isolated and directly linked to 
the perceptual stimuli. Our behaviour, on the contrary, is always based on reflective capacities, also 
in  case of  epistemic  states  of  perceptual  nature:  if  John believes  that  this [pointing]  is  red,  he 
believes so in a fully conceptual way, rather than in non-conceptual terms as animals may do.7 The 
epistemic divide between humans and non-humans cannot be any larger. Now, I do not want to 
deny that we mainly have fully conceptual and reflective thoughts; rather I want to point out that 
there  are  other epistemic  states beyond the non-doxastic  ones as these have been construed by 
Millar.
A very simple non-doxastic state is one that drives the behaviour of the system endowed with it 
in a quite rigid way. My iris “knows” the amount of light in the surroundings, but I cannot derive 
any knowledge from the knowledge of this (sub)system of mine (which makes this a sub-doxastic 
knowledge) and I cannot actively do anything in order to correct it. If the system gives me incorrect 
information, this can be due solely to a malfunction, and this malfunction can be repaired just by 
6  During the Sixties many chess programs in the artificial intelligence area have been developed by asking chess 
masters to made explicit their unconscious heuristics. See Simon (1982) for references to early studies and recent 
applications to economy.
7  In support of the non-conceptual, see Peacocke (1992) and Crane (1992); against it see Brewer (1999).
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modifying the circuitry, either chemically or physically, of the system itself.
Consider now the case in which I see, as in the case made famous by Malcolm and Davidson, a 
cat that runs toward an oak tree but, at the last moment, swerves and disappears up a nearby maple. 
I believe the cat is on that [pointing] tree, and my dog can do the same. We are both wrong, though. 
Should we invoke a cognitive difference between me and my dog Fido in order to account for our 
mistake? True, I can believe of the tree that  it is the oldest tree in the town, a kind of belief not 
available to Fido, but this would miss the point. The point rather is that our perceptual systems, 
mine  and Fido’s,  are  perfectly  functioning  and if  a  mistake  occurred  it  cannot  be  repaired  by 
modifying the perceptual apparatus circuitry; what I and Fido need is more information, and such 
information need not necessarily be fully conceptual. Spotting the cat on the maple would suffice, 
both for me and for Fido. I have called these states with content of type 2, distinguishing them from 
the non-doxastic  states  previously mentioned (content  of  type  1)  and the fully conceptual  (and 
semantically opaque) states (content of type 3)  (see Gozzano in press).
So far I  have been considering,  with a critical  look,  the way in which animals’  beliefs  are 
conceived, and the contrast between sub-doxastic and reflective thoughts, on which the normative 
constraint can be applied. A further question, though, can be the following: is the way in which 
reflective thoughts are conceived fully defensible?
According to Millar (p. 138), to have the belief that p (Bp) entails (in general) knowing that one 
has such a belief (KBp). That means that Bp entails KBp. Similarly, for intending that p, in which 
case Ip → KIp. At the same time Millar has to endorse that Kp→Bp, a quite accepted thesis.8
This shows that, for Millar, since  Kp→Bp  and  Bp→KBp  (Millar’s thesis) then  Kp→KBp  (by 
transitivity). I think that this result is somewhat unrealistic. It entails that, for every proposition we 
know, we should have reflective knowledge on our believing it, and this overloads our cognitive 
capacities by doubling every knowledge we have, explicit or implicit, with a second order belief, 
either implicit or explicit. Secondly, if there is no constraint on the logical form of what is known, it 
is possible to generate a regress of this form: if KBp is a knowledge as is Kp, then it entails (by the 
accepted thesis) the belief BKBp that, in virtue of the same reasoning, gets to KBKBp, and so forth. 
This surely is an unpalatable consequence. So, at least a closing clause is needed.
Let  now consider the “ideals  of reasons”.  Millar  thinks that  if  one has to take verdict  on a 
proposition q (Vq) then, if s/he believes that p (Bp) and knows that there is an entailment relation 
between p and q (Kp₪q) then s/he ought to believe q (OBq). 
So, let’s suppose that I have to take verdict on q and that the above described thesis holds. This 
can be formalized as follows:
Vq → (Bp&Kp₪q→OBq)    Vq
By modus ponens we get to
          Bp&Kp₪q→OBq     
Let us now suppose that as a matter of fact we 
Bp&Kp₪q
By modus ponens again we get to
                    OBq   
Now, let’s introduce the implication discharging the first premise Vq
Vq → OBq  
8  This is so because if Bp→KBp, if I believe that p and I know that p→q then, if I have to give verdict on q, I can 
believe that q (Bq) only if K(p→q) entails that I B(p→q), which is to say that, in general Kx→Bx for any x.
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Finally, let’s introduce the implication by discharging the second added premise
(Bp&Kp₪q) → (Vq → OBq)
So, if one believes that p and knows that p is somewhat entailed by q then, if one has to take a 
verdict on q one ought to believe it. Modularity here determines a problem. For, suppose that the 
issue you have to take a verdict on is the content of Müller-Lyer (M-L) illusion, or any other kind of 
persistent illusion. The persistency of some illusions is due, so the story goes, to the informational 
encapsulement of the modules that treat them. So, independently from our knowing that the two 
segments of the M-L illusion have the same length, they appear to us as different.  These cases 
show, in general, that our inferences may mix beliefs, as mental states with conceptual content, with 
beliefs  as  mental  states  with  non-conceptual  content,  one  along  with  the  other  in  a  hybrid 
succession  of  thoughts  and proto-thoughts.  So,  a  prima facie reading  would  be  that  of  taking 
proposition p as “the segments have different length” and proposition q as “the segments have same 
length”. It is difficult, though, to understand how there can be an entailment relation between p and 
q other than contradiction; it would be unreasonable, then, to suppose that by believing that p one 
should be led to believe that q. 
Another option is to take p as “the segments seem to be of different length”. In such a case, even 
if it seems to be logically odd to insert the appearance within the propositional content of the belief, 
it would be possible to have an entailment from p to q. So, if I were to believe that p and knowing 
that p₪q, I ought to believe that q were I to take verdict on it. Here the crucial step is the kind of 
epistemic state p belongs to. In fact, the p content, inasmuch as it is informationally encapsulated, 
could be appropriately considered as a sub-doxastic state of the same kind non-speaking animals are 
endowed with; at the same time, content q is a fully conceptual propositional content, as those that 
are proper of human beings alone. Now, if the entailment relations among propositional contents 
were supposed to isolate only those contents on which the normative discourse is in force, then 
there should be no entailment between p and q because p is not in the normative domain. On the 
other  hand,  if  one  wants  to  bite  the  bullet  and  to  consider  p as  fully  conceptual  and  hence 
normative, since there is no way to modify it permanently, we have to give up, or at least weaken, 
the  idea  that  all  propositional  attitudes  are  connected  in  a  net  of  logical  relations  and  thus 
individuated. 
The general problem that this argument brings to the stage is the extent to which Millar adheres 
to a coherentist view of belief and intentional states. Davidson and McDowell have both endorsed 
the view according to which our beliefs are justified and supported solely by other beliefs. So, every 
belief we have is the result of an inference. The status of perceptually fixed belief, though, is vexed. 
So, it seems that either adherence to coherentism is complete, and then it must be explained why 
some belief cannot be modified as is the case with illusions, or it is limited. In both cases, however, 
the idea of individuating intentional states through their logical relations seems in jeopardy.
A somewhat related theme is the attack on dispositionalism, a sort of important detour. Millar 
thinks that the only other game in town is the view that the ideals of reason, both the one that 
concerns belief and the other on intentions, can be construed in terms of complex dispositions. So, 
to set a trip to the sea is to be ready to take a bathing suit and a towel and set off for the shore (see 
Ryle, 1949). Dispositionalism, though, is not a viable option because it can license a contemplative 
view of our mental life, analogous to the attitude we can have toward our character traits. The basic 
intuition  behind  dispositionalism is  that  beliefs  and  intentions  are  dispositional  properties,  like 
fragility. A dispositional property is causally set off by specific triggering conditions; once these 
conditions  are  in  play,  the  property  gets  activated  unless  other  properties  prevent  it  from 
manifesting.  If  a  system  has  a  dispositional  property  D and  the  system  is  in  the  appropriate 
conditions  then the property shows its  causal  effects.  Secondly,  dispositional  properties  can be 
considered as supervening on categorical  properties (the fragility of the glass supervenes on its 
molecular structure) (cf. Armstrong 1968 and Mumford 1998 for clarifying such a view). In such a 
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case, dispositionalism would accept the contemplative interpretation of the dispositions in the sense 
that dispositions as such would not have causal powers over and above those of their categorical 
bases,  as  is  the  case  with  sub-doxastic  states.  However,  some  systems  can  avoid  the  purely 
contemplative stance toward the property by setting themselves into a condition that would prevent 
a  given property from setting off.  I  long for  a  cigarette,  so I  go to  a  place where smoking is 
forbidden, forcing myself to respect my promise not to smoke. It seems that one cannot make sense 
of such a possibility without endorsing in some way Millar’s view that we have capacities that 
transcend the purely dispositionalist  view.  However,  it  seems to  me that  taking dispositions  as 
supervening  on  categorical  bases  does  not  entail  having  a  contemplative  view  toward  them. 
Dispositionalism, as specified, can be taken as a thesis concerning beliefs formation: I see a red car 
and I come to believe that there is a red car in front of me. My perceptual apparatus is structured in 
such a way that if there is something red in front of me I come to believe that something red is in 
my visual  field.  Millar  resists  calling  these beliefs;  rather  he takes  these as purely information 
bearing states. If so, the problem lies in the concept of belief rather than in the dispositionalist view, 
a concept whose subtleties have been the matter of my previous concerns.
3. Last remark
In closing his book, Millar briefly surveys two different naturalistic approaches to common sense 
psychology. Both assume that there is a conditional thesis to the effect that if folk psychology is 
true,  then  there  must  be  some  physical  properties  realizing  what  is  posited  by common  sense 
psychology. However, the two approaches part company on how to face such difficulties. On the 
one hand, Jerry Fodor (1987) thinks that if we cannot confirm the expected properties it is necessary 
both to analyze again the generalizations of folk psychology and to look for deeper structures of the 
mind, in line with researches in computational linguistics. On the other hand there are those, like 
Paul Churchland, who think that if the expected physical properties cannot be confirmed. so much 
the  worse  for  commonsensical  generalizations:  these  should  be  abandoned.  Even  if  Millar 
recognizes, with Churchland (1981), that there are serious limitations to folk psychology, he denies 
the very conditional that is held by naturalists. The propositional attitudes posited by common sense 
psychology should not necessarily be conceived of as mirrored by specific physical properties. “On 
the  conception  developed  in  this  book,  there  are  dispositions  –  albeit  normatively  specifiable 
dispositions – that are characteristic of the attitudes. But the constraints that the dispositions place 
on the physical states of the subjects are loose”. (p. 234) However, at the beginning of the book we 
are told that attitudes get their individuation, at least in part, because of the causal role they play (p. 
8). So, if these dispositions do not causally force the structure of our psychology, the how and why 
we act and think, it seems that Millar is taking the causal role of intentional states as loose. If this is 
so, then either the individuation conditions of the attitudes are loose, but in such a case how can 
these attitudes support deep normative considerations, or the causal efficacy of them is lost, and in 
this case how can we be said to be acting and thinking by virtue of our intentions and beliefs? In 
both cases the prospects are difficult. However, I think that Millar has been very able in refining 
and ameliorating the normative view of propositional attitudes, and every naturalist has to confront 
her or himself with such a deep and mature new theory.9 
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Extending the Space of Reasons: Comments on Chapter Four 
of Understanding People
ADRIAN HADDOCK
(University of Stirling)
1.  Wilfrid Sellars employs the metaphor of the space of reasons to express a certain conception of 
knowledge: “in characterising an episode or state as that of  knowing … one is placing it in the 
logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says” (1956: 289-9).  A 
growing number of philosophers employ the same metaphor to express a conception of at least 
some (other) mental states: in characterising a state as that of belief, or intention, for example, one 
is placing it in the same logical space.  The burden of Alan Millar’s characteristically careful and 
thought-provoking book is to tell us what this conception amounts to, and to argue for its truth.1 Its 
central claim is that the concepts of belief and intention, and what they are concepts of, are (in a 
sense to be explained)  normative.  Chapter four – “the heart of the book” in Millar’s view  (this  
issue, p. 17) – is devoted to explaining, and defending this claim. 
In these comments, I will focus on what Millar’s claim has to say about belief. I will suggest 
that the claim breaks down into three indistinct theses (§2), examine his argument for these, and 
claim that it is, at best, incomplete (§3). I will then develop a further problem for his claim (§4) and, 
finally, suggest that there might be a way to make sense of a conception of belief as a standing in 
the space of reasons that is not wanting for argument, and does not face this further problem (§5).  
2.  The three theses into which Millar’s claim appears to divide are: a strong conceptual thesis, a 
weak conceptual thesis, and a constitutive thesis.  Each gives weight to the following principle.  
The Implication Commitment  Principle:  For any rational  subject  S,  and any proposition  P,  if  S 
believes P, then for any proposition Q, if P implies Q, then S incurs a commitment to believing Q, 
if S gives a verdict on Q (p. 109).2  
According to the strong conceptual thesis, the Implication Commitment Principle is analytically 
true.  The claim that S believes that P brings into play the concept of believing that P, and “without  
further ado” – that is, simply on account of the content of the claim, and “without the help of 
additional assumptions, other than ones that merely make explicit features of [this] content” (p. 93) 
– implies that  S incurs a commitment to believing any implication of  P upon which she gives a 
verdict. 
According  to  the  weak  conceptual  thesis,  “grasping  the  concept  of  belief  commits  one  to 
accepting the [Principle]”. It is not possible for  S to believe that she believes that  P, but not be 
committed to believing that she incurs a commitment to believing any proposition P implied upon 
which she gives a verdict. And it is not possible for S to believe of another rational subject that she 
1  All page references are to Millar (2004) unless otherwise specified.  
2  The restriction to rational subjects is important. A rational subject is a subject in possession of capacities to reflect  
on her own states of mind, and Millar’s claim only concerns the species of belief that such subjects can enjoy, and 
its concept.  (There is more on the idea of a rational subject in §5.) 
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believes  that  P,  but  not  be  committed  to  believing  that  this  rational  subject  incurs  the  same 
commitment.  
According to the constitutive thesis, the Principle is a “partial specification … of what it is” (p. 
118) to believe  P; in other words, it is a partial specification of the nature of belief.  It is part of 
what it is to believe P that S (who believes P) is committed to believing any proposition P implies 
upon which she gives a verdict. 
What is the relation between the strong thesis and the constitutive thesis? If the Principle is an 
analytic truth – as the former maintains – how can it  not be the case that the Principle gives a 
(perhaps only partial) specification of what it is to believe P? If3 it is analytically true that bachelors 
are unmarried males, and unmarried males bachelors, it goes without saying that what it is for X to 
be a bachelor is (at least in part) for X to be an unmarried male. And it goes without saying not only 
because it is evidently true, but also because, in typical circumstances, the point of saying that a 
proposition specifies what it is to be something is to bring out that the proposition is, at the least, 
necessarily true, but not necessarily analytic. This seems not to be Millar’s point, because he seems 
to think the Principle is analytic. Perhaps he bothers to state the strong thesis and the constitutive 
thesis because he wants to reject the idea that his claim concerns only the concept of belief and not 
belief’s nature. But it is not entirely clear what this rejection amounts to. The strong thesis concerns 
the concept of belief; but because it purports to state an analytic truth, it cannot but concern the 
nature of belief as well. What kind of claim could concern the concept of X but not X’s nature?
One answer is: the kind of claim enshrined in the weak thesis. The weak thesis states that being 
committed to accepting the Principle is a condition for grasping the concept of belief; and, on the 
assumption that anything one must accept in order to grasp a concept must be true thereby implies 
the truth of the Principle.  But, on the further assumption that the Principle can be true and the 
constitutive thesis false – an assumption that Millar seems to accept, as we will see – it does not 
follow that the constitutive thesis is also true.  As a result, the weak thesis appears to be a claim that 
concerns  the concept  of belief,  but neither  makes  nor implies  a claim about belief’s  nature.  In 
saying that his claim concerns the nature of belief as well as its concept, Millar seems to be insisting 
that he is committed, not only to the weak thesis, but to the constitutive thesis as well.  
This tells us why Millar bothers to state the constitutive thesis and the weak thesis.  But it does 
not tell us why he bothers to state the constitutive thesis and the strong thesis.  Perhaps Millar is not 
committed to the strong thesis after all. If he was, why would he bother stressing that he is  also 
committed  to  the  constitutive  thesis,  as  opposed  simply  to  reminding  us  that  he  is obviously 
committed  to  it,  simply  on  account  of  his  commitment  to  the  strong thesis?  This  suspicion  is 
compounded by the fact that, in these post-Quinian days, it is a little recherché – and so a little 
surprising – to  find a  philosopher  boldly claiming to  have laid  his  hands on an analytic  truth, 
especially  one that  has been unacknowledged hitherto.  Even so,  Millar  does  seem to  express a 
commitment to the strong thesis. In what follows, I will assess Millar’s argument for its success in 
establishing both the strong thesis and the constitutive thesis, where the latter is understood on the 
assumption that the Principle states a necessary, but not analytic, truth. As we will see, it will not 
matter in the end whether Millar is committed to the strong thesis or not.  
Whichever thesis (or theses) Millar is trying to argue for, his argument attempts to show its (or 
their) superiority over an alternative position that rejects it (or them) but endorses the Principle. 
This argument  can only get off  the ground if  it  is possible  to do what this alternative position 
claims.   In what follows, I will consider whether it  is possible,  en route to suggesting that the 
argument seems not to succeed.     
3   Why ‘if’?  Well, which of the following are bachelors: a recently divorced male who has previously been married 
fifteen times; an unmarried male who has lived with, and been in a loving relationship with, the same partner for 
over sixty years; an unmarried male who is in a civil partnership with another unmarried male; an unmarried male 
who has never married and lives on his own; a married male who belongs to a society very different to our own, and 
was forcibly married at the age of one-and-a-half?  Is this supposed to be a matter that a concept – and it alone – can  
decide?  See Travis (forthcoming). 
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3.  In the case of the constitutive thesis, the alternative position claims the following: even though 
the Principle  is  a  necessary (but  not  analytic)  truth,  incurring the commitment  specified  in  the 
Principle is not part of what it is to believe that P; in other words, it is not constitutive of believing 
– contrary to what the constitutive thesis claims. However, on the assumption that the alternative 
position is not simply a version of the strong thesis, and so does not maintain that the Principle is 
analytic, what exactly does this claim of constitution add to the claim upon which the constitutive 
thesis and the alternative position agree: that, necessarily (but not analytically), if S believes that P, 
then  S incurs  the specified  commitment?   In other  words,  is  there  is  a difference  between the 
constitutive thesis and the Principle, where the latter is understood as stating a necessary but not an 
analytic truth? 
It is not obvious that there is. I am going to consider two ways in which it might be thought that 
there is, and suggest that neither is of help.  
According to some philosophers, even though it is necessarily the case that, if I was not alive, 
then I would not be able to wiggle my fingers, nevertheless my being able to wiggle my fingers is 
not  constituted by my being alive, because it is not in virtue of my being alive that I have this 
ability, but rather in virtue of my brain and body functioning in a certain sort of way.4 We ought to 
be able to explain why this is true (if it is).  And one explanation seems to be this: having a suitably 
functioning brain and body is necessary and sufficient for possession of the ability, but being alive 
is  merely  necessary.   Applying  this  suggestion  to  the  present  case,  we can  say the  following: 
according  to  the  Principle,  where  P implies  Q,  and  S gives  a  verdict  on  Q,  S’s  incurring  a 
commitment to believing Q is necessary for S’s believing P; so, according to the constitutive thesis, 
where P implies Q, and S gives a verdict on Q, S’s incurring a commitment to believing Q is also 
sufficient  for  S’s  believing  P.  But this  is surely absurd.   The proposition that  it  never rains in 
Southern California implies the proposition that it did not rain in Southern California on Friday 18th 
March 1983; and I can (of course) be committed to believing the latter without believing the former, 
for I might simply believe the (more modest) proposition that it did not rain in Southern California 
during  the  week  beginning  Monday  14th March  1983.  Incurring  a  determinate  commitment  to 
believing Q cannot, then, be sufficient for believing P. To ensure that the constitutive thesis remains 
both  a  going  concern,  and  distinct  from  the  Principle,  we  need  a  different  account  of  what 
constitution amounts to.  
We can arrive at one such account by reflection on the case of dispositions and their grounds. 
Consider an aspirin: it has a disposition (to relieve headaches), which can be recorded in terms of a 
conditional (if  S takes the aspirin, then  S’s headache is relieved),  and which has a ground (the 
chemical  structure  of  the  aspirin)  that  both  explains  why the  aspirin  has  this  disposition,  and, 
importantly, can be specified without employing the concepts that figure in the relevant conditional. 
It is not simply that the conditional holds of the aspirin; it  is also that there are features of the 
aspirin that can be specified from outside the conditional’s concepts, and which explain why the 
conditional holds.  This allows us to draw a distinction.  It is one thing for it to be necessarily so 
that if … then …, and quite another for there to be features of the thing of which this holds that 
explain “from outside” why this is so.  In the latter case, but not in the former, the conditional is not 
only a necessary truth but also a (perhaps partial)  specification of what it  is to be the thing in 
question.  We can now say the following: if the Principle is to be a partial specification of what it is 
to believe that P, there must be an explanation of why this Principle holds that appeals to features of 
belief that can be specified “from outside”.  
Millar  explicitly  rejects  the  possibility  of  providing  an  explanation  of  why  belief  is 
commitment-incurring that satisfies this “from outside” requirement. He notes that certain ethicists 
attempt  to  explain  moral  principles  by appealing  to  its  consequences  for  a  feature  that  can be 
specified “from outside”; as when consequentialists  attempt to explain why killing is wrong by 
4  Ram Neta (2008) is one philosopher who argues in something close to this way.  
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appealing to its upshot for the general good.  But he thinks that attempting to do something similar 
in the present case – by appealing to some kind of independently specifiable value that will be 
attained if we conform to the Principle – is “odd”, and “leads to a dead-end” (p. 117). So, it looks as 
if, by Millar’s own lights, we cannot makes sense of a distinction between the constitutive thesis 
and the Principle, if we take the aspirin case as our model.  
But perhaps we can still make sense of the distinction. The constitutive thesis purports to specify 
part of the nature of belief, and says that it is part of this nature that, if S believes that  P, then S 
incurs the commitment specified in the Principle. In so doing, it seems to contrast with a different 
thesis, according to which it is not part of the nature of belief, but part of the nature of rationality 
that, if S believes that P, then S incurs the specified commitment.  (Perhaps the nature of rationality 
consists of the totality of relevant normative principles, of which the Principle is one). If this is 
right, then there is a difference between the constitutive thesis and the Principle, because the thesis 
does, and the Principle by itself does not, take a stand on whether the Principle specifies (part of) 
the nature of belief,  or (part of) the nature of something else (for instance, rationality).  It is, of 
course, possible for the Principle to specify the nature of both rationality and belief. But, whether or 
not it does, it looks as if an alternative to the constitutive thesis – which accepts the Principle but 
denies the thesis – can be made out.  
An alternative to the strong conceptual thesis is easy to see: the Principle is not an analytic truth. 
The claim that S believes that P implies that S incurs a commitment to believing any implication of 
P upon which she gives a verdict only if this claim is conjoined with the Principle. The Principle is 
necessarily true; but it does not specify the nature of the concept of belief. It is not even part of the 
nature of this concept that, if S believes that P, then S incurs the specified commitment. 
So, does Millar’s argument establish the strong thesis, or the constitutive thesis, or both?  If we 
were to use Millar’s argument in support of the strong thesis, it would run as follows.  Short of an 
explanation of why the Principle holds, it is mystery why it does so; but it is not a mystery why it 
does so; so, there must be an explanation; and the strong thesis provides the only such explanation: 
the Principle holds because it is part of the nature of the concept of belief that it holds; therefore, the 
strong thesis is true.  
The problem with this argument is that, even if it is valid, one of its premises is surely false. If 
the strong thesis suffices to explain why the Principle holds, it seems the constitutive thesis can do 
the same: the Principle is true because it is part of the nature of belief that it is true.  Even if Millar’s 
explanatory demand can be met by the strong thesis, it looks as if there is no need for it to be met by 
the strong thesis, for the constitutive thesis will do just as well.  
To ensure that his argument establishes all three theses, Millar needs to build a bridge from the 
constitutive thesis to the others. He might be able to move from the constitutive to the weak thesis if 
he could make good on his claim that there is no more to the nature of belief than is “specified by 
… the concept”  of  belief  P (p.  102).  I  am not  entirely  sure what  it  means  for  the  nature  of 
something to be “specified” by a concept, but it is not implausible to suppose it means at least the 
following: if S grasps the concept of X, then she believes all the truths there are to believe about the 
nature of  X. If this is right, then belief  in the constitutive thesis is a condition for grasping the 
concept of belief, and something very close to – in fact far stronger than – the weak thesis would be 
ensured.  
However, it is not obvious that we can move from this new version of the weak thesis to the 
strong thesis. To ensure that we can, Millar would need to free from criticism the thought that any 
belief  required for the grasp of a concept must have an analytic  truth as its content.   And that 
thought is not evidently true. Donald Davidson (1974) is one philosopher who claims that we can 
reject  the  very  idea  of  an  analytic  truth, but  nevertheless  maintain  that  possessing  appropriate 
beliefs is a condition for grasping (at least some) concepts.  For Davidson, it is considerations of 
overall interpretative charity that determine which beliefs are appropriate, and not analyticity.  If 
Davidson is right, then the beliefs required for grasping concepts need not have any analytic truths 
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as their contents.  
But, even if Millar could free the thought from criticism, trying to do so would surely be a 
forlorn project, for it seems we already have in hand an explanation of why the Principle holds that 
does not appeal to the constitutive thesis: namely, that it holds because it is part of the nature of 
rationality that it does so.    
The upshot, then, is that it seems there is another explanation of why the Principle holds, which 
relies on neither the constitutive, weak, nor strong, thesis. And if that is so then it looks as if, even if 
Millar can plug the lacuna in his argument that I have identified, he has not given us reason to 
prefer any of the theses over a position that denies them, and accounts for the truth of the Principle 
in the way I have described.  
4.  I now want to develop a problem for the Implication Commitment Principle itself, by examining 
Millar claim that “it is not possible for [us] to adopt a contemplative stance towards” (p.124) our 
own current beliefs.  
Taking a contemplative stance towards one of our beliefs is a matter of registering that we have 
the belief, “without taking that fact to have any normative import” (p.111) for us, where taking the 
fact to have such import  is a matter of thinking that the fact ensures we incur the commitment 
specified in the Principle. It is not obvious that we cannot take this stance towards our beliefs.  
Gareth Evans (1982) is famous for discerning a certain transparency in second-order belief: our 
justification for believing that we believe that  P (or, do not believe that P) is our justification for 
believing (or not believing) P. We consider the reasons whether or not P and either conclude that P 
is the case, and we believe P, or conclude that P is not the case, and we do not believe P. We might 
think that all second-order beliefs are transparent in this way.  But Richard Moran, from whom 
Millar takes the idea of a contemplative stance, writes that if “I have some reason to believe that 
some attitude of mine is not “up to me”… then I cannot take the question regarding my attitude to 
be transparent to a corresponding question regarding what it is directed upon” (2001: 67). And it 
seems that Moran is right about this.  
I might be a committed believer in socio-biology and, as a result, believe that, as a member of 
the species homo sapiens, I have various psychological tendencies that flow from my evolutionarily 
determined nature. One of these is a tendency to believe racially discriminatory thoughts. Of course, 
when I  reflect  on whether  or  not  these  thoughts  are  true,  I  see  no reason to  believe  they are. 
Nevertheless, I see plenty of reason to believe that I believe they are, and as a result, I form this 
second-order belief.  In such a case, transparency fails.  
If  this  socio-biological  story is  correct,  my first-order  belief  derives,  not  from reflection  on 
whether or not its content is so, but from something over which it seems I have no control: namely, 
my biological nature. It is a belief I am simply landed with, and not one I formed on the basis of 
reasons.  It is also one I am unable to give up.  Or, rather, the only way I could give it up is by 
altering my biological nature.  Perhaps it is possible for me to do that.  But, even if it is, it surely 
cannot be rationally required that I abandon the belief.  Consider an analogy. It cannot be rationally 
required that NN conform to basic social norms if NN no longer possess the ability to do so because 
she suffers from Alzheimer’s Disease, even though it may be possible to find a cure for this disease 
(one day),  and thereby restore her ability.  ‘Ought’  implies  ‘can’,  at  least  in this  case,  for even 
though there may be a sense in which even an Alzheimer’s suffer can conform to such basic norms, 
they surely cannot do so in the sense that matters to the present ‘ought’. The same goes for the 
subject  of  the  socio-biological  story:  it  cannot  be  the  case  that  they  are  rationally  required  to 
abandon the belief.5  The problem is that this is precisely what the Principle requires.  
5  It might be objected that the Alzheimer’s disease sufferer is not relevant here, because she is not in any sense a 
rational subject.  I think this is disputable, if we employ the conception of a rational subject that I sketch in §5 of this 
paper (which Millar seems to endorse).  But the objection is not relevant in any case, for the point of the analogy is 
to remind us of a sense of ‘ability’ on which a sufferer who lacks a certain ability is on that account not subject to a 
certain ‘ought’, and so long as the very same sense applies to rational subjects’ inability to reject certain beliefs on 
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If I believe that P, and P implies Q, I am committed to believing Q, if I give a verdict upon Q; 
and – as Millar makes clear – one way of discharging this commitment is to stop believing P. That 
is what I am rationally required to do if P implies Q, and I believe P, but give a negative verdict on 
Q. So, if I were to believe the racially discriminatory thoughts, but to give a negative verdict on 
whether or not their consequences are so, then – by the Principle – I would be rationally required to 
abandon my belief in the thoughts.  But, in the relevant sense of ‘cannot’, this is something I cannot 
do.  And, for this  reason,  it  cannot be rationally required that I do so.  In such a case,  taking a 
contemplative stance towards my beliefs is something I can do, and ought to do.  
If this is right, then it seems that Millar has a choice. He could restrict the Principle so that it 
applies only to beliefs that are “up to us”; in order words, to beliefs that (in the relevant sense) we 
can reject. Or, he could deny that the story I have just told, and others like it, could possibly be true, 
and claim that all beliefs are, necessarily, “up to us” in this sense.  
But, if beliefs are located in a causal nexus, how can there be an obstacle in principle to their 
being so located as to place them outside our control?  Millar does not want to deny that beliefs 
have causal location; indeed, he wants to insist that a conception of belief as a standing in the space 
of reasons is compatible with them having such location. And yet, if he were to say that all beliefs 
are necessarily “up to us”, he has to claim that there is a certain kind of causal location that beliefs 
cannot have.  
I do not know how Millar will respond to this problem. But, however he does, it seems to be a 
problem that he has to face.
5.  In these comments, I have suggested that Millar does not have a compelling argument for his 
theses.  I have also presented a problem for the Principle to which the theses adhere.  Does this 
mean that we should reject a conception of belief as a standing in the space of reasons?  I want to 
end by suggesting: perhaps not. Perhaps there is a way of understanding that conception on which it 
is undeniable, and avoids these objections.  
Millar’s  claim confines  itself  to  the  beliefs  of  rational  subjects.  There  are  various  ways  of 
understanding the idea of a rational subject, but one way is surely as that of subjects whose doings – 
intentional bodily actions, for instance, and mental actions such as thinking and intending – are, 
perhaps not always, but certainly sometimes, explicable by appeal to considerations that display 
them as things that subjects rationally ought to go in for, in the relevant circumstances (McDowell, 
1986). In such cases, the considerations count as both reasons for subjects to do what they do, and 
reasons why they do so. And these ‘reasons for’ are, in many if not all cases, things that the subject  
believes. So, the beliefs of rational subjects must be capable of providing reasons for their doings.6 
That they are so capable is a truth that holds necessarily of beliefs in this class.  
This description of rational subjects offers one way of unfolding the idea that belief is a standing 
in the space of reasons.  It  is also a description that  anyone who understands this  paper should 
recognise, for it is surely a description of us. That is something I cannot see how we can hope to 
deny. And, if we cannot, then we have reason to accept a version of the conception that Millar 
wishes to defend.   
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Understanding People Keeping Up Standards
PAUL NOORDHOF
(University of York)
Alan Millar’s book, Understanding People, is a defence of the role of the normative in the proper 
understanding of people. In broad outline, the defence has three principal components. The first is 
an explanation of what an appeal to the normative potentially provides that other explanations lack. 
Here the foil  is  reductive dispositionalist.  The second addresses a worry about the explanatory 
relevance of the normative. Even if appeal to the normative promises to provide explanations which 
other things cannot, the promise may not be fulfilled if it has no purchase on our mental life. Millar 
outlines how he thinks it does have such a grip. The third addresses the question of whether we 
should understand the explanations offered in terms of the theory theory or simulation approach to 
the understanding of others. Millar’s principal claim is that those who privilege the normative need 
not be committed to a simulation approach.
Cross  cutting  these  three  components,  there  are  three  issues  that  play  a  crucial  role  in  the 
development of the picture. The first is the correct identification of the normative. Here Millar’s 
distinctive claim is that there are a class of non-justificatory reasons - or commitments - that have an 
important role in our understanding of other people. 
The second is  the proper account  of their  nature:  what is  the source or basis of these non-
justificatory reasons.  Millar identifies three prima facie different sources. 
In the case of the commitments we incur through having intentions and beliefs, he argues that 
they are derived from ideals of reason. The commitments are not identical to the ideals because 
there can be cases where we fail to live up to the ideals without irrationality, for instance, because 
doing so ceases to be in our control (Millar 2004, pp. 76-78, 120). Because these propositional 
attitudes serve to characterise our ideal of reason, the commitments derived from the ideal are part 
of  the  nature  of  the  states.  The  commitments  are  reflected  in  the  normative  character  of  our 
concepts  of  propositional  attitudes.  When  we  self-ascribe  propositional  attitudes,  we  represent 
ourselves as having commitments to other propositional attitudes and, as a result, seek to meet our 
commitments. 
In the case of commitments we incur concerning the meaning of terms, Millar’s answer is that 
they are derived from the constitutive rules of practices or institutions to which we are committed 
by participating in them. In the case of the commitments we incur concerning concepts, they are, as 
with  words,  derived  from the  constitutive  rules  governing  the  correct  uses  of  these  concepts. 
However,  these  rules  are  not  conceived  as  constitutive  of  practices  or  institutions  because  a 
particular concept could not be governed by different rules and, thus be susceptible to a different 
practice (Millar 2004, pp. 183-185). 
The  third  cross-cutting  issue  is  a  defence  of  a  ‘high’  conception  of  propositional  attitudes 
according to which they are only properly attributed to subjects with the capacity for reflection 
about their commitments and what they ought to do (Millar 2004, pp. ix-x, 14).
These three issues will be the main focus of my discussion. Millar’s overall approach is not to 
demonstrate that the correct understanding of propositional attitudes gives a substantial explanatory 
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role  to  the  normative.  It  is  rather  that,  call  them  what  you  will,  there  is  a  distinct  way  of 
understanding  other  people  as  a  result  of  various  facts  about  them that  involves  appeal  to  the 
normative. If we recognise this, the battle is over. The terminological dispute as to what to call them 
-  propositional  attitudes,  propositional  attitudes  in  humans,  normatively  committed  attitudes  or 
whatever - is of little interest. 
On this last point, which I may have expressed a little more forcefully and crudely than Millar 
(!),  I  am in  complete  agreement.  I  also  think  that  the  debate  is  significantly  advanced  by  the 
systematic  and  subtle  way  Millar  has  gone  about  discussing  the  issues.  Certainly,  the  line  of 
resistance I express below would not have been possible for me to formulate, if I had not benefited 
immensely  from  reading  Millar’s  book.  Nevertheless,  however  pleasant  it  may  be  to  hear, 
agreement does not require restatement. Thus, I will emphasise the ways in which I find the defence 
of Millar’s position wanting. 
In brief, I will argue that we don’t yet have clear cases of non-justifying reasons, nor a clear 
motivation for recognising them. I will argue that, in any event, Millar’s characterisation of their 
nature makes them ill-fitted to play the role which he says that reductive dispositionalism cannot 
play and that they are supposed to, namely explain why we cannot adopt a contemplative attitude to 
certain mental states. I will argue that the high conception of propositional attitudes is not justified 
by the  phenomena  to  which  Millar  appeals.  Finally,  I  will  argue  that  Millar’s  response  to  the 
integration  challenge  -  that  is,  whether,  we can  have  explanations  with a  genuinely  normative 
explanatory  force  along side  complete  causal  explanations  concerning  the  very same entities  - 
doesn’t really get to the heart of the issue. I will also take the opportunity briefly to comment upon 
Millar’s discussion of theory theory vs simuluationist approaches to the understanding of others. 
My own views on these matters will come up at certain points in the discussion though, for 
reasons of space, the exposition will be brief and I will rely upon references and defence elsewhere. 
In the conclusion, I try to sketch an alternative picture. Regarding the extent of the normative, my 
line will be that there is genuine normativity and then keeping to a standard. The latter should not 
be taken to be an instance of the former and is not an extension of its domain. It cannot play the 
explanatory role identified for genuine normativity and, indeed,  a hybrid rather than a univocal 
approach  to  explaining  the  various  phenomena  to  which  Millar  adverts  is  more  likely  to  be 
successful. I hope that, by this focus, some of which raises moves which will be familiar to readers 
of the literature, I will draw out from Millar further justification and elaboration of his significant 
work in this area.
1. Reasons which do not supply justification
According  to  a  picture  endorsed  by  Donald  Davidson,  an  agent’s  reasons  for  an  action  are  a 
combination of a desire plus a means end-belief (Davidson 1974,1980, p. 233). Millar seems happy 
to allow that these may constitute motivating or explanatory reasons although he prefers a different 
picture (Millar 2004, p. 10). More important for him is that they do not constitute normative reasons 
(Millar  2004,  p.  11).  Normative  reasons  are  the  sort  of  things  people  put  forward  as  reasons: 
considerations.  Thus  they  are  not  beliefs  but  the  contents  of  beliefs,  not  desires  but  whatever 
rationally  leads  us  to  have  a  particular  desire  (Millar  2004,  pp.  12-13).  If  reasons  are  simply 
propositions, then there is a reason to believe that ships will fall off the end of the world, namely the 
proposition that  the world is  flat.  Apart  from such awkwardness, to some,  propositions are the 
wrong kind of thing to be reasons. Most of the time it is what propositions are about, rather than the 
propositions  themselves,  which  support  what  we believe,  or  justify  our  acts  (Dancy 2000,  pp. 
114-116). If reasons are states of affairs, then, it seems, we fail to have reasons when our beliefs are 
false. Assuming that my son did not beat up somebody at school, I have no reason to be angry with 
him even if I believed he did. This may lead us to suppose that reasons are possible states of affairs 
or to recognise that there are two different classes of cases which we talk of collectively in terms of 
an agent’s reasons. I shall not settle this matter here and, indeed, Millar says no more about it.
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A consequence of taking reasons to be considerations is that many reasons are not characterised 
in normative terms even though they may possess normative properties. The reason for believing 
that it is raining now is the possible state of affairs of it raining now. The rain is not normative (by 
anybody’s lights). Millar gives, as a reason for regret, that a particular remark caused offence and, 
as a reason for wanting to see a movie, that it was recommended by a critic whose judgement he 
respects (Millar 2004, pp. 11-12). Neither of these seems particularly normative unless it turns out 
that respect and offence are propositional attitudes with commitments. Even so, these commitments 
will not concern whether regret or desire is appropriately formed in some other subject. If reasons 
are normative, it is in virtue of their non-normative character that they are.
Although it seems that reasons must have normative properties in virtue of their non-normative 
character, it is deeply puzzling how they could have such properties given the character in question. 
Just what is it about the rain falling down that gives it an ‘oughtiness’ with regard to the formation 
of a belief that it is raining. It is tempting to think that the situation is rather like this. The reasons 
themselves are not normative. However, the character of various propositional attitudes gives them 
this role. For instance, if the subject aims to have true beliefs, the rain falling down will, relative to 
this aim, determine that the subject ought to have a belief that the rain is falling down. Note that this 
point does not derive from thinking that the normative could not be part of the world independent of 
ourselves. It rather derives from an observation about what we actually count as reasons and how 
those things might  obtain their  normative properties.  Those considerations  for which it  is  most 
difficult to identify a type of propositional attitude with a distinctive aim are those where, if we take 
the reasons to be objective, we feel impelled to attribute normativity to the outside world: morality 
being a case in point.
There  is  a  potential  threat  to  the  extent  of  the  normative  explanations  Millar  favours.  In 
providing considerations in favour of one attitude or another, reasons are naturally thought of as 
justifying the attitude in question. If it seems that justification is not available for a certain kind of 
attitude, then there are no reasons and the attitude, and actions which follow from it, fall, at least 
partly, outside the ambit of normative explanation that Millar is seeking to defend. His rejection of 
the link between providing considerations and justification promises to extend the application of 
normative explanation further.
Millar also argues that it helps to deal with a dilemma. Consider the following two principles:
The Motivation Principle: For any agent x, x’s motivating reasons for a belief, action, etc., 
are reasons that x takes (rightly or wrongly) to be adequate normative reason for that belief 
or action (Millar 2004, pp. 42, 68).
The Intention Principle: For any agent x, and action Φ, x Φ s intentionally if and only if x 
Φ s for a reason (Millar 2004, p. 69).
They seem in conflict if actions include apparently arational actions like doodling, kicking a car 
when it won’t start, scratching out the eyes of a love rival in a photograph and so forth (Anscombe 
1963, sec. 17; Hursthouse 1991). The concern is that no adequate justifying reasons are available 
for these actions. So, if the reasons mentioned in the Intention Principle must be adequate justifying 
reasons, then either the Intention Principle is false - there are intentional actions for which there is 
no reason - or we must claim that there are justifying reasons for these actions after all (Millar 2004, 
pp. 68-71). If reasons need not be justifying, then we can cite the agent feeling the urge to lash out 
as  if  the  car  deserves  a  kick  or  to  damage  the  photograph  respectively  as  reasons.  The  more 
pointless something seems - for instance, an agent’s doodling - the less it seems like an action.
The success of this treatment depends upon two things. First, that our inclination to suppose that 
there are no reasons why we do these things rests on the assumption that whatever is cited must 
justify doing them. Second, there is no way of capturing the fact that action has a point without 
appealing to a reason. Both are questionable. 
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Regarding the first, the challenge of the examples is not removed by allowing that the reasons 
need not justify the agent. The point was rather that the things that might flash before the agent’s 
mind resulting in the action couldn’t possibly be taken as a consideration in favour of the action in 
any sense: can’t stand the way he looks at me; teach the car a lesson etc. Strictly speaking, they 
cannot give a point to the action because, although there is a clear association, the action isn’t to the 
point that they would suggest. In the photo, the rival is not looking at you. You know only too well 
that cars don’t receive lessons by kicks. Doodling is even a clearer case since there seems no point 
to it other than doing whatever is going on.  
Urges may causally explain the actions but the actions aren’t done to express those urges. They 
are not the consideration why the agents acted in the way that they did. Indeed, if urges were the 
reasons for the actions, then the agent would appear to have a justification after all. If there is no 
consideration  against  defacing  the  photo  or  kicking  car,  what  better  ground for  doing  so  then 
expressing an urge and, thereby, relieving oneself?
Regarding the second point, it is by no means obvious that all actions require a reason for them 
to have an aim. Certain expressions of emotion are cases in point. There is a continuum here. At one 
end, there are frowns and smiles, laughter and tears. Here I have in mind not those we put on but 
those which are elicited from us as simple natural responses. These are not actions (Goldie 2000, 
pp. 136-137). However, there are a range of other cases in which, although it would be incorrect to 
deny that the agent wanted to respond in the way that he or she did, attributing the desire is not to 
attribute something which the action was aimed to satisfy. Closest to the non-actions are stylised 
expressions of emotion such as jumping for joy,  punching the air and so forth (Goldie 2000, p. 
138). These are close to being acts in so far as we modify this type of behaviour over time and, 
indeed, monitor it when we engage in it, and yet still they are relatively automatic. We don’t have a 
desire to jump up and down, or punch the air, and then satisfy it, yet the point of the action is to 
express a certain emotion. This is settled by the way in which the action relates to the emotion. It is 
not so much that we desire to express these emotions as that we lack the desire to suppress them. 
Philosophers should think long and hard before they commit  themselves  to understanding such 
cases in terms of a desire to express an emotion and a belief that (say), if it is joy that one is seeking 
to express, then jumping up and down would be a good way of doing it. It might invite ridicule.
Then  there  are  cases  like  the  ones  described  above  relating  to  the  photograph  and  the  car 
kicking. Here, as I have already noted, strange desires would have to be postulated to explain these 
actions. It doesn’t seem to be any help to suggest, as Michael Smith does, that such desires are part 
of the nature of the emotions we are undergoing, for instance, jealousy involves the desire to scratch 
out the eyes of a rival (Smith 1998, pp. 158-161). The issue is not the way in which we attribute the 
desires (as part  of an emotion-package or individually)  but simply that  it  seems implausible  to 
attribute the desires to the agent in the first place outside of the hope of fitting the action into a 
standard model of action explanation.
Peter Goldie has suggested that behaviour such as scratching at the eyes in the photograph is to 
be explained by a desire to scratch out the rival’s eyes plus a tendency to imagine oneself doing this 
(Goldie 2000, p. 129). I think it is unlikely that the agent genuinely did want to scratch the rival’s 
eyes out, that is, really blind and disfigure them. Few of us are that unhinged by love. Nevertheless, 
even if this were the desire which explains the action, it seems that it cannot provide us with a 
characterisation of its point. So it is no defence of Millar’s claim that the point of an action must 
derive from a reason. Scratching the eyes out of a love rival in a photograph is no means by which 
to secure that the rival is blind and disfigured.
Finally, at the other end of the continuum, there are the complex expressions of emotion in art 
works. Such expression can happen in various ways and I am not trying to argue that all art works 
must involve the expression of emotion in one or more of these ways. It is just that Collingwood 
describes  a  particularly  striking  way  in  which  emotions  may  be  expressed  which  is  a  nice 
illustration of the point I am trying to make: 
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When a man is said to express emotion, what is being said about him comes to this. At first, 
he is conscious of having an emotion, but not conscious of what this emotion is. All he is 
conscious of is a perturbation or excitement, which he feels going on within him, but of 
whose nature he is ignorant. While in this state, all he can say about his emotion is: “I 
feel ... I don't know what I feel.” From this helpless and oppressed condition he extricates 
himself by doing something which we call expressing himself ... the emotion expressed is 
an emotion of whose nature the person who feels it is no longer unconscious (Collingwood 
1938, p. 109).
Emotion guides the expression without it being clear to the agent what is being expressed or how it 
will be expressed. Yet the guidance is not to be thought of as an automatic response to a stimulus. It 
is something over which the agent seems to have control. It is active rather than passive. Again, 
although it is not wrong to say that the agent desired to express the emotion, this is because the 
agent did express the emotion and failed to have the desire to suppress it. Moreover, the desire in 
question would not be determinate because, by the nature of the case, the agent did not know what 
the emotion was.
My conclusion is that, while actions have goals, these may not always be derived from reasons 
the agent had. An agent’s reasons are just one - perhaps particularly important - way in which an 
action may have a goal. Other elements of our mental life may supply goals too if the appropriate 
mechanisms  of  feedback and guidance  are  in  place.  In  his  discussion  of  self-deception,  Millar 
acknowledges that there may be sub-intentional purposive formation of beliefs and that these are 
properly designated  activities (Millar 2004, p. 157; Johnston 1988). This invites the question of 
whether  there  may be intentional  activities,  which  derive  their  purpose  from the  same kind of 
factors these sub-intentional activities do, and yet which are intentional in that they are controlled to 
a greater extent by the agent. It is hard to see why not. To deny this possibility seems to rest upon a 
tendency to take propositional attitude psychology to apply en bloc, manifested, for example, in the 
insistence that, if something is intentional, there must be a reason which supports the intention. I 
question whether this  must  be so. It  may be appropriate  to allow for the application of certain 
elements - for instance, the fact that something is intentional - without bringing with it the whole 
package. If that’s right, then there is no need to introduce the notion of non-justificatory reason to 
avoid the dilemma expressed by the two principles with which I began this section. The cases cited 
provide reason to suppose that the second principle is false.That does not mean that Millar is wrong 
to recognise instances of non-justificatory reasons. Just that the general motivation for recognising 
them identified above is not effective. In his book, in contrast to his earlier article, he places more 
emphasis on intuitive and theoretical considerations which arise from reflection upon a range of 
cases (Millar 2002, Millar, personal communication).
The first type of case involves action where, it seems, there is no objective matter concerning 
the right thing to do. One illustration is the thorny question of what to do with one’s leisure time. 
Millar imagines a trip to Madrid in which he considers visiting the Prado. There are considerations 
in favour of visiting the Prado but these don’t establish that it is the right thing to do over every 
other leisure activity.  Suppose that this is the case. It is not clear why the considerations fail to 
count as non-conclusive justifications in favour of one course of action or another. Justification 
does not require commitment to there being a uniquely right thing to do. 
There can fail to be a uniquely right thing to do in, at least, two ways. According to the first 
way, there is no determinacy in this area. There are one or things which one might do, none of 
which are the right thing to do, even from a certain perspective. According to the second way, there 
are one or more right things to do, from one perspective one would be right, from another, another 
would be right. The latter would be a kind of relativism. A third option would be to take judgements 
about the uniquely right thing to do as expressive of sentiments, as the expressivist recommends. I 
set aside this option because Millar does so too and I am interested in the options which work 
within his assumptions (Millar 2004, pp. 34-36).
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If there is a link between truth and justification, then the second way in which there may be no 
uniquely right thing to do presents no problem. The truth-justification link would just be a link to a 
relativistic  truth  (if  this  is  coherent).  The  first  way  is  more  challenging.  Insistence  on  the 
justification-truth link would have the consequence that the considerations in favour of visiting the 
Prado couldn’t be counted as justifications. However, the insistence is in need of defence. It is one 
thing to say that, where there’s a truth to be had, justification must be linked to truth. It is another to 
insist that justification must be linked to truth when there isn’t. 
Instead,  we  might  take  justification  to  be  linked  to  the  avoidance  of  falsehood  or,  more 
generally, less good options. It seems undeniable that, while there is no right answer about what one 
should do in one’s leisure time, there are several options which are not right. Staying in the hotel 
room with the curtains drawn watching repeats of lottery draws from the UK National Lottery while 
in Madrid would be one example. The considerations in favour of going to the Prado or searching 
out tapas bars would be considerations which speak against this kind of error about what to do with 
one’s leisure time. 
The second type of case Millar discusses to support his position concerns means-end reasoning. 
Consider the conditional: If I intend to buy a newspaper, then I ought to go to the newsagent.
Millar correctly notes that the ‘ought’ is non-detachable. It is not true that I ought to go to the 
newsagent. Morality or prudence makes no such demands upon me. Rather, it is simply that  if I 
intend to buy a news paper, I ought to. The conclusion Millar draws from this is that the ‘ought’ 
which  characterises  the  consequent  of  the  conditional  should  not  be  taken  to  indicate  the 
justification of a particular action: going to the newsagent (Millar 2004, p. 59).
This type of case does not show that normative reasons are independent of justification because 
here we don’t have a distinct type of normative reason at all. Rather we have a justificatory ought 
which governs the conditional: it has ‘wide scope’. It says that the following combination of mental 
attitude and (in)action is not being as we ought to be: intending to buy a newspaper, not going to the 
newsagent.  The  proper  representation  is  not  Ip  → Rq  (where  ‘R’  represents  non-justificatory 
reason) but rather O(Ip → q) (‘O’ for the justificatory ought). In John Broome’s terms (from whom 
I take this  move),  there  is  a rational  requirement  rather  than a  case of non-justificatory reason 
conditional upon the antecedent being realised (Broome 1999). 
Millar is aware of this alternative account of the matter and notes that he recognises a type of 
reason that Broome does not (e.g.  Millar and Bermudez 2002, p. 6; Millar (2002), p. 123 footnote 
15;  Millar  2004,  p.  79).  However,  he  seems  neither  to  offer  an  argument  against  Broome’s 
scepticism about these kind of reasons nor offer an argument in their favour. On the sceptical side, 
it seems implausible that one can generate reasons simply by having intentions. Suppose I have no 
reason to slap myself on the thigh but intend to do so. Do reasons come so easily that I now have a 
reason to slap my thigh? It doesn’t seem so (Broome 2001, pp. 98-99). Suppose, to return to the 
original example, I ought not to intend to get a newspaper. There are far more important things to 
do. Do I have the slightest reason to get a newspaper because I intend to? Is there now something to 
be said in favour of it  even if it  does not justify doing it? It is plausible that the answer is no 
(Broome 1999, pp. 406-410).
I presume that Millar’s response is that, if we take his notion of ‘reason’ simply to be that of 
commitment, then it is plausible that I am committed to slapping my thigh or getting a newspaper, 
given I intended to (hereafter,  I shall  talk of commitment-based reasons). As Millar recognises, 
though, Broome’s rational requirements can capture the idea of commitment while rejecting the 
existence of commitment-based reasons. So appeal to commitment does not seem to do the job of 
justifying  his  kind  of  reasons.  Moreover,  as  we  shall  see,  accounts  of  the  bases  of  these 
commitments make it even less likely that they will always be reason-generating.
Recent  work  by Niko Kolodny may appear  to  assist  the  development  of  Millar’s  position. 
Kolodny  has  argued  that  ‘narrow  scope’  reasons  -  those  where  ‘O’  or  ‘R’  just  governs  the 
consequent  of  the  conditional  -  are  required  to  capture  the  fact  that  certain  ways  avoiding  of 
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irrationality  allowed  by  the  wide  scope  reading  are  not  open  to  an  agent.  Commitment-based 
reasons are a subcategory of narrow scope reasons. The relationship between intention and action is 
not a particularly good illustration of Kolodny’s  point.  The following candidate  requirement  of 
reason is a better one.
(WS) O(If you believe that you ought to do A, then you intend to do A) (Broome 2007, p. 
360). 
The requirement would seem to suggest that, if you believe that you ought do to A and currently fail 
to intend to do A, then there are two ways of being as you ought: either give up the belief or form 
the intention. But, Kolodny argues, it is not rational to give up a belief simply because you fail to 
have an intention. So, to capture this asymmetry, we need
(NS) If you believe that you ought to do A, then you  ought to intend to do A (Kolodny 
2005, pp. 527-530 - or, more cumbersomely, it ought to be the case that you intend to do 
A).
In  fact,  Kolodny’s  observation  is  ill-suited  to  support  the  attribution  of  commitment-based 
reasons. First,  commitment-based reasons cannot capture the intuition that you should not revise 
your belief but have the intention. If you are committed to something given that such and such is the 
case, one option is always to change what is the case, if you can, so that you are not committed (a 
point on which Millar is agreed, Millar 2004, pp. 74-75). There may be considerations which rule 
this out but the simple presence of a commitment-based reason is not one of them. Second, and 
relatedly, the attribution of the relevant commitment-based reason cannot capture why the revision 
of the belief is not an option for you. Yet, once we have explained this, the commitment-based 
reason seems redundant.
The reason why it seems unacceptable to remove the belief that you ought to do A, rather than 
form the intention to do A, is that we think of the belief as having rational support. There is nothing 
particularly bad about getting rid of a belief for which there is no support given that we fail to have 
the intention (put aside for the moment the point about whether we can). So we should break down 
reasoning into two components: requirements of reason which take the form Broome recommends 
and lay out the options; and reasons, which exclude some of the options to be taken. In the case at 
hand, then, we have it that, as far as the requirements of reason are concerned you ought either not 
to believe that you ought to do  A or intend to do  A. The reasons in favour of believing that you 
ought to do A exclude the first option. Hence reasons plus requirement imply that taking the second 
option is the only way to be as you ought. It is not that we have reason to intend to do A simply 
from believing that we ought to. It is that the reasons in favour of believing that one ought to do A 
rule out abandoning the belief as a way to secure rationality. If you believe that you ought to do A, 
and you have reason to have this belief, then the only way you can avoid irrationality, and be as you 
ought, is by having the appropriate intention. It is compatible with this that, in fact, one’s reasons 
for believing that you ought to do A are misleading - one oughtn’t to do A - and hence that there is 
no reason for you intending to do A. If the reasons for the belief are not misleading, then one may 
have reasons for the intention but these will be both justificatory and derived from the reasons for 
belief.
We may be psychologically unable to give up a belief even if we lack reasons for it. It is a 
simple fact that we believe it and have no reasons against it. In those circumstances, it cannot be 
that one of the options open to us is giving up the belief. This does not mean that O(If you believe 
that you ought to do A, then you intend to do A) is incorrect. It is simply that the first option - of 
giving  up  the  belief  -  is  ruled  out  for  us.  So,  for  us,  the  only  way we can  obey the  rational 
requirement is by implementing the second disjunct: forming the intention.  But that doesn’t mean 
that we reason as follows. I ought either to give up the belief or form the intention. I cannot give up 
the belief. Therefore, I ought to form the intention. There is no reason for forming the intention 
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(given that we lack reasons for having the belief). It is rather that I fail to have the option of giving 
up the belief. Examples of these type of cases are apt to be contentious and often involve conflicted 
agents. Yet, to illustrate, consider a married woman who holds down a job and can see no reason 
why she ought to do 80% of the domestic tasks. Nevertheless, she may still believe that she ought to 
do them and feel guilty if she does not. She would not be as she ought to be if she had the belief and 
yet  failed to have the intention to carry them out.  Nevertheless,  in recognising that  she cannot 
abandon the belief and yet can find no reason to hold it, it does not follow that she has reason to 
have the intention.
Millar’s  third  type  of  case  involves  actions  which  even  the  agent  can  see  no  virtue  in 
undertaking and yet they do. Examples include smashing your squash racket into your successful 
opponent’s face or killing your children to spite your ex-spouse.  The actions have a point and yet, 
the thought runs, not only from the objective viewpoint but also from the agent’s viewpoint they are 
wholly negative (Watson 1975, p. 210; Stocker 1979; Velleman 1992, pp. 117-118; Millar 2004, 
pp. 63-67). 
Again  it  is  questionable  whether  we  actually  have  reasons  in  play  here  as  opposed  to  the 
workings of rational requirement.  It  is not that  our strongest desire provides a non-justificatory 
reason for a particular action. It is simply that if, say, our strongest desire is to smash our racket into 
an opponent’s face and yet we fail to have the relevant intention, we would not be as we ought to 
be. 
These third type of cases also rest upon an illegitimate assumption concerning how the point of 
action will be revealed. The thought seems to be that, if the object of our action is not conceived to 
be good, then the point of action cannot be the good and, hence, reasons for action cannot be seen 
as  justifying through pointing out how something is conducive to the good. It helps to compare 
matters with belief. If I believe that p is true, it does not follow that the aim of belief is truth. If it 
did,  then my desiring  that  p is  true  would establish  that  the point  of  desires  is  to  be  true too 
(Velleman 2000, pp. 247-248). If I regard the proposition I believe as true, it does not follow that 
the aim of belief is truth either. When I imagine that p, I imagine regarding the proposition as true 
(Velleman  2000,  pp.  248-250).  Yet  our  imaginings  do  not  aim  at  the  truth.  David  Velleman 
suggests that belief involves accepting a proposition with the aim of accepting a truth (Velleman 
2000, p. 251). By analogy, doing something involves having a favourable attitude to the success 
conditions  of  the  action  with  the  aim  of  favouring  something  which  is  good.  There  is  no 
requirement that we should conceive of these conditions as concerning something good. Thus when 
we do what we conceive to be bad, it does not follow that the point of action fails to be the good. 
Velleman argues that, if aiming at the good were the aim of desire, then we must conceive of 
that which we desire as good or desirable. It is a necessary condition for having this as its aim 
(Velleman (1992), p. 118). If the point of actions partly derives from the desires behind them, then 
it follows that, if the point of action is the good, it should be so conceived. The points made above 
regarding action taking this connection to be a sufficient condition rather than a necessary one.
However, it is not clear that Velleman is right in making conceiving something to be good a 
necessary  condition.  Although  the  state  of  those  who  desire  what  they  conceive  to  be  bad  is 
puzzling, it does not seem to exclude the possibility that their desires are still aimed at the good. 
Suppose, for instance, that being aimed at the good was the biological function of desires. This 
would remain so even if there were occasions in which subjects conceived that what they desired 
was  bad.  Part  of  the  mechanism  by  which  desires  tracked  the  good  would  be  the  subjects’ 
assessment of what was desired. One way in which this mechanism could malfunction is by judging 
to be good what was, in fact, bad. Another way in which this mechanism could malfunction is by 
failing to have the proper impact upon what one desires either by being ineffective or by being 
conversely effective: what we conceive to be bad being hitched up to what we desire. So long as 
these latter cases are plausibly viewed as cases of malfunctioning, there is no threat to the thesis that 
desires are aimed at  the good. The point is a general  one and can apply to any account of the 
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constitutive aim of desires, beliefs or, the case in point, action. Note how unnatural it would be to 
say that the point of the act, in smashing a racket into your opponent’s face, or killing your children 
to spite your spouse, is to do something bad. At best, the plausibility of such cases derives from 
whether they undermine the thesis that the point of desires is to reveal the good. If what I have 
argued here is correct, though, the cases don’t.
The analogy with belief is two edged. I used it to suggest that the way we regard a proposition 
may come apart from the aim of the state which has the proposition as its object.  Actions may be 
aimed at the good without us regarding what we do as good. Velleman resists this position partly 
because the corresponding possibility for belief seems to make no sense. How can we believe that p 
while  regarding  p to  be false?  (Velleman 1992,  p.  118).  I  suggest  that  cases  of  self-deception 
sometimes  have exactly  this  feature  but  that  they are  rare  because of  an  important  connection 
between attentive  consciousness and the formation  of belief  which I  will  touch on in  the next 
section and which I have defended elsewhere (Noordhof 2001). Another consideration stems from 
beliefs or acts where the subject, either through immaturity or lack of reflectiveness, does not regard 
what is believed or done in either of the ways said to be distinctive: as true or as good. These beliefs 
and actions will be classified as such because of other substantial similarities with the reflectively 
appreciated  beliefs  and  actions,  for  example,  causal  profile.  These  similarities  will  also  justify 
extension to cases in which the conception of the objects is opposite to that which is expected in the 
proper functioning cases e.g. as false or as bad.
The interpretation of cases of the third type is also delicate. Rather than suppose that the agent 
sees nothing good in the acts it seems plausible to suppose that what they do see as good - the injury 
of an opponent, the suffering of somebody who they think merits it - is far outweighed by all the 
things which are bad about the acts. Part of the anguish which is characteristic of agents’ view of 
these acts stems from the fact they are drawn to them, they see something good in them which, 
because they also have a reasonably clear perception of how bad they are, becomes itself a source 
of reproach. If there is something good in the acts - though completely outweighed by all that is bad 
- then there is no problem with supposing that there are reasons derived from the good even though 
these reasons are outweighed by all that is bad.
I conclude that we have yet to find a case for the existence of commitment-based reasons. So 
far, on the one side we have justificatory, but often non-normative, reasons and, on the other, we 
have requirements of reason. The latter specify the combinations of states in which we are as we 
ought to be, and that is, as people who have preserved whatever reasons exist for further reasoning. 
The former may include, as a sub-class, justificatory reasons which, due to malfunctioning, in fact, 
reveal what is conducive to the bad.
Another case for which Millar argues that there are non-justificatory reasons relates to the use of 
terms and possession of concepts. Millar claims that, although their meaning or content gives us 
reasons to use them in particular way, these reasons should not be counted as justificatory. Again, I 
have my doubts about whether we have reasons here at all. In contrast to the previous cases, this is 
much clearer when we consider Millar’s account of the source of these reasons. So rather than 
consider  the  case  further  here,  I  will  go  on  to  discuss  Millar’s  account  of  the  basis  of  non-
justificatory reasons. My conclusion will be that reasons derived from the meaning of terms or the 
content of concepts do not constitute a homogenous group. There will be justificatory reasons and 
Millar-style reasons whose character I question. 
2. The Source of Non-justificatory Reasons
I said at the outset of my discussion that Millar has three prima facie distinct accounts of the source 
of  commitment-based reasons.  In the case of propositional  attitudes,  the idea is  that  they have 
constitutive principles governing their role. These constitutive principles derive from the nature of 
the states. The principles in question are derived from ideals of reason characterised in terms of the 
role  of  the  various  states  in  question.  In  the  case  of  meaning,  our  commitments  stem  from 
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participation in a practice. In the case of concepts, the constitutive principles are derived from the 
nature of the concepts (so, in this sense, they are like propositional attitudes) but not in turn from 
ideals of reason (so, in this sense, they are like meanings).
However, behind this heterogeneity,  there is more homogeneity than may first appear. In all 
three cases, there is something which is understood in terms of constitutive principles: propositional 
attitudes, concepts, practices. In each case, we grasp this through the concepts we have of them. 
Millar  takes  the  constitutive  principles  to  be  part  of  our  concepts  of  these  things  and,  hence, 
identifiable  a  priori.  Self-attribution  is  the  vehicle  by  means  of  which  the  commitments  are 
recognised (Millar 2004, pp. 118-125). We attribute to ourselves a certain intention (for example) 
and, thereby, are committed to act upon it, and so on. If that’s right, then the explanation Millar 
offers  of  our  commitments,  in  general,  is  not  substantially  different  in  character  from  the 
explanation  which  takes  some  of  our  commitments  to  derive  from participation  in  a  practice. 
Variation in the account derives from whether it  is practices, concepts or mental  states that are 
attributed the constitutive principles. The fundamental mechanism thereafter is broadly the same. 
Something Millar explicitly recognises when he indicates that his account of the basis of normative 
commitments in general may be understood as on a par with the commitments which are based in 
the institution of promise keeping (Millar 2004, p. 119).
In  this  section,  I  shall  first  discuss Millar’s  argument  for the practice-based account  of  our 
commitments regarding the meaning of words. This helps to introduce my concerns with the whole 
approach. I’ll then go on to consider whether this type of account in general is adequate for the 
explanatory role of commitments Millar favours.
Millar  distinguishes  between  conditions  of  use  and  those  of  application.  The  conditions  of 
application of a term are those conditions in which,  if the term were applied to the object,  the 
resulting sentence would be true. By ‘applied’ the idea is roughly that of predicating the term of 
some object (e.g. concatenating it with a referring term for the object to form a simple sentence) 
(Millar 2004, p. 161). The conditions of use are broader. They can involve how a term is correctly 
used in interrogative and other non-indicative sentences. The difference also arises where a term is 
correctly applied but based upon a misapprehension of meaning.  Millar’s example is of a ritual 
which  is  both  ancient  and  arcane  being  described  by  a  speaker  as  ‘arcane’  on  the  mistaken 
understanding that the term ‘arcane’ means ancient rather than known only to the initiated (Millar 
2004, pp. 162-163).
With this understanding of the circumstances in which a term is correctly used - rather than 
applied - Millar points out that standard accounts of the origin of the normativity of meaning don’t 
work. For instance, Paul Howich’s claim that the meaning of words determines how we ought to 
use them because it is desirable to believe truths so our actions succeed, and we will not believe 
truths if we use them in nonstandard ways, fails (see Horwich 2005, pp. 81-82, 116-117). There are 
rules governing what a term means, without being connected with truth, and we can arrive at truths 
without  following  the  rules.  The  account  has  no  way  of  explaining  why  we  ought  (or  are 
committed) to using the term according to these rules (Millar 2004, pp. 176-177).
Millar’s  cases  of truths  stemming from misuses  are  accidental,  for  instance,  not  all  ancient 
rituals need be arcane. So we might try to base the normativity of meaning upon the importance of 
reliably believing  the  truth.  Two  issues  arise  in  this  context.  The  first  is  the  strength  of  the 
association between the conditions of application of two distinct terms. For instance, if there is a 
nomologically necessary or metaphysically necessary relationship between the two, then it is not 
simply accidental that the rule for one predicate enables subjects to arrive at a truth regarding the 
application of the other. The second is the proper specification of reliability, for example, does it 
require  sensitivity to the truth of proposition believed or safety, that is, that the belief could not 
easily have been false (Williamson 2000, pp. 127-130, 147-163). Obviously these two issues may 
interact. The tighter the connection between the conditions of application of two distinct terms, the 
less likely that misuse will be unreliable in whatever sense. 
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Suppose  we  allow  that  reliability  comes  in  different  strengths.  Across  one  dimension,  for 
instance, sensitivity is stronger than safety. It may that a belief could not easily have been false and 
yet, if the proposition believed had been false, we would still have had the belief. Similarly, care 
over the rules which govern the use of a term will, in general,  make us more reliable, and less 
reliant upon whether their conditions of application happen to be tied closely together even if, in 
particular  cases,  care does not matter.  A natural  way of putting these two points  together  is  to 
suggest that the rules of application of terms can be understood as part of the characterisation of an 
ideal of reason - something to which Millar appeals in characterisation of the normativity associated 
with propositional attitudes (Millar 2004, pp. 72-78). Because sets of terms used to classify the 
world may vary, there will be different determinate ideals corresponding to different sets.
Not all propositions have potential pragmatic consequences. For those which don’t, the appeal 
to the desirability of successful action won’t work. As a result, Horwich suggests that believing 
truths is non-instrumentally valuable. He characterises the value as a moral one (Horwich 2005, p. 
118; Horwich 2006, pp. 351-352). Developing the point within the framework above, the thought 
would be that we value the ability to be reliably and non-reliantly moral. On the assumption that 
moral  requirements  don’t  apply  to  all  rational  subjects  but  only  for  those  which  are  morally 
sensitive, the ideal of reason identified earlier becomes an ideal of morality and reason.
Even this retreat from instrumental or pragmatic value cannot deal with Millar’s other point: the 
existence of proper uses which are not applications (Millar 2004, pp. 176-177).  Nor, Millar argues, 
can our commitments be derived from intentions to use terms with their received meanings. Young 
children  fail  to  have  such  intentions  yet,  according  to  Millar,  they  still  have  the  relevant 
commitments  (Millar  2004,  pp.  172-173).  Equally,  according  to  Millar,  we should not  seek to 
derive the normativity of meaning from a desire for successful communication, as a result of which 
you  keep  meaning  fixed.  He  suggests  that  it  is  important  to  distinguish  our  commitment  to 
participating within a practice with the commitments following from this participation (Millar 2004, 
pp. 176-177). 
These observations have force if  a univocal account of the normativity of meaning is to be 
expected. An option that Millar does not consider is that different attitudes and values are the basis 
for different elements of our commitments or obligations. This is a point to which I shall return at 
the end of the section. I turn first to Millar’s own approach because it promises a univocal account. 
If it is successful, then that would be a significant consideration in its favour. 
Millar’s preferred alternative is to view our use of terms as participation in a practice.  As a 
result of participating, we are committed to the terms being used in a certain way (Millar 2004, pp. 
166-175). Millar explicitly makes the comparison with Searle’s familiar work on speech acts and 
the practice of promise-keeping in particular  (Millar  (004, p. 119). Searle argued that  he could 
derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’ because, in brief, when subjects utter the words ‘I promise  X’ in 
certain specific circumstances and, thereby, participate in the promise-keeping practice, they place 
themselves under an obligation and, hence, ought, in certain circumstances, keep the promise. The 
important point is that the specification of the circumstances in which uttering ‘I promise  X’ is 
placing  oneself  under  an  obligation  is  entirely  non-evaluative  regarding  promise-keeping.  It  is 
simply a matter  of linguistic  facts,  facts  about the practice of promising-keeping,  the speaker’s 
sincerity  and  so  on  (Searle  1969,  pp.  177-179).  Some  of  these  facts  may  be  more  generally 
normative but they do not concern whether or not we ought to keep our promises.
The standard response to Searle’s approach is to distinguish two senses of ‘ought’: the internal 
and the external. Internal to the practice of promise-keeping - that is, what the practice says we 
ought to do given that we are participants in it - it follows that we ought to keep our promises. 
However, it is always possible to adopt an external view to the practice of promise-keeping and ask 
whether we really ought to do as we ought in the internal sense (Hare 1964, pp. 140-144; Mackie 
1977,  pp.  66-73).  There  are,  at  least,  two  ways  of  understanding  the  internal  sense.  One  is 
participation-relative. Somebody participating in the practice of promise-keeping simply ought to 
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keep their promises (or, better, ‘ought’ unless there are outweighing considerations allowed by the 
practice). The second way of understanding the internal sense is that it simply records the principles 
laid down by the practice for its participants, what the practice says about how you should act when 
you have promised. Call this a practice-relative sense. Respondents to Searle’s position have no 
problem allowing that he can characterise our situation regarding promise-keeping in terms of the 
second way of understanding the internal sense of ought. They deny that anything stronger has been 
established.
The same point  applies  to  Millar’s  favoured formulation  regarding practices  concerning  the 
meaning  of  words  although,  initially,  the  formulation  of  his  position  may  seem  to  avoid  the 
difficulty in two related respects. First, Millar doesn’t speak of ‘ought’ but rather ‘commitment’ 
which is explicitly distinguished from ‘ought’ by being non-justificatory. Second, he characterises 
the situation as: 
O (either withdraw from the practice OR be committed to the rules of the practice) (Millar 
2004, pp. 168-169).
For instance, regarding the practice of promise-keeping, if this holds and one doesn’t withdraw 
from the practice, then one is committed to keeping one’s promise. In a personal communication 
commenting on a previous draft of this review, Millar claims that the second disjunct should read 
simply ‘follow the rules of the practice’. This doesn’t seem to reflect the fact that Millar, in contrast 
to Broome, holds that practices supply non-justificatory reasons for doing something and do not 
simply rule that certain combinations of states are not being as we ought to be. Broome, after all, 
denies that there are reasons (justificatory or otherwise) simply generated by doing or failing to do 
something.
The distinction between internal/external senses of ‘ought’ goes across to commitments. Talk 
about ‘commitment’ rather than ‘ought’ is primarily meant to leave open the possibility that one 
might withdraw from the practice and hence one is not obliged to follow the standards laid down by 
the practice. The question still remains whether, if you are a participant in the practice, the practice-
relative commitments become, for you, participation-relative commitments: commitments you have 
by  participating  in  the  practice.  Or,  can  you  be  a  participant  and  yet  have  no  (normative) 
commitment to the rules?
I don’t see how Millar has established that we should be stuck with taking practices so seriously. 
For all Millar has argued, what is wrong with playing along, and hence participating in the practice, 
and yet eschewing the practice-relative commitments as not applying to you. Not all practices are 
good and yet good can be brought about by playing along until the crucial moment. Suppose that in 
some dystopian future only those who swear allegiance to, and learn the arts of, human huntsman 
obtain access to the killing grounds. Each human who survives a hunt in those grounds is freed 
from being hunted for ever. The good huntsman swore allegiance and learnt the arts in order, by 
sabotaging hunts, to increase the chance of the hunted humans surviving. I don’t see that the good 
huntsman was committed to hunting unless he or she withdrew from the hunt. Obviously, this is a 
deliberately extreme case but it suggests that we need a lot more than participation to transform the 
alloy of practice-relative commitments into the gold of participation-relative commitments for you.
Millar  appreciates that  participation-relative commitments may be overridden or undermined 
(Millar  2004,  p.  86).  However,  that  is  not  sufficient  to  answer  the  charge  that  his  position  is 
committed to taking practices too seriously. The case of the human huntsman is not one where, 
though the huntsman has commitments,  other things count for more.  Nor is it a case where the 
particular nature of some his or her commitments may be undermined by the considerable cost in 
human suffering. Instead, the nature of the practice fails to generate participation-commitments at 
all. 
The question of whether or not the practice-relative sense of commitment - as just recording the 
rules of a practice - is a genuine sense of commitment is of little interest. More important is whether 
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this sense of commitment captures what Millar needs. I see little problem for Millar regarding the 
meaning of terms. The rules which govern their use characterise a way in which a speaker can go 
wrong which we can describe as failing in one’s commitments in the use of the term (if we want to). 
This is compatible with allowing that there might be a very good reason for failing in this way and, 
indeed, rejecting any kind of attribution of participation-relative commitments generated from these 
practice-relative commitments. 
Nor is there a problem when we turn from practice-relative commitments to what we might term 
concept-relative commitments, those recorded in the constitutive rules grounded in the nature of 
concepts. In the case of concepts, apparently radical failure to keep to the rules, so that there is not 
even a partial specification of the property the concept purportedly concerns, makes attribution of 
the concept incorrect (Millar 2004, pp. 182-183). Outside of that, there can be departures from the 
correct  rules of application distinctive of a concept  without that  concept  failing correctly to be 
attributable (Millar 2004, pp. 184-187). We can set aside the question of the circumstances under 
which it is appropriate to attribute a concept. A variety of different opinions are compatible with the 
general thrust of Millar’s approach. Bracketing this, practice-relative commitments are sufficient to 
make it appropriate to describe a subject’s use of a concept as either correct or incorrect in terms of 
the rules without having to rachet up the accusation to saying that they have not behaved as they 
ought.
The difficulty arises when we focus on Millar’s argument against dispositionalism and in favour 
of a normative characterisation of propositional attitudes. As I noted at the beginning of this section, 
Millar supposes that beliefs, desires and other propositional attitudes have constitutive principles 
governing their role in our mental lives. These constitutive principles concern the aims of these 
states. For instance, beliefs, guesses and conjectures all have truth as their constitutive aim, though, 
Millar  argues,  it  governs  their  roles  in  distinctive  ways  (Millar  2004,  pp.  23,  46-47).  These 
constitutive aims reflect conceptual truths about the states in question and our recognition of our 
commitments  with  respect  to  these  aims  are  ensured  by,  and  grounded  in,  our  reflective  self-
attribution of the states in question.
For the reasons I  have indicated  previously,  I  shall  not consider  in any depth whether it  is 
correct to suppose that propositional attitudes should be partly understood in terms of constitutive 
aims. The issue is rather the significance of this. Divide the causal role of these states into two 
components: their downstream role, characterising the kind of states they bring about, and their 
upstream role, characterising the kind of things - other mental states or items in the world - required 
to  cause  them  in  the  first  place.  If  the  states  have  a  certain  constitutive  aim,  and  perhaps  a 
distinctive way in which the aim governs their presence, then it is plausible that this will show up as 
a distinctive causal profile of the state. Some have argued that we cannot understand belief in terms 
of its downstream causal profile alone because we would be unable to distinguish between belief 
and imagination (e.g. Velleman 2000, pp. 255-263). I do not think this is true (Noordhof 2001, p. 
253). However, we need no such claim to defend the interest of individuating mental states in terms 
of  a  causal  profile  which  includes  both  downstream and upstream causal  roles.  The  important 
question is whether there are any grounds for supposing that a normative characterisation of our 
mental lives is essential and whether, by recognising this, we can understand why it is of interest to 
individuate mental states in terms of both their downstream and upstream causal roles. It is here that 
I have my doubts about Millar’s approach. 
His approach rests upon the observation that we cannot adopt a purely contemplative view to the 
causal role of our propositional attitudes. He illustrates this as follows: 
Suppose I am prone to irritability... I could adopt a purely contemplative stance in which I 
simply register that I am easily irritated. I could be indifferent or just curious about how I 
will react in situations I am about to encounter. In any case, the matter would be of merely 
theoretical interest (Millar 2004, pp. 111-112).
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By  contrast,  Millar  urges,  if  we  currently  intend  to  do  A  but  do  nothing  to  ensure  the 
implementation of A, we don’t really have an intention (Millar 2004, pp. 112-113). Similarly if we 
believe that something is the case but fail to be moved by its implications being false, we don’t 
really have the belief (Millar 2004, p. 117). Dispositionalism about any mental state allows for the 
possibility of adopting a purely contemplative view to the state. Hence the impossibility of a purely 
contemplative view to beliefs and intentions reveals the inadequacy of dispositionalism. Here Millar 
is  appealing to Richard Moran’s point  that  our own propositional  attitudes,  such as beliefs  and 
intentions, concern what we endorse, what we are engaged to do, and bring with them commitments 
to do it: they have roles in a first person essentially practical perspective (Moran 2001, p. 79). 
The problem is this is not what we would predict given Millar’s account of the source of the 
commitments relating to our propositional attitudes.  Suppose I believe that I promised to do  A. 
Then, given the distinction between practice-relative commitments and the rest, I can still reflect on 
whether I ought to do A. I could be indifferent to doing A because I don’t accept the obligations of 
the practice of promise-keeping or I might be just curious to see whether the practice of promise-
keeping manages to make me feel guilty about whether or not to keep my promise even though I 
don’t recognise the obligation or I might carry out its requirements experimentally to see whether 
good or bad things follow. Of course, I can’t quite see the outcome as of theoretical interest alone 
because  I  am considering  what  to  do.  Herein  lies  a  potential  disanalogy  with  being  irritable. 
Irritability does not just govern what we do but also behavioural responses that are less plausibly 
characterised as actions. The disanalogy does not establish the connection between practice-relative 
commitments and the inability to adopt the contemplative stance though. It can simply be explained 
in terms of the way in which making a promise is more practically salient. Moreover, recognising 
that we are irritable, can be highly practically salient too. We can reflect upon whether our beliefs 
and intentions are steered by this disposition and take steps against it.
I  don’t  mean to suggest that,  when we self-attribute  intentions  or beliefs,  we can adopt the 
external perspective to them and dismiss whatever commitments we seem to associate with them. It 
is very plausible that, when we have an intention, we strive to implement what is intended and, 
when we have a belief,  we draw the appropriate consequences. These observations point to the 
character  of  the  complex  dispositional  properties  attributions  of  each  pick  out,  in  this  respect 
different  from  that  of  irritability.  If  detachment  is  not  an  option,  then  this  is  a  feature  the 
characterisation of the causal role must respect. My point is that, if the normative character of our 
beliefs and intentions involves commitments which are simply the result of constitutive aims and 
principles grounded in the nature of these attitudes - just as the practice of promise-keeping has 
certain  constitutive  rules  concerning  the practice-relative  commitments  of  a  promise  -  then  we 
should expect that it is possible to adopt the external perspective to our intentions and beliefs as 
well.  I should also make clear that I’m not claiming that our attitude to making promises is as 
commitment-free as my remarks might seem to suggest. We are not indifferent to the promises we 
make. The point is rather that, if our commitments were routed in practices in the way that Searle 
and Millar  suggest,  that  would be our situation.  The fact  that  it  is  not suggests  that  they have 
identified the wrong source of our commitments or, at best, given an inadequately differentiated 
account of its source. 
As I have already noted, Millar holds that we recognise the commitments involved in being in 
certain mental states through attributing them to ourselves. Thus, ascribing to oneself the belief that 
p is  a  way of endorsing  p and being committed  to  what follows from this.  However,  it  is  the 
endorsement element of the story which is doing the work. Successful self-attribution may require 
that we are disposed to act upon the state attributed, either as the basis of our recognition of what 
state we are in, or as a requirement for its successful representation. In neither case, does it follow 
that there are distinctive commitments attached to the states attributed or, more to the point, if there 
are commitments, that they are the basis for our inability to take a contemplative attitude to these 
states.  A state’s  constitutive principles do not make the contemplative stance towards that state 
62  Understanding People Keeping Up Standards 
impossible  unless  these  principles  are  endorsed  and,  of  course,  if  a  subject  has  endorsed  the 
principles, then contemplation is over.
Millar  argues  that  reference  to  commitments  is  essential  in  the  specification  of  all  of  this 
because the dispositions characteristic of a belief are dispositions to discharge our commitments 
(Millar  2004, p. 128). I didn’t see the force of this line of thought. We may need to grasp the 
commitments  of  a  belief  in  order  to  be  able  to  specify exactly  which mental  states  should be 
succeeded  by  other  mental  states  but  it  is  presumably  possible  to  describe  the  relations  of 
succession, and identify the states in question, in non-normative ways. Of course, if such states are 
essentially  normative,  then  this  will  not  be  possible.  But  I  take  it  that  we are  supposed to  be 
considering whether we have reason to believe this and not assuming that it is so at the outset. The 
non-normatively specified causal role may well be conceived of as the role which spells out the 
commitments  of  the  belief  but  the  role  itself  may  have  a  fully  adequate  non-normative 
characterisation (as far as I can see). 
Millar recognises that commitments can be flouted. We may participate in a practice and yet 
flout the rules (e.g. see Millar on soccer, Millar (2004), pp. 168-169). Thus, the inability to adopt 
the contemplative stance to certain attitudes is compatible with flouting their commitments. 
Endorsing a particular mental state may be characterised in terms of ruling out flouting (if there 
are commitments to be flouted). Although Millar allows that flouting is possible and, indeed, in the 
case  of  soccer  pretty  easy,  there  are  other  occasions  where  he seems  to  take  the  existence  of 
commitments  to  make  flouting  much  more  difficult.  His  discussion  of  a  certain  type  of  self-
deception is a case in point.
A familiar example is that of a father who believes that his son is a fine painter because of the 
pleasure it brings him to believe this of his son, while, deep down, knowing that his son’s artwork is 
poor (Millar 2004, pp. 151-152). Millar rejects this attribution of belief to the father in favour of 
either simply thinking that his son is a fine painter, or avowing that his son is a fine painter, or 
conjecturing his son is a fine painter, or being prepared to act as if he believes that his son is a fine 
painter.  The  strategy founders  on its  inability  to  capture  the  precise  nature  of  the conflict  and 
complacency that the father feels. You don’t fill with pride, feel relaxed about your son’s future 
career, feel unembarrassed about his work in most circumstances, and so forth, if you don’t believe 
that he is a fine painter but just entertain the thought he is or conjecture that he is or act as if you 
believe he is. For all the rest of these attitudes, it is very much open whether or not the son is a fine 
painter and one gets little satisfaction from them. On the other hand, if the father is significantly 
challenged, certain matters are drawn to his attention, and so forth, you can be surprised about how 
quickly the points strike home and provoke a negative defensive reaction. You can be puzzled how 
the negative case seems, in a way, already familiar or how, in a defensive reaction, a further feature 
of the negative case is presupposed. There are going to be no open and shut examples of this kind 
but the attribution of two conflicting beliefs does make sense of all of this and differentiates these 
type of cases from ones involving the non-doxastic attitudes.
A constitutive principle of beliefs is supposed to be that they are aimed at the truth. It seems to 
be  because  Millar  views this  principle  as  pretty  much unfloutable  that  he insists  that  the self-
deceived  don’t  have  beliefs which,  at  the  same  time,  they  deep  down take  to  be  false.   The 
assumption relates to his concern that, if such cases of self-deception were possible, they would 
show subjects could have a more detached attitude to their beliefs than, he presumes, is compatible 
with his theory (Millar  2004, pp. 151-152). However,  this seems to be a mistake.  If his theory 
allows flouting, then it allows for a more detached attitude to the principle alleged to be constitutive 
of belief. If flouting is ruled out here, we need an explanation why. Even if that is forthcoming, he 
does not have to deny the type of case of self-deception just described. A conflicted subject who 
believes p and believes that not-p will be equally conflicted in terms of his or her endorsements and 
detachment.  When  one  belief  is  centre-stage,  he  or  she  will  be  in  the  grip  of  endorsements 
concerning it and detached from the other belief he or she is said to have, and vice versa. Millar is 
  63
quite at liberty to qualify his position to accommodate this without damaging its overall structure. 
Of course, he might think that such a qualification is unnecessary or implausible but, it seems to 
me, this follows from an antecedent view about a certain way of understanding self-deception and 
not because the structure of his position impels him in that way in the respects mentioned.
Millar’s treatment of the paradoxical character of Moorean sentences such as
I believe that p and it is not the case that p
also seems to rely upon flouting being much more difficult. According to Millar, the first conjunct 
claims  that  I’m in  a  state  with  certain  commitments,  for  instance,  assenting  to  p.  The  second 
conjunct  has  me  failing  to  fulfil  that  commitment  (Millar  2004,  p.  125).  If  I  can  flout  my 
commitments,  then it  seems that I should have no particular  difficulty attributing to myself  the 
belief that p while failing to endorse p. This would just be a case in which I am a conscious flouter. 
Yet, the state seems far more problematic than that. It is not inconsistent but it is not simply that we 
don’t like thinking of ourselves as rule flouters. 
It is open to Millar to appeal to the endorsement story I mentioned earlier (as he has noted to me 
in a personal communication). According to this, I cannot represent myself as having a belief that p 
while failing to endorse p. Hence a necessary condition of self-attribution would not be met in the 
situation that the Moorean sentence describes. However, as before, the appeal to the endorsement 
story renders apparently otiose mention of commitments.
Perhaps the thought is that I would have no reason to self-ascribe a belief that p if I felt no 
commitment to assent to p. However, this seems to get things after the fact (as it were). It is because 
my endorsement that p determines that I have a belief that p that, from the first person perspective, 
my reasons for p are reasons to self-ascribe the belief that p. Moorean sentences appear paradoxical 
because of this direction of endorsement rather than because of the subsequent commitments I have, 
if I am in these states. I see no grounds for thinking that the role of these reasons cannot be captured 
in  causal  terms.  Equally,  when  Moran  observes  that  our  resolutions  about  what  to  do  remain 
resolutions for which we are responsible even if we believe that we are prone to backsliding, he 
captures a certain causal profile: how we are apt to respond to what we have resolved, the way in 
which  beliefs  about  their  strength  cannot  influence  our  resolutions  in  certain  ways,  how  our 
attitudes to these resolutions can, and so on.
Tacit appeal to different difficulties in flouting obscures the explanatory inadequacy of appeal to 
normativity  in  the  explanation  of  our  mental  life.  One  challenge,  arising  from  the  previous 
discussion,  is  this.  Given  that  there  are  cases  of  self-deception,  and  the  like,  in  which  the 
downstream causal role of belief comes apart from the upstream causal role, why are these cases so 
rare? In particular, why is it so difficult consciously to produce a belief at will? Here I don’t mean 
consciously go about manipulating oneself so one gets in a position in which one ends up with a 
certain belief (for example, looking in the mirror every morning and repeating ‘Every day and in 
every way I’m getting better and better’). Rather the thought is that we cannot consciously produce 
our beliefs directly without this kind of manipulation. Moreover, this inability is not like the fact 
that many of us are unable to waggle our ears but perhaps could learn to do so and that there are 
creatures who can. The inability consciously to produce beliefs at will seems to be stronger than 
that. Millar’s floutable constitutive aims seem ill-suited to be the basis for an explanation. Talk of 
the  constitutive  principles  governing  the  formation  of  belief  provides  no  answer  without  a 
background theory concerning the ease to which these principles may be flouted.
My own favoured response begins with the thought that  we find it  strongly attractive to be 
disposed to act upon what we take to be true: that is, we find it very attractive to be in states with 
the downstream causal role of belief only if it also has the upstream causal role. So the aim of truth, 
such as it is, of a particular kind of state, belief, is derived from the desires we have regarding the 
basis of our action. However, now we simply have a relocation of the problem. The issue becomes 
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the prevalence of these desires. 
One possible explanation is that evolutionary selection favours creatures with such desires.  If 
that were right, then the aim of truth is not essentially associated with belief. It is just that we find it 
invariably  associated  in  all  evolutionarily  evolved  creatures.  Given  an  appeal  to  evolution,  an 
appeal to desires may seem inessential. All that we need is that, in evolutionarily evolved creatures, 
states  with  the  downstream causal  role  of  beliefs  will  have  the  upstream causal  sensitivity  to 
whether or not they are true (for instance, by being responsive to perceptual evidence). The problem 
with  this  position  is  that  evolutionarily  selected  systems  may  malfunction  both  in  some 
circumstances  within  a  creature  and  for  some  creatures  all  the  time:  hearts  providing  a  good 
example, the malfunctioning of which may lead to an early death. From the point of evolutionary 
selection,  what  could  be  more  important  than  a  functioning  heart?  Certainly  not  directly 
unmanipulable  beliefs.  Indeed,  if  systems  may  malfunction,  there  seems  no  reason  why  the 
following particular kind of malfunctioning might not occur: failing to have the appropriate desires. 
Yet, however irrational and misguided a subject is, it still seems as if they are seeking to respond to 
material which is guiding the subject towards the truth: evidence of various kinds. 
I have argued elsewhere that an important  feature of attentive consciousness is that  it  gives 
determinative weight to the norm of truth. It makes manifest the attractiveness of being disposed to 
act upon what one takes to be true. As a result, we make judgements and form beliefs - that is, go 
into states  which dispose us  to  act  on what  we take to  be true.  When we are  not consciously 
attending to the reasons for or against a particular belief, it is possible to be disposed to act upon 
what one takes to be true (since we take all our beliefs to be true) without the beliefs in question 
being sensitive to whether or not they are true. Classic examples involve self-deception. That’s why 
a failure  of consciousness at  a crucial  point is  required for self-deception  (Noordhof 2001, pp. 
259-264, Noordhof 2003).
Of course, the same challenge might be turned upon me. Might there not be creatures which lack 
attentive  consciousness  as  a  result  of  evolutionary  malfunction?  If  so,  don’t  I  have  a  similar 
problem with  explaining  why it  is  just  not  possible  to  have  directly  manipulable  beliefs?  The 
response is that the datum which we need to explain is why I cannot consciously believe something 
at  will.  The  existence  of  self-deception  and  related  phenomena  demonstrates  that  I  can 
unconsciously do this.
In the first part of this section, I argued that much (but not all) of the normative force which is 
attributed to meaning can be derived from the value of reliably believing the truth. In the second 
part of this section, I argued that the state-relative analogue of his account of the normativity of 
meaning  cannot  play  the  role  he  sought  for  it.  Instead,  appeal  was  needed  to  the  idea  of 
endorsement  and/or  floutability.  If  Millar’s  aim was to  establish an explanatory role  for norms 
derived from the idea that certain things - practices, concepts, states - have constitutive principles, 
then the case developed in this section puts pressure on it from two angles. The first part suggests 
that there is another source of normative force in central cases of meaning, the second part suggests 
that Millar’s type of account does not earn its keep when applied to propositional attitudes. 
An alternative would be to accept Millar’s account of practice/state/concept relative principles 
(call them norms if you like) but argue that such an account has little to do with the explanatory 
appeal of normative considerations. The explanatory work is done, rather, by the way in which 
these principles reveal themselves to be attractive to follow, our endorsement of them, or various 
other explanations as to how they might be easier or more difficult to flout. If the normativity of 
meaning is taken to concern the latter, then no uniform account of it is likely. The principles may 
state, in general,  what our obligations are but their existence does not constitute the obligations. 
Instead, obligations derive, sometimes, from the value of reliably believing the truth, sometimes 
from the value of successful communication and sometimes, for example in the case of children, 
from the attraction of avoiding being scolded by adults. 
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3. The High Conception of Propositional Attitudes
Part of Millar’s justification for the high conception of propositional attitudes is that it is from our 
capacity for self-attribution that we recognise the constitutive aims of our propositional attitudes 
and, as a result of which, they have impact. Consciousness of their commitments is essential for 
propositional attitudes to play the role that they do. The latter point is one source of the claim that 
beliefs, desires and other such states may not be attributed to certain animals, those without the 
capacity for conscious thought about the commitments of these states. Indeed, the phenomena to 
which Millar adverts can receive an even thinner description in some cases. It matters little whether 
we describe what is required in terms of being conscious of a state’s commitments. The question is 
simply whether consciousness of a state is required for them to play a certain kind of role. Thus, 
Millar argues that we carry out our intentions only if we know we have them (Millar 2004, pp. 
146-148). Our failure to act as intended can be simply because we forgot - that is, were not aware of 
our intention - even though we had it. 
Similarly,  Millar  argues, desires are only indirectly explanatory of action.  Desires may be a 
cause of beliefs that I have them, and hence causes of my action, but they will not figure as the 
immediate cause of the action in question (Millar 2004, p. 12). According to Millar, this is because 
our desires do not lead us to act blindly. We act with a view to satisfying our desires. Beliefs which 
figure as assumptions in our reasoning require knowing that the assumptions are ones we believe 
and are relying upon (Millar 2004, p. 138). 
In the case of intentions, Millar claims that a further justification for the high conception derives 
from the problem of deviant causal chains. In order to capture the difference, Millar argues that in a 
nondeviant case, we do something by way of intending to carry out the intention in question and 
being sensitive to its commitments.  
If the activity of our mental states requires being able reflect about our propositional attitudes 
and form beliefs about them, then it seems that the capacity for such reflection is essential to having 
these propositional attitudes. The high conception of these states is true.
I have three worries about this defence of the high conception of propositional attitudes. The 
first is that it does not seem sensitive to the distinction between being conscious that one has a 
certain propositional attitude and knowing or believing that one does. The latter higher order state 
does not have to be conscious and, if it is not, we are presumably no better off. For example, if I fail 
to act because I forget my intention, then action is not secured by the equally forgettable belief that 
I have the intention. A consequence of this point is that Millar has no particular need to endorse a 
non-intentional characterisation of self-deception. I don’t deny that it is very plausible to suppose 
that there are cases of purposive but non-intentional belief-production as Mark Johnston envisages 
(Johnston 1988). Nevertheless, as we can know what intention we have without being conscious of 
it, Millar could combine the high conception of intention - if he so wished - with the possibility of 
intentional self-deception without threat of paradox (Millar 2004, pp. 156-157). Perhaps Millar is 
committed to a higher order account of consciousness according to which, beliefs about lower order 
states  make them conscious  without the beliefs  themselves  being conscious  (see e.g.  Rosenthal 
1990). Nevertheless, this is not a matter he discusses.
Second, and relatedly, even if beliefs about states are required for them to play their role, on 
pain of regress, there will be some states that play their role in the absence of beliefs about them, for 
example, the higher order beliefs themselves. The question is, if this is allowed, then  what’s so 
special (or lacking) about the lower order states which makes beliefs about them required for their 
role to be played? Perhaps Millar’s thought is that, when a higher order state enables a lower order 
state to play a role, the higher order state is not, itself playing a role. When it is, then an even higher 
order state concerning it is required in turn. If something along these lines is correct, more detail is 
desirable about when a state requires another state to enable it to play a role because, certainly, the 
higher order state plays some role by enabling lower order states to play theirs.
Third, and finally, it doesn’t seem obvious that Millar’s appeal to beliefs about the commitments 
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of  states  avoids  the  difficulty  arising  from  deviant  causal  chains.  The  essential  role  of 
considerations from deviant causal chains arises in the following way. Millar accepts that agents 
may follow the constitutive plan of an intention they possess without conceiving of themselves as 
implementing the intention in the plan. For example, Davidson’s climber wants to let go the rope so 
that the climber below (who has lost grip) fails to drag him down the mountain. He becomes so 
nervous that this causes his hand to jerk so letting the rope go. Nevertheless, the climber was not 
acting upon the intention and did not conceive of himself as so doing. Here we have a deviant 
causal chain which implements the planned results.
Millar makes two moves to deal with such cases. First, following Searle, Millar talks about the 
intention-in-action - described from the first person perspective - as that I Φ by way of carrying out  
this intention (Millar 2004, pp. 145-147, Searle 1983, p. 85). Second, he appeals to the idea that, in 
normal,  that  is  nondeviant,  cases,  we  are  sensitive  to  the  commitments  of  our  propositional 
attitudes. 
Regarding the first move, it is not obvious that, if I have an intention with the content that I Φ 
by way of carrying out this very intention, it follows that the resultant behaviour is non-deviantly 
caused. Searle claims that what is lacking in the deviant cases, and present in the nondeviant cases, 
is an experience of the movement (corresponding to the action) as a result of the intention in action. 
For instance, if the action is raising one’s arm, the corresponding movement is one’s arm raising. 
The action is the combination of the experience and the movement caused by it. This is peculiar. It 
suggests that something may be a perceiving of something else - the causing of movement - while 
being prior to it because it is doing the causing.  It is usually thought that a necessary condition of 
perceiving something is that the latter is a cause of the former. Perhaps Searle supposes that the 
experience has the content of a causing of a movement without being a perception of the causing 
(Searle 1983, pp. 91-95). If that’s right, then it is quite unclear why one shouldn’t have a case which 
isn’t action and yet in which one has the relevant experience. Indeed, the climber may experience 
his or her intention causing the action because it is having the intention that makes him or her 
nervous.
In considering this case, Searle says that there is no moment at which the climber might say I 
am now letting go of the rope as a result of the intention (Searle 1983, p. 108). However, that is not 
the correct test. The test is whether the agent is experiencing the rope being let go as a result of the 
intention.  The answer to that is surely ‘yes’ unless ‘as a result of’ is intended in a non-deviant 
causal sense. In which case, we need a specification of what this sense is. Once we have it, there 
would be no need to appeal to this component of Searle’s analysis because we could go straight to 
‘go’ and use it to characterise non-deviant causation directly.
Making intentions  reflexive not only seems ineffective,  arguably it  gets  the phenomenology 
wrong. It is certainly correct that, when an agent intends to Φ, he or she does not suppose that the 
action will be caused by other means. It is also true that, in those circumstances, he or she will not 
have acted if the action is caused by other means. Nevertheless, I don’t see why it follows from 
these two things that the intention in question is reflexive. When we act we don’t typically intend to 
produce an action which has a certain aetiology. We just aim to produce something with a certain 
outcome (and our beliefs and desires are geared towards this). It seems to me that we have here, at 
best,  the illicit infiltration of the requirements of an analysis - regarding the difference between 
deviant and non-deviant causal chains - into the proper specification of the content of a state. 
This brings me to the second component of Millar’s position - indeed, the one on which he 
places  emphasis  -  namely  that  we should  be  aware  of  the  commitments  of  the  intention.  The 
problem here  is  that  one may be  so  aware  and yet  have  an  action  which  is  deviantly  caused. 
Consider Davidson’s climber. He thinks that the only way he will survive is by letting go the rope. 
He intends to do this and is aware of the commitments of his intention.  As a result of this, he 
becomes so nervous, that he does it anyway. If you consider the original case plausible, it is hard to 
see  why  one  should  not  consider  this  case  plausible.  Indeed,  it  is  plausible  that  this  way  of 
  67
describing the case is central. It is no special variant. The whole reason why the climber became 
nervous is precisely because he is aware of the commitments of the intention he has formed.
The same goes  for  Searle’s  variant  on this  position.  He suggests  that  we should  appeal  to 
whether or not we have a reliable case of causation by the intentional aspects of the relevant states 
(Searle 1983, pp. 135-140). But such intentions may be quite reliable in getting our climber nervous 
as a result of their intentional features. Still the result would not be an action because, intuitively, he 
is neither in control of his nervousness nor is this part of the standard causal route to action. 
The message of deviant causal chain cases is not that you should identify more mental states that 
can capture the difference - for instance, knowledge of one’s intention - or that there should be a 
particular content or quality that the action should have. The message is rather that, when all these 
are taken into account, we need to talk of a particular way in which  this lot causes the action in 
question. For example, in the case of belief,  Ralph Wedgwood appeals to a rational capacity or 
disposition to respond to the commitments of a belief to form any of a range of other beliefs, when 
we are considering basic steps of reasoning (as opposed to those involving further mental states as 
intermediate  steps in reasoning)  (Wedgwood 2006, p.  672).  As an illuminating response to the 
problem of deviant causal chains, I have my doubts about this. Extending the approach to the case 
we have been considering, I presume that the intention to let go the rope causing the action via 
nervousness would fail to count as a rational capacity or disposition even though it may count as a 
mental  disposition  of  the  subject,  even  if  this  disposition  were  highly  sensitive  to  a  range  of 
different cases, and even though, as we saw with regard to the other proposals, it is a response to the 
commitments to the intention. That suggests that the deviant-nondeviant distinction is, at least to 
some extent, embedded in the classification of a capacity as rational or otherwise. Nevertheless, as 
an articulation of exactly the kind of account we need - appealing to a certain way of causing rather 
than intermediary states - Wedgwood’s proposal seems bang on the money.
4. Explanatory Relevance of the Normative (and the Character of the Explanations in which it 
figures)
In his initial characterisation of the problem of explanatory relevance, Millar writes that the issue is
If  rationalizing  explanations  are  causal,  then  the  attitudes  cited  in  such an  explanation 
explain qua causes of the action...The challenge ... is to show how the fact that the agent’s 
attitudes  rationalize  what  they  explain  can  be  relevant  to  the  explanation  of  what  is 
explained (Millar 2004, p. 21).
This suggests that there are three defensive steps needed to vindicate an appeal to the explanatory 
relevance  of  the normative.  First,  identify  a  potential  causal  role  for  the  commitment-inducing 
properties of the contents of beliefs, and other propositional attitudes, for instance, their conceptual 
structure or logical form. Second, explain how the commitment-inducing properties of the contents 
of beliefs (say), and not simply their realisations, are a cause of the transition from some beliefs to 
other beliefs. This would involve Millar in discussing what Jaegwon Kim has dubbed the exclusion 
problem (e.g. Kim 1998). If the world of physics is causally complete and mental properties are not 
identical to, but realised by, the properties identified by physics, then there seems to be no causal 
role for mental properties. Their realisers will cause each other and the mental properties will just 
come along for the ride. Third, argue that the causal role which the commitment-inducing properties 
play is one which makes their  normative nature explanatorily relevant.  That is,  the explanatory 
force is genuinely normative and not simply causation by the normative. The last step is suggested 
by Millar’s distinction, in the quoted passage, between rationalising attitudes being causes and it 
being the fact that they rationalize which explains the action (see also Millar 2004, p. 192). We 
might dub the overall  challenge that these steps answer, the integration challenge.  How do you 
integrate normative explanatory material with a causal framework?
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Unfortunately, Millar’s main response to the integration challenge seems to be to explain how 
the normative may be efficacious and, even there, as he acknowledges, the defence is incomplete. 
This doesn’t quite measure up to the initial problem set. He begins by rejecting the idea that the role 
of commitment-inducing properties is simply that the commitments identify how things will go in 
idealised  appropriate  circumstances.  He notes that  if  we have dispositions  whose manifestation 
corresponds to,  and  thereby display an implicit  grasp (perhaps)  of,  logical  relations,  it  doesn’t 
follow that the commitment-inducing features have an explanatory role (Millar 2004, pp. 196-197). 
Although this seems right, it is slightly surprising that Millar makes this point and yet accepts that 
the failure of such dispositions to be manifested captures what goes wrong in deviant cases (Millar 
2004, p. 198). As we saw in the previous section, sculptured nervous dispositions would still seem 
to be deviant even if they display the envisaged structure. If dispositions may correspond to, and 
thereby display an implicit grasp of logical relations, without commitment-inducing features have a 
suitable  explanatory  role,  then  these  very  same  dispositions  cannot  constitute  the  essential 
difference  between deviance  and non-deviance.  Failure  to  have a suitable  explanatory role will 
correspond to a particular class of deviant cases of causation. On the other hand, if the dispositions 
are only manifested if they are responsive to commitments in a non-deviant way, then likewise it 
seems that they will not be manifested if there is simply correspondence with a content’s logical 
relations.
The second point he makes against the appeal to the disposition to respond to commitments is 
that it would not be able to account for cases in which, while the reasons failed to support the 
action, rational explanation is still possible. Things which seemed a good idea but weren’t couldn’t 
be the manifestation of a rational disposition (Millar 2004, pp. 203-206). Yet surely, Millar argues, 
we  would  not  want  to  say  that  the  commitments  of  propositional  attitudes  failed  to  have  an 
explanatory role.
The general form of Millar’s proposal is that, when rational explanation is operative, we take 
ourselves to have an adequate reason to believe that p (say) as a result of which we believe that p 
(Millar 2004, p. 204).  In good reason cases, we take ourselves to have adequate reason because 
there is such a relationship. In bad reason cases, when we don’t stand in this relation, there should 
be an explanation of why we take ourselves to do so (Millar 2004, p. 207).There is some unity but 
also some important differences in the cases regarding how the explanation works (Millar 2004, pp. 
209-210).
The problem with this position is that the difficulties he has identified, if genuine, seem to apply 
as much to taking oneself to have an adequate reason as they do to the beliefs mediated by it, on the 
one hand, and the rejected appeal  to dispositions,  on the other.  If  all  that  Millar  means  by the 
italicised phrase is that the subject is disposed to respond in the appropriate way, then it is not clear 
how his proposal avoids the first problem he raises for dispositional accounts. If taking oneself to  
have adequate reason is a mental state on a par with beliefs and desires, then we need a story of 
how its commitment-inducing properties have an explanatory impact. At a certain level, it seems we 
are going to be appealing simply to causality. We will have causation by the normative and not an 
explanation with genuine normative force. 
It is not obvious that the integration challenge - understood in the way that Millar seems to 
understand it - can be met. Once it is accepted that the normative is, and must be, efficacious in 
order to have explanatory force, it seems that the best we can expect is that such explanatory force 
rests upon a particular kind of causation by the normative.  In that  case, though, the substantial 
challenge to the explanatory force of the normative stems from those who endorse a variant of 
Jaegwon  Kim’s  exclusion  argument.  If  there  is  a  complete  causal  story  characterised  in  non-
normative terms, then, on pain of systematic overdetermination, there is no role for the normative to 
play.  Yet  Millar  does  not  discuss  this  argument  and,  he  has  confirmed  to  me  in  personal 
communication that, while he assumes that there is some answer to it, he does not seek to defend a 
particular approach in his book. In the light of my discussion above, this strikes me as a lacuna. 
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Another development of his approach to the explanatory role of the normative is revealed in his 
discussion  of  theory  theory  versus  simulation  accounts  of  explanations  citing  propositional 
attitudes. Millar rejects the idea that, if we appeal to reasons or commitments, we must take the 
resulting explanations to be those favoured by the simulationist. Here it is helpful to distinguish 
between two issues. First, is the material we use to explain the mental life of others something that 
can be represented as a theory?  It is not obvious that talk of commitments is a natural  part of 
scientific theorising. Second, is the right description of the cognitive processes that enable us to 
understand  others  properly  described  as  theorising  or  simulating?   This  distinction  is  slightly 
obscured by Millar’s talk of the basis for ascribing attitudes which can be thought of in either way 
(Millar 2004, p. 215). Millar takes simulation theorists to deny that a theory can be formulated but 
this is much too strong if one is a simulationist regarding the second issue. Contrary to what Millar 
suggests, even if a theory can be formulated, simulation would scarcely be useless. First, the theory 
may not be available to the subject. Second, simulation may help us deal with the complexity of the 
subject matter and, also, provide a cognitive saving in processing power. By the same token, we 
may agree with Millar that the resolution of these issues do not proclaim one way or another upon 
whether it is appropriate to appeal to the normative to understand and explain others.
5. Concluding Remarks
The starting point in Millar’s work is that there are certain things which have constitutive principles 
concerning them: practices, states and concepts. Two additional claims are then made: first, that 
these constitutive principles are normative (although not necessarily justificatory) and, second, that 
they play a certain explanatory role. I have tried to argue that these two claims are in tension. The 
explanatory role identified - in particular, to explain when a contemplative attitude is not possible - 
cannot be played by appealing to constitutive principles alone. This is fundamentally because there 
will always be a further question of whether the constitutive principles are ones we should respect 
even if, in some sense, we have committed ourselves by the terms of the practice, by instantiating 
the state, or by utilising the concept. Contrary to what Millar urges, there is a further question of 
what people have resolved to do or whether they have endorsed the principles which is crucial to 
the proper understanding of how they respond (see Millar, Precis, p. 15). The proper understanding 
of  this  is  a  matter  of  psychology  (and philosophy)  and cannot  be  exhausted  by  appeal  to  the 
normative.
Even acknowledging this, there is a question over whether we should conclude that there is a 
genuinely stronger notion of normativity as yet  uncaptured by talk  of constitutive principles or 
whether  that’s  the  only notion  we have  and the  rest  is  to  be  dealt  with  under  the  heading  of 
endorsement or resolution. My suggestion is that we keep the option of supposing that there is a 
genuine normativity as yet uncaptured and, as a working hypothesis, at least, take the constitutive 
principles to be setting out a standard: a standard to which, at least in principle, we may adopt the 
contemplative attitude and question whether it works for us.
At  the  beginning  of  section  1,  I  claimed  that,  in  many cases,  reasons  themselves  are  non-
normative states of affairs. Their bearing on propositional attitudes, which I characterised in terms 
of their oughtiness, stemmed from the constitutive principles that governed the formation of these 
attitudes.  We  are  tempted  to  ascribe  oughtiness  to  the  world  where  the  relevant  states  and 
constitutive principles are not forthcoming. If constitutive principles simply lay down a standard, 
then,  the  oughtiness  of  reasons  cannot  stem from the  constitutive  principles  alone.  They  may 
characterise how states of affairs bear upon the world - which states of affairs may count as reasons 
for which propositional attitudes - but they will not by themselves provide an explanation of why 
we  ought to be in these states in such and such circumstances. The obligatory character depends 
upon another feature as well, that touched upon under the heading of endorsement or resolution. 
The  constitutive  principles  lay  down  distinctive  standards  for  various  kinds  of  things  but  our 
endorsement of, or resolution to adopt, these standards is required to turn the alloy of principles or 
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regulations into the gold of obligation. At the end of section two, I noted that endorsement may rest 
upon a number of different  factors so that there  is no unitary account  of all  of the obligations 
attached to meaning, concepts and propositional attitudes and not even a unitary account for each of 
them.
In developing a theory of endorsement, we may hope to arrive at answers to the explanatory 
issues raised so eloquently in Millar’s work and discussed in sections three and four. In particular, 
when we provide normative explanations, must the application of endorsed principles be mediated 
by higher order states and, if so, how? How will these endorsed principles be explanatorily relevant 
when we also explain things in terms of brute causality? What kind of causation must be involved? 
A theory of endorsement will need to explain how a subject is sensitive to the exact content of the 
principles and resolves to be governed by them. In spelling this out, we will need to explain what is 
involved in government and, presumably thereby, when it is relevant to cite the fact that we were so 
governed1.
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Replies to Authors 
ALAN MILLAR
I am grateful to my critics for their comments and for the work that they have put into producing 
them. Thinking about the criticisms, and how best to reply to them, has been a valuable exercise for 
me. I hope my responses will be of some use. I have focused on what I take to be the main points. 
Many of the issues raised merit further discussion.
Reply to De Caro
I am encouraged by Mario De Caro’s appreciative comments. In the book I developed a broadly 
Davidsonian  line  of  thought  on  which  rationality  is  taken  to  be  essential  to  the  possession  of 
propositional attitudes. I suggested that rationality is not just a matter of internal coherence and the 
legitimacy of transitions in reasoning, but has to do with being in touch with reality. De Caro asks, 
‘how we, the interpreters, can be sure that the interpreted speaker is actually in touch with reality—
even if this is what it seems like to us’ (p. 25). Perhaps radical translation, as opposed to immersion 
in the language once it is learned, does not enable us to be sure. The best we could achieve in this 
enterprise would be plausible hypotheses that are subject to refinement or rejection in the light of 
further  evidence.  The  key  point  is  that  in  arriving  at  these  hypothesis  we  are  guided  by  our 
knowledge of the environment and by considerations about what it make sense for people to think 
and do, given the state of the environment and what is going on within it. People standing in a café 
drinking coffee, reading newspapers, chatting with each other, and interacting with those who are 
serving, are doing just what we would expect them to do in those surroundings. It would be difficult 
to explain their behaviour except on the assumption that they are in cognitive contact with their 
surroundings. In a calm setting such as this, in a location that is  relatively safe,  a person who 
displayed intense fear might well not be in adequate cognitive contact with the surroundings. It 
would depend on whether there is some reason for him or her to be fearful. Of course, we view such 
a person against a cultural background in which there is shared knowledge of customary modes of 
behaviour, the function of cafés, and so on. If we are in an environment where the culture is less 
familiar  and we do not know the language,  it  will sometimes be harder to make sense of what 
people are doing. But even then we are not baffled when, at what is evidently a market, people are 
buying and selling goods, or when people quicken their pace to avoid an approaching vehicle, or 
adjust their movements while walking so as to avoid bumping into others. 
These  common  sense  observations  do  not  by  themselves  suffice  to  meet  philosophical 
scepticism  about  knowledge  of  whether  people  are  ever  in  touch  with  reality.  Philosophical 
sceptics, and those who think sceptical challenges are hard to meet, tend to work with theories of 
knowledge that make it hard to see how the requirements for acquiring some type of knowledge are 
met.  In  recent  philosophical  tradition,  Quine  stands  out  as  a  theorist  who  limits  the  basis  for 
knowledge  and  fruitful  theory  to  stimulations—activations  of  nerve-endings.1 Aware  that  it  is 
impractical to represent our theorising as if we literally take account of what is going on at our 
nerve-ending, he settles for the next best thing—an evidential basis that is maximally (though not 
completely) free of what, from his perspective, have to count as theoretical presuppositions. From 
this perspective the ‘middle-sized’ objects that we take ourselves to encounter through perception 
1  See Quine 1960, especially chapter 1 and 2.
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are theoretical posits. Applied to radical translation the upshot of this view is that our evidential 
basis for understanding others is limited to verbal dispositions conceived at a level that does not 
rely on detailed assumptions about what those we seek to understand mean by the words they use. 
To read into the evidential base any particular ontology would be to presume what needs to be 
established,  but in the end cannot be established because of the inscrutability of reference.  The 
upshot is, in effect, a kind of scepticism not just about knowledge of meaning and reference, but 
about whether the very idea of meaning and reference has a place in a respectable, truly scientific, 
theory of the world. If the view is to be challenged it must be by showing that the underlying theory 
of knowledge is open to question. This, of course, raises the question of what it is to which our 
theories of knowledge are answerable. This is not something I explored in the book. My view on the 
matter is in some respects fairly traditional. I hold that when doing epistemology we should seek to 
make sense as much as  possible  of what,  prior  to  theorising,  we would on reflection  count  as 
knowledge. Our data will include real or imagined cases in which it is not a matter of real dispute 
that people know this or that, and will also include our pre-theoretical grounds for thinking of these 
cases as cases of knowledge. In relation De Caro’s challenge it is therefore relevant to point to what 
would in practice assure us that others are or are not in touch with reality: our seeing those we seek 
to understand respond to their environment in ways that make sense. It is also relevant to take note 
of how remote from our actual thinking is Quine’s radical translation thought-experiment. There 
remains  room for  further  discussion  on  the  matter  beyond  anything  I  tackled  in  the  book.  In 
particular, we need a theory of our knowledge of others that is not confined to the framework of the 
traditional epistemological problem of other minds, but makes sense of the ease with which we 
really do know a very great deal about what others think and know, and about they are doing.2
A central  theme of the book is that  in understanding others we must  view them as rational 
agents,  operating,  as they say,  within ‘the space of reasons’, but I also hold that psychological 
explanations are causally explanatory. Much attention has been paid to a problem concerning how 
to make sense of causation at the level of intentional psychology. The problem, in essentials, is that 
if, as many suppose, physical events admit of complete causal explanation at the level of physical 
science, there seems to be no room for autonomous psychological explanation. We have a problem 
of explanatory exclusion. I agree with De Caro that this is an issue of importance, though I did not 
tackle it in the book. I give some indication below of what I take to be a promising line of thought, 
though clearly it requires development.3
Suppose that I receive an e-mail from a colleague asking me for an opinion on some disputed 
matter. I read the message. The upshot is that I understand the colleague to be asking me for an 
opinion on the disputed matter. There is, let us suppose, a scientific account of the chain of events 
leading from the brain of my colleague,  via his keyboard and computer,  through the university 
network to my computer and terminating in events in my brain. The account is couched in scientific 
terms and does not draw upon the categories of intentional psychology. Why should we assume that 
this explanation is complete? It may be complete in the sense that each change in the chain of 
physical  events  leading to  the change in  my brain-state  as  I  understand the message occurs  in 
accordance with the laws that cover such changes. But it would not be complete in the sense of fully 
explaining my reading and understanding my colleague’s message. An account of this that did not 
advert to the fact that I read and understand the message, and to my capacity to do so, is not a 
complete account of my reading and understanding the message. So there is a sense in which the 
scientific explanation is incomplete. It is not incomplete in the sense of having gaps or jumps that 
are not in accordance with the general workings of my colleague’s brain and body, of the computer 
network, and of my brain and body. But it is incomplete in the sense that it does not relate the 
2  I may add that it seems to me that the epistemological wrings of John McDowell are crucial for this enterprise. See 
in particular, McDowell 1981 and 1982. I pursue these matters further in Millar (forthcoming 2008).
3  For some remarks on what,  in the book, I  called the problem of explanatory relevance,  see my reply to Paul 
Noordhof.
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events in my brain to my coming to understand what my colleague wants. So perhaps the problem 
of explanatory exclusion arises in part because the notion of a scientific account in non-intentional 
terms, that is without gaps in the sense explained, has been conflated with the notion of a complete 
explanatory account. 
The line of thought I have just sketched is couched in terms of explanatory completeness. Some 
will think that it does not address the real issue, which is posed by the thought that if the scientific 
story deals in causal chains without gaps then, barring causal overdetermination, there simply is no 
room for  a  causal-explanatory  story  at  the  level  of  intentional  psychology.  The  picture  in  the 
background here is that, since the real causation is going on at the scientific level, either there is no 
causation at higher levels or, if there is, it is causation in some etiolated sense. But I do not see why 
we should not suppose that there are layers or levels of causation, just as there are layers or levels of 
explanation.
Imagine that I am pushing a wheelbarrow while working in my garden in order to transport 
compost from one part of the garden to another. A scientist might be interested in explaining why 
the barrow moves in just the way that it does in terms of the forces acting upon it—forces that 
enable the barrow to overcome the friction exerted by its contact with the ground. Why the barrow 
is being moved by me would be irrelevant to such an explanation. That is because the phenomenon 
to be explained is a physicalistically specified motion and the explanation sought is in scientific 
terms. If the scientist wished to follow the explanatory chain from the motion of my arms to the 
contraction of my muscles and beyond then it would be necessary to account for the events that 
took place within by body that lead to the barrow moving. Such an account would not be relevant to 
an explanation of why the barrow is being moved by me. An explanation of that must be in terms of 
my intention to transport compost from one part of the garden to another. Here the explanandum is 
an intentional action of mine. It is clear here that the phenomena to be explained are different and it 
is not surprising that the explanations should different. Plausibly, we have here causation at two 
levels: my taking steps to move the barrow in order to transport compost is a cause of the barrow’s 
being moved by me; the causal factors picked out by the scientific account cause the barrow to 
move in such-and-such a physicalistically specified manner. 
Against  this  view of  the matter  it  might  be said that  there  is  still  one event—the barrow’s 
moving—that on my account has two sets of causes. After all, if the barrow is moved by me, then it 
moves and my intentions are therefore causally relevant to the occurrence of this movement. But 
why can’t we just accept that this is so with good grace? There is the one motion of the barrow, but 
that motion can be considered from different points of view with different explanatory interests in 
mind.  There  remains  a  difference  between the  causal  factors  relevant  to  an explanation  of  the 
physical characteristics of the barrow’s moving in terms of the physical forces exerted upon it and 
an explanation of the movement’s being one that is initiated by me in this context.
Reply to Gozzano
Simone Gozzano says  that  ‘[o]ur epistemic  conduct,  the way we proceed from one thought  to 
another, may follow very different strategies’ (p.  32) With this in mind he claims that ‘[i]t seems 
quite difficult, given a set of beliefs, to say in advance what is entailed by this set and what this set 
entails without specifying what kind of epistemic conduct we are to follow and what is the aim of 
our reasoning’ (p.  32).  Gozzano appears to work with a very broad notion of entailment. In the 
book I spoke of what is implied by what one believes. By ‘implies’ I meant what some would 
express by the phrase ‘analytically entails’. Gozzano’s notion of entailment is not apt for expressing 
the views I expressed by my use of ‘implies’. 
Gozzano pursues his theme by noting that there are different ways one might go faced with what 
looks like a counterexample to a generalisation one accepts. If I understand him, he thinks that 
merely taking account  of the fact  that  believing something commits  one to believing what this 
entails does not tell us what move we should make—what belief if any we should adopt or abandon. 
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I agree; knowing what a belief or intention commits you to doing leaves open a great deal about 
how you will and how you should think and act in consequence. But my aim was not to explore 
strategies for adjusting beliefs or acting. Because discussions of normativity have been hampered 
by lack of specificity about the sorts of normative consideration that govern our thinking, I focused 
principally  on  the  implication  commitments  of  believing  and  the  means-end  commitments  of 
intending. I took it that many would agree that we incur such commitments even if they disagreed 
with my view of the form that these commitments take. There are issues concerning the further 
ramifications  of  having  incurred  a  commitment,  which  I  did  not  raise.  That  was  because  my 
principal concern was (i) with the link between beliefs and intentions and the commitments that 
they incur and (ii) with the importance of our reflective stance on our beliefs and intentions and on 
the commitments they incur. Properly to address these matters it was not necessary to discuss all the 
many different ways in which it is possible to react to a given commitment.
Gozzano observes that there are different ways of conceiving of entailments, for instance, in 
terms of classical  or intuitionistic logic. He asks whether I think that ‘it  does not matter  which 
method you follow as long as, once you have taken one, you follow it thoroughly’ ( p.  33). The 
answer is, ‘No’ because I do not think that classical and intuitionist logic correspond to different 
methods that we might or might not adopt, depending on our aims. It suffices for my purposes that 
we are often in a position such that it is not in dispute that certain things one believes entail other 
things. If there are cases in which in which some think that P entails Q and others deny this then 
there will be, correspondingly, disagreement over what believing P commits one to. I do not see that 
this poses a fundamental problem for my view since it was never part of the view that it should 
always be evident to us whether a given commitment is incurred. I think a similar response should 
be given to Gozzano’s claim that we can never be sure that folk psychological talk is paradox free 
(p. 33). That may well be so, but again it does not seem to affect what matters for my purposes. So 
far as belief is concerned what matters is that it  can sometimes be evident that some things we 
believe commit us to believing other specified things. If there are indeterminacies with respect to 
what is entailed by what we believe then, on my view, it follows that there are indeterminacies in 
the content of the belief and thus also in what we ascribe when we ascribe that belief in a content-
specifying way. I acknowledge that that there are deep issues here, which the book does not tackle.
When it comes to intention Gozzano suspects that the means-end ideal is truistic. He says, ‘if [it] 
amounts to saying that if you want to Φ then do whatever you think can bring about Φ, then it is 
equivalent to giving the grammar of realizing an action, but it cannot provide any substantial help 
for giving a correctness condition for an intention’ (p. 33). 
I need to make two points of clarification. First, the ideal and the corresponding commitment are 
tied to intention, not to wanting. (See Understanding People, pp. 120-121). Second, it is important 
that both the ideal and the corresponding basic means-end commitments deal in what is actually 
necessary to carry out an intention, rather than what one thinks is necessary. If I intend to Φ and I 
believe that  Φ-ing is necessary if I am to Φ  then I incur a belief-relative commitment to  Φ-ing. 
(See Understanding People, pp. 75-76). But the belief-relative commitment is grounded in the basic 
means-end commitment.  Rationality calls  upon us to aspire to discharge the basic commitment. 
Doing that requires me to find out what are the necessary means and in trying to do so I may 
acquire  a  false  belief  on  the  matter.  In  virtue  of  such  a  belief  I  would  incur  a  belief-relative 
commitment that may be at odds with the basic commitment. Even so, it is the means-end ideal that 
gives  rise  to  the  basic  commitment,  which  in  turns  explains  why  I  incur  the  belief-relative 
commitment. From the stance in which I have a false belief about means, to be in breach of the 
belief-relative commitment would be to be in breach of the basic means-end commitment. The latter 
is what I must avoid. 
I am happy to accept that both the means-end ideal is truistic and wish that other theorists would 
agree.  Gozzano  doubts  that  my  apparatus  delivers  a  ‘correctness  condition  for  intending  to 
Φ’       (p.  33). I did not present it as doing so. My aim was to be explicit about the shape of 
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commitments incurred by intentions and to raise the question of how intentions are linked to the 
commitments they incur. This is the project that I call explaining normative import, which I pursued 
in chapter 4.
Gozzano takes  me to  task for saying  that  normativity  is  primarily  a feature  of judgements, 
beliefs, statements, claims, etc. I am not sure exactly what his worry is, though it is connected with 
a desire to avoid prejudging the issue of whether belief depends on language. I do not think that the 
offending  statement  does  pre-judge  the  issue.  Perhaps  I  should  have  made  it  explicit  that 
normativity attaches to statements and the rest in virtue of their content. Thus a statement can have 
a content such that it is normative, and so can a belief. For instance, a belief to the effect that one 
ought to avoid believing contradictions, would be normative. So would a statement with the same 
content. 
In the book I claimed that our beliefs and intentions differ in kind from any states possessed by 
animals  that  lack  our  reflective  capacities.  Gozzano’s  perspective  on how I  treat  this  matter  is 
guided by his  assumption  that  I  think that  there  is  ‘some sort  of irreducible  gap between sub-
doxastic states, those information-bearing states that manage our motor behavior in driving the car 
on a busy road or helping us to catch a thrown ball, and beliefs and intentions, those states whose 
content is consciously elaborated in a linguistic way’ (p.  35). I certainly take human beliefs to be 
different  from any sub-doxastic  information-bearing states in  the sense that  no human belief  is 
identical with any state that is purely sub-doxastic. Similarly, I take it that human intentional action 
is not identical with any sub-intentional yet goal-directed activity. Gozzano suggests that the two 
levels ‘are not completely apart, at least not in us’ (p. 36). I do not think I made any claims in the 
book that commit me to thinking otherwise. In connection with intention I acknowledge that sub-
intentional activity may be implicated by intentional action (pp. 52-3). It seems evident that there 
must be an interplay between beliefs under my high conception and sub-doxastic states. Gozzano 
says that when driving along, unreflectively, engaged in discussion with a passenger, one may halt 
the  discussion  and  (consciously)  attend  more  to  what  one  needs  to  do  to  drive  safely  in  the 
prevailing  conditions.  He  describes  this  as  letting  one’s  sub-doxastic  states  resurface  in  the 
conscious dimension. I prefer to view the change as a transition from sub-intentional activity, for 
instance, adjustments to the steering wheel, shaped by features of the situation registered at the sub-
doxastic level, to noticing and thinking about what needs to be done. It is compatible with my view 
of belief that some beliefs are necessarily tied to sub-doxastic states. For instance, it is plausible that 
if I have a demonstrative perceptual belief that I would express by saying, ‘That ball is coming 
straight at me’, then it is constitutive of my having that very belief that I am tracking the trajectory 
of the ball at a sub-doxastic level.4 Whether or not this is right it is compatible with preserving a 
distinction between human beliefs and any belief-like states on the part of animals that lack our 
reflective capacities.
Gozzano asks whether we need to invoke a cognitive difference between him and his dog Fido 
in order to account for their  both mistakenly believing that the cat is up a tree which they are 
looking at. Perhaps not. Both, after all, will be in a state in which they are primed, for instance, to 
search that tree if trying to find the cat. I do not suggest that to account merely for the mistake we 
need to invoke a cognitive difference between the two. When I defend a high conception of human 
believing it is to do justice to a characteristic role of beliefs in our thinking—that of supplying us 
with assumptions that form or contribute to our reasons for action. (See Understanding People, pp. 
138-39, and chapter 7.) When we exploit our beliefs in this way we take stock of what we believe. 
Dogs presumably do not, and it is an empirical matter whether higher primates do. 
Gozzano ascribes to me the view that ‘to have the belief that p (Bp) entails (in general) knowing 
that one has the belief (KBp)’ (p.  37). I do not work with a conception of entailment that holds 
sometimes  but  not  at  others,  where  contents  are  held  constant.  But,  even  with  Gozzano’s 
qualification ‘in general’, the view ascribed to me looks stronger than any that I hold. In the book 
4  I touch on the interplay between perceptual belief and sub-doxastic states in Millar 2007.
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(pp. 138-39) I was careful to say that  when beliefs perform a certain characteristic role—that of  
supplying us with assumptions that form or contribute to reasons for other beliefs—we know that 
the assumptions with which they supply us are ones we believe and that we are relying on them. 
The idea is that if, believing that p, I exploit that belief in this way, treating the consideration that p 
as forming or contributing to a reason to believe that p, and believe accordingly, then I shall know 
that I am doing so. Suppose, for instance, that I believe that Tom is going to the party and that if 
Tom is going then Mary will go. I then exploit those beliefs, and form the belief that Mary will go 
to the party on the grounds that Tom is going and that if he is going then Mary will go. The claim is 
that  when  I  form  this  belief  in  that  way  I  will  know  what  I  am  doing.  Perhaps  there  are 
circumstances in which believing that Tom is going to the party and that if Tom is going then Mary 
will go will causes me to believe that Mary will go, without my knowing why I formed that belief. 
In that case the beliefs that constitute the cause are not performing the role under consideration and 
their contents do not figure as my reasons for believing that Mary will go. We have many beliefs 
that are dormant standing states and that we never exploit at all or never exploit in the way under 
consideration.
Gozzano (p. 37) also ascribes to me the view that if I have to give a verdict on whether q, and I 
believe that p, and know that the proposition that p entails that q, then I ought to believe that q. This 
view  is  actually  contrary  to  a  central  idea  in  the  book,  which  is  that  while  I  would,  in  the 
circumstances envisaged, be committed to believing that q it does not follow that I ought to believe 
that q. 
I claim in the book (Ch. 4) that under dispositionalism beliefs have a standing that is akin to that 
of a character trait. That is to say, believing something is considered as a complex dispositional 
property that is manifested in a variety of ways depending on the nature of the factors that trigger 
the disposition. It is a problem for this view that if it were true then it would be possible to adopt a 
contemplative stance to our current beliefs. Such a stance would be one on which I do not take my 
having the belief to have any normative import for other things I might believe or do. It does not 
seem to me to be possible to adopt such a stance. 
Addressing my critique of dispositionalism, Gozzano says,
Dispositionalism, as specified, can be taken as a thesis concerning belief’s formation: I see 
a  red car  and I  come to  believe  that  there  is  a  red car  in  front  of  me.  My perceptual 
apparatus is structured in such a way that if there is something red in front of me I come to 
believe that something red is in my visual field. Millar resists calling these beliefs; rather he 
takes these as purely information bearing states. If so, the problem lies in the concept of 
belief rather than in the dispositionalist view … . (p. 39).
I do not deny that belief-formation implicates dispositions. Nor do I deny that genuine beliefs 
can be formed in direct response to sensory experiences. My target was a conception of beliefs and 
intentions on which each such state implicates a cluster of non-normatively specifiable dispositions. 
I argued (Understanding People, Ch. 4) that it is not at all clear that dispositionalists can adequately 
account for the fact that beliefs and intentions incur normative commitments. I also tried to make it 
plausible that we have little general conception of which dispositions are characteristic of which 
beliefs and intentions (Understanding People, pp. 125-31). Our conceptions of what a person is 
liable to think or do given this or that belief or intention relate to real or imagined circumstances. 
They and rely on assumptions and sometimes knowledge about much else that the person believes, 
intends, hopes, and so on, in those circumstances. Roughly speaking, we think of the sorts of thing 
that it would make sense for the person to think or do, given the beliefs or intentions, and whatever 
else we know about the person and his or her circumstances. Thinking about what would make 
sense includes thinking about what there is reason for the person to think or do, and about what the 
person is committed to thinking or doing. I think that this has a bearing on Gozzano’s concerns 
about styles of reasoning. Focusing on a particular belief tells us very little about what a person is 
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liable  to think or do even granted that we take the implication commitments  of the belief  into 
account.  In trying to make out what the person might think or do we need to know much else 
besides.
Reply to Haddock
The Implication Commitment Principle is a regimentation of something that might be expressed in 
more everyday parlance by saying that if you believe some things you have to believe others. I take 
it that believers are committed to thinking this true, and could be brought to appreciate that it is true 
with a few examples. The regimentation makes explicit how it needs to be understood if it is to help 
to make sense of our thinking. First, you don’t have to believe everything entailed by what you 
believe. But if you believe P, and P entails Q, then if you give any verdict on Q it has to be belief. 
Second, it interprets the notion of  what you have to believe in terms of the idea that you have to 
avoid a certain combination of stances. (Analogously, saying that Q must be true, having noted that 
it is entailed by  P, in a circumstance in which the truth of  P is be taken for granted, amounts to 
saying,  ‘P, and necessarily,  if  P  then  Q’, not ‘Since  P, necessarily  Q.) If I believe  P, and  Q is 
entailed by P, then I ought to avoid continuing to believe P while giving a verdict on Q other than 
belief. So the sense in which I have to believe Q is not such that I ought to believe Q, since I could 
do what is required by no longer believing Q.
In calling the principle a conceptual truth I meant only to mark the fact that it is a truth and 
something to which one is committed if one has mastery of the concept of belief. Notwithstanding 
our post-Quineian felicity,  I  know of no good reason for doubting that there  are conceptual  or 
analytic truths in the sense explained. As Adrian Haddock suggests (footnote 3) there is an oddity in 
supposing that an unmarried male in a civic partnership with another unmarried male is a bachelor. 
That seems to me to show, not that there is some doubt as to whether it is analytic that a bachelor is 
an adult male who has never married, but rather that the concept of a bachelor has little use in 
current social circumstances. At a time at which there was a prevailing expectation that most males 
would end up married in the conventional sense, and that those that did not, would not enter into 
anything which, like a civic partnership, is akin to marriage in the conventional sense, there was 
some point in dividing adult males into those who are or have been married and those who are not 
and  have  never  been.  Given  the  proliferation  of  statuses  that  exist  now  and  are  widely 
acknowledged, the concept has little use, for want of anything interesting in common among those 
to whom it applies. (It’s ages since I have heard anyone described as a bachelor.) 
Haddock suggests that the Implication Principle might be conceived as a necessary truth that is 
not analytic. It is widely held that the claim that water is (identical to) H2O is necessary but not 
analytic. Its necessity reflects the fact that it specifies the nature of water. I take Haddock to be 
suggesting that we might similarly think of the Implication Principle  as partially specifying the 
nature of belief even though it is not analytic. The position taken in the book is that the concept of 
belief is not the concept of a natural kind or in the relevant way akin to such a concept. I assumed 
that the nature of belief is, as I put it, captured or specified by the concept. (See  Understanding 
People, pp. 191-92.) Haddock wonders exactly what I mean by this (p. 44). He conjectures that the 
underlying thought might be that ‘if S grasps the concept of X, then she believes all the truths there 
are to believe about the nature of  X’ (p.  44). It is just as well that I am not committed to such a 
strong and obviously implausible thesis. The idea is rather that the concept of X captures the nature 
of X if there is no more to being X than would be ascribed to something by saying of it that it is X. I 
take it that the statement that a substance is water does not meet this condition. There is more to a 
substance being water (its being H2O) than is stated by saying that it is water. I claim that there is 
no more to someone’s believing that the stock market is volatile than is stated by saying that that 
person believes that the stock market is volatile. That the nature of belief is captured by the concept 
explains why our epistemic route to the nature of belief is via reflection on the concept. What other 
route could there be? Some claim that the concept of belief picks out a physicalistically specifiable 
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state, the character of which can be investigated empirically. But so far as I can see there is really 
very little reason to believe that this is so. (That is compatible with supposing that there would be 
no beliefs if our neurophysiological systems did not function in appropriate ways.) Given my stance 
on the status of the Implication Principle, the issue that preoccupies Haddock—whether calling the 
principle constitutive adds anything to calling it necessary but not analytic—was not an issue for 
me.  I  acknowledge that  it  is something worth pursuing just  because it  takes us into interesting 
methodological  issues  about  the  metaphysics  of  belief  and about  whether  philosophising  about 
belief should be viewed as a form of conceptual enquiry.
The stance I have just taken has an impact on at least part of Haddock’s attack on my case for 
thinking that we can best account for the fact that believing incurs an implication commitment in 
terms of the idea that it is part of the nature of belief that beliefs incur such commitments.  He 
suggests that we could as well account for the commitments incurred by beliefs by invoking the 
Implication  Principle  understood  as  necessary  but  not  analytic.  While  I  think  that  this  is  an 
interesting suggestion, it has problems of its own. If belief is not in a category akin to a natural kind 
then the question arises as to how we determine that the principle is a metaphysically necessary 
truth. Be that as it  may,  I resist dropping the suggestion that the principle is a conceptual truth 
because it seems to me to be something that our actual thinking about belief commits us to. For all 
that Haddock has said metaphysically necessary truths about beliefs need have no impact on our 
actual  thinking.  Even  if  that  is  not  objectionable  in  itself,  we  should  not  wish  to  place  the 
Implication Principle, or at least its implications for particular cases of belief, where it lacks such 
impact. 
More pressing, I think, is Haddock’s suggestion (p. 50) that we may think of the Implication 
Principle,  as having to do with the nature of  rationality.  As Haddock acknowledges I raise the 
question of why the Implication Principle should be thought hold. The issue concerns what licenses 
the transition from, say, 
(1) Sally believes P
(2) P entails Q
to
(3) Sally committed to believing Q, if she gives any verdict to Q. 
A very natural thought is that all we need to explain this move is a conception of rationality on 
which rationally demands that Sally believe Q, in circumstances in which (1) and (2) are true and 
Sally  gives  a  verdict  on  Q.  If  this  is  right  then there  is  no need  to  assume that  it  is  partially 
constitutive of Sally’s believing P that she incurs commitments to believing entailments of P. In the 
book (pp. 117-18) I reject  such a move in the context  of a discussion of dispositionalism.  The 
reason is that if it is not in the nature of believing that it is commitment-incurring in the manner 
described  then  it  becomes  an  issue  why we should  suppose  that  the  Implication  Commitment 
Principle  holds.  The  problem  emerges  when  we  consider  that,  on  the  dispositionalist  view, 
believing  P is  akin  to  having  a  character  trait—it  is  simply  a  matter  of  having  a  cluster  of 
dispositions. If I am an aggressive person then I am unusually prone to being aggressive. Thus in 
situations that would not provoke most others I am liable to be aggressive. If this is how I am then it 
might well be rational for me to do something about it. Yet there is nothing about the trait of being 
aggressive that in and of itself explains this. To explain it we need to take account of the impact of 
my being aggressive in the light of what is of value. It is of value that I should maintain good 
relationships with others. Since my being aggressive will tend to undermine, or prevent me from 
having, such relationships, there is good prudential reason for me to try to be less aggressive. Now, 
if Sally’s believing P is a dispositional state in the way that my being aggressive would be, similar 
considerations would apply. Under dispositionalist assumptions, appeal to rationality alone will no 
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more explain why Sally should avoid continuing to believe P while giving a verdict on Q other than 
belief,  than  appeal  to  rationality  alone  will  explain  why  I  should  do  something  about  being 
aggressive. It is easy to lose sight of this because it seems so obvious that Sally should avoid the 
condition specified. But, even though it is obvious, this needs an explanation. I claim that the best 
explanation is that belief is essentially commitment-incurring in the way I have described. What 
rationality demands does not drop out of the sky; it  is grounded in the nature of the states (for 
instance, believing and intending) on which it imposes constraints.
Haddock draws attention to difficult issues concerning the extent to which our beliefs are under 
our control. He imagines a theorist who believes that our nature, being determined by evolution, 
leads us to have a tendency to have beliefs that are racially discriminatory, while seeing no reason 
to  believe  such  things.  Haddock  takes  the  example  to  be  suggestive  of  two  points  that  pose 
problems for my views. One is that if I have a discriminative belief, which my nature determines 
that I should have, then it becomes questionable that I ought to avoid continuing to have the belief 
while giving verdicts on what it entails other than belief. For even if I come to know that some 
things entailed by the belief are false it is not in my power to abandon the belief. The other point is 
that while I should adopt a contemplative stance towards the discriminatory belief, my theory has it 
that  such  a  stance  is  not  open  to  me.  These  are  important  matters  and  they  certainly  require 
discussion beyond what I have provided so far. In the book (pp. 76-78) I acknowledge that failure to 
discharge the commitments I describe need not be failure in rationality. Sally may reject Q because 
ignorant of the fact that it is entailed by P, which she believes. Her ignorance need not be due to 
irrationality.  To  address  this,  and  a  parallel  point  concerning  means-end  commitments,  I 
distinguished between what I called ideals of reason and requirements of rationality. It is an ideal 
of rationality that one avoids believing things while giving verdicts on what they entail other than 
belief. On the picture presented in the book, particular implication commitments are grounded in 
this ideal. Limitations on our logical acumen mean that it is possible to be in breach of the ideal 
through ignorance that simply reflects our cognitive limitations, rather than irrationality. Yet it is 
part of what it is to be rational that we are required to aspire to satisfy the ideals so far as it is in our 
power to do so. An implication of this approach is that if implication commitments are expressed in 
terms of ‘oughts’ then in the relevant sense ‘ought’ does not entail ‘can’. But it is far from clear that 
‘ought’ always does entail ‘can’. In particular, it  seems to me that we can make some sense of 
‘oughts’ linked to ideals, for which ‘ought’ does not entail ‘can’, but does entail something like ‘can 
aspire to conform to’. Haddock is especially concerned with beliefs that it is not in our power to 
abandon. It is tempting to address his concerns simply by noting the point about ‘ought’ that I have 
just made. While I am sure that this should be part of an adequate response, it is less than satisfying 
taken on its  own. It  is central  to my perspective that believing something is of its  very nature 
sensitive to the commitments which that belief incurs. If it is not open to me to abandon a belief, 
then a severe limitation is imposed on my ability to discharge the commitments that it incurs. In 
view of this it might be wondered whether I may count as having the sensitivity to the commitments 
that, on the story I tell, is constitutive of what it is to believe something. I shall make a couple of 
remarks on this. First, suppose that there are beliefs that their subjects are powerless to abandon. It 
is a further question whether we can make sense of people maintaining such a belief, while also 
acknowledging either that there is no reason to think it true or that it entails things known to be 
false. A more plausible scenario would be one in which there are psychological mechanisms in 
place that do one of two things. Either they make the subject blind to the fact that there is no reason 
to think the belief true or evidence for thinking it false, or they lead the subject to pretend that there 
is reason to think the belief true and to explain away what is alleged to be evidence of falsehood. In 
cases of pathological believing,  sensitivity to relevant commitments  may be manifested in such 
ways. Second, if a subject appears to believe something while fully aware that there is no reason to 
think it true, or even aware that there is strong evidence that it is false, there is a real question as to 
whether the situation is at it appears. That is a Davidsonian consideration but it is far weaker than 
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any interpretation of the constitutive role of rationality on which a belief is taken to be problematic 
if it is not rationally held. Here we are not simply imagining an irrational belief, but rather a belief 
held by a subject who in effect recognises that it is irrational. Are people not often in this situation? 
Are not those who suffer from depression often powerless to abandon beliefs about their various 
inadequacies, even though they know that there is no reason to think these beliefs true? Again, it 
seems to me that we must be careful how we describe cases. One possibility is that such subjects 
have fluctuating beliefs, alternating between acknowledging that they are not really so inadequate 
and, under the dark clouds of depression, believing that they are inadequate. These fluctuations pose 
no problem for my view and do not implicate the kind of condition that Haddock envisages his 
theorist with the racist beliefs to be in: they do not require us to ascribe to the subject a belief at the 
same time as acknowledging that there is no reason to think it true. There might be cases in which a 
depressed subject acknowledges that it is false that he or she is inadequate but continues to  feel 
inadequate. Again that is not the condition that Haddock takes his theorist to be in. I think we would 
find it hard to know what to make of a person who appeared to be in this condition. That would 
reflect the fact there is a real question then as to whether the subject who is supposed to have the 
unavoidable racist belief counts as having that belief or, if he does, whether he is truly in a situation 
in which it is not open to him to change his mind. An alternative understanding is that such a person 
cannot avoid having racist  thoughts spring to mind. That would fall short of having racist  beliefs. 
And even granted  that  the  subject  has  the  belief,  this  would  not  settle  that  he should  adopt  a 
contemplative attitude towards that belief. I remain sceptical that it is open to us to adopt such a 
stance to our current beliefs. 
Reply to Noordhof
Paul  Noordhof’s lengthy and detailed  scrutiny of  the  book raises  many issues  that  merit  fuller 
treatment. I shall do my best to try to defend or at least clarify some of the points with which he 
engages.
Normative reasons for action and justification for action
The first part of Noordhof’s discussion is concerned with my view that not all normative reasons for 
action are justificatory reasons. Noordhof thinks that, on the contrary, ‘[i]f it seems that justification 
is not available for a certain kind of attitude, then there are no reasons and the attitude, and actions 
which follow from it, fall, at least partly, outside the ambit of normative explanation ’ (p. 50) 
My view about normative reasons for action, outlined in Chapter 2 of the book, is based on 
considerations  about  what  we  would  naturally  count  as  reasons  for  action  and  also  on  more 
theoretical considerations about the nature of intentional action. For instance, it seems to me quite 
natural to suppose that my intending to buy fresh fish today,  along with certain facts about the 
availability of fish near where I live, and about the time and expense I am prepared to put into 
finding  fish,  provide  a  reason for  me  to  go  to  our  local  fish  shop.  The  reason here  gives  an 
instrumental point to my performing a certain action: it is a step towards buying fresh fish. It strikes 
me as odd to regard my reason as providing a justification for my going to the fish shop. The sense 
of oddness has, I think, two sources. The first is that the fact that an action would contribute to 
doing something I intend does not by itself justify my performing that action. My intention to buy 
fish is innocent enough, but many intentions, and the means to carrying them out, are not. The 
second is that, in the absence of further description of the scenario, talk of justification seems out of 
place.  Not  all  actions  call  for  justification.  I  take  Noordhof’s  point  (p.  50)  that  there  can  be 
justification for an action even when there is no uniquely right thing to do in the circumstances. 
Even so, a justification for an action must surely show that there was at least nothing wrong with 
performing that action. The reason in the example I have just given does not do that, but nor does it 
have to do that in order to be a reason for the action. 
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Noordhof might be moved by a sense that to count reasons for action as normative when they do 
not provide justification is to empty the notion of the normative of any content. As I see it, my 
reason for going to shops is normative because, though it would not be right to say that it justifies 
my going to the shops, it provides a rationale for the action in that it confers a point on that action. 
To that extent it recommends or favours my going to the shops. To that extent it is, therefore, a 
normative reason. In this sense even perverse or foolish intentions can generate a reason for an 
action—a reason in the light of which the action can be seen to have a rationale and to be thus far 
intelligible. But no action would on that account alone be justified. 
This takes us to the more theoretical considerations. What counts as a reason for a belief, or as a 
reason for an action, depends, respectively, on the constitutive aim of belief and the constitutive aim 
of intentional action. The constitutive aim of belief is truth. Consequently, a normative reason for a 
belief that  p cannot do less that justify thinking it true that  p. I claim that the constitutive aim of 
intentional action is simply that the action should have a point and that an action can have a point 
merely by being a means to carrying out an end that the agent actually has, whether innocent, noble, 
foolish or perverse. Some actions call for justification.  They call for justification in the face of 
considerations that suggest that performing the action might,  for instance, lead to some harmful 
result, or be in breach of, or make it impossible to fulfil, some obligation. Whereas the intrinsic 
character  of  belief  determines  that  a  reason  for  belief  should  justify  that  belief,  the  intrinsic 
character of intentional action does not determine that a reason for action should justify that action. 
Whether an action calls for justification and whether it is justified depends on how it stands, or 
would stand, in relation to what is of value, and what is obliged. There might be an issue as to 
whether I may use some time for leisure activity, arising from obligations I have to perform certain 
tasks. In that event spending the time on leisure might call for justification. Whether it is justified 
will depend on whether the leisure activity is compatible with performing those tasks or perhaps on 
whether, in any case, I need the leisure time to conserve my own energy and health. For an action to 
be justified more is required than that it should have a point (not be pointless). 
I  work  with  a  conception  of  the  commitments  incurred  by  beliefs  and  intentions  that  I 
acknowledge to have affinities with John Broome’s conception of normative requirements.  This 
being so, Noordhof (p. 53) wonders why I do not stick with the idea that having an intention incurs 
a commitment to taking the necessary means and drop the claim about reasons? Part of the answer 
is that it restores common sense to acknowledge that having intentions can generates reasons to take 
the necessary means. Suppose I ask my wife whether we have any reason to go into town today. 
She answers, ‘You said you were going to cook fish this evening’. She is reminding me of my 
intention to cook fish and implying that so long as that remains so we have a reason to go into town. 
(We like to check out the fish together.) If my intention to cook fish does not provide a reason to go 
into town, then it looks as if my wife’s answer is beside the point and that she has failed to grasp 
what it takes to be a reason for action. But her reaction clearly makes sense. I want to do justice to 
that. I do not, however, rest content with intuitions. There are the wider considerations that contrast 
belief and intentional action, with respect to their constitutive aims and the wider considerations 
about what genuine justification is.
Arational, yet intentional, actions?
Noordhof  tackles  my  discussion  of  supposedly  arational  actions,  in  the  sense  of  Rosalind 
Hursthouse (1991). Such actions are supposed to be done for no reason. Examples include kicking a 
car when it does not start or tearing up the photograph of a rival. Noordhof suggests that 
… the challenge of the examples is not removed by allowing that the reasons need not 
justify the agent. The point was rather that the things that might flash before the agent’s 
mind resulting in the action couldn’t possibly be taken as considerations in favour of the 
action in any sense. (pp. 51).
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Noordhof’s idea is that, for instance, kicking the car won’t make it start; nor will it teach the car a 
lesson. So the reason for the action cannot be that it will bring about those ends. I agree but I do not 
look for the rationale for the action in these terms. By my account the reason for the kicking the car 
is to satisfy an intention to give way to the urge to do so. Noordhof says
Urges may causally explain the actions but the actions aren’t done to express those urges. 
They are not the consideration why the agents acted in the way that they did. Indeed, if 
urges were the reasons for the actions, then the agent would appear to have a justification 
after all. (p. 51)
Obviously urges are not considerations. They are intense inclinations. The urge to kick the car is 
borne of frustration and anger. In the absence of some pathological mental condition, kicking the 
car is likely to be intentional. If intentional it is informed by an intention to kick the car, but that 
intention, by itself, does not bring out the character of the action because it does not reveal the point 
of the action. Nor, by itself, does the urge to kick. What brings out the character of the action, and 
reveals its point, is that the agent intentionally gave way to the urge. He kicked the car because, as 
we might say, he felt like it and gave in to that feeling. But he was not under any compulsion to 
kick. He meant to satisfy the urge to kick the car and that confers a point on his doing so. It might 
be that agents are sometimes prompted to violent acts in the grip of passions so strong that they are 
quite out of control. It seems to me that if an agent were to kick a car in such a state then what he 
does would be too far removed from anything he means to do to count as an action of intentionally 
kicking the car. If car-kicking really is intentional, as opposed to the out-of-control manifestation of 
a rage (and it would have to be some rage), it has to have some point beyond itself. My proposal is 
that the point is to give way to, and thus to satisfy, the urge to kick the car. We need something like 
this to make sense of how the act can be something that the agent meant to do—something of which 
he is, therefore, the author. But it  also seems to me to be very clear that neither the urges, nor 
intentions to satisfy them, provide justification for kicking the car. If we allow ourselves to talk as if 
they did we deprive ourselves of convenient means of distinguishing, as we should, between what I 
would regard as genuine justification and the kind of point-conferring rationale that figures in my 
treatment of these and other examples. 
Noordhof thinks that my view distorts the phenomenology of the actions in question. At one 
point, speaking of jumping for joy, or punching the air from joy, he says, ‘We don’t have a desire to 
jump up and down, or punch the air, and then satisfy it, yet the point of the action is to express a 
certain  emotion’  (p.  51).  He adds  that  ‘[p]hilosophers  should  think  long  and hard  before  they 
commit themselves to understanding such cases in terms of a desire to express an emotion and a 
belief that (say), if it is joy that one is seeking to express then jumping up and down would be a 
good way of doing it’ (p.  51). The aim here is to embrace the idea that actions springing from 
emotions can have a point, and on that account be intentional, and yet not be done with a view to 
expressing the emotion and so not be done for such a reason. We agree that there are genuine 
actions that in some sense express, or are borne of, emotions, or longstanding attitudes like love and 
affection.  Examples  would  be  kissing  one’s  children,  hugging  someone  who  has  suffered 
bereavement, warmly shaking someone’s hand, and jumping for joy. Some such actions may be 
done  in  order  to  express  the  emotion  or  attitude.  Here  the  expression  might  be  a  matter  of 
communicating to the other what one feels. But the action need not be done with this kind of aim. 
Hugging the bereaved person out of love or concern might simply be aimed at comforting that 
person. All of these are cases of intentional action. It seems to me that they are all cases in which 
the agent acts for a reason—to communicate love, affection, or concern, to comfort,  and so on. 
Noordhof’s worry about jumping for joy might be that if we think of such actions as being guided 
by a belief that jumping is a means to the expression of joy then we over-intellectualise what is 
going on and underplay the spontaneity of the act. But to think of them as being both intentional 
and  done for  reasons  does  not  commit  us  to  over-intellectualisation  and it  is  important  not  to 
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overplay the spontaneity. It is not in dispute that such acts do not spring from deliberation and need 
not involve a step from consideration of an aim to choosing the means to satisfy that aim. Yet 
greater or lesser degrees of know-how and social skill lie behind them. Not any kind of hugging 
will serve the purpose of comforting or expressing concern. We don’t hug just anybody and we 
don’t jump for joy just anywhere no matter who is in our company. Or if we do we are liable to 
incur censure or ridicule. Such actions can have a measure of spontaneity while also being informed 
by  understanding.  The  agent’s  reasons  for  doing  them—giving  comfort,  showing  concern, 
expressing joy—shapes how they are done and bring into play the agent’s understanding of how 
they are to be done. It is not to the point that one does not think to oneself, ‘Doing this is a way to 
achieve this end’. An understanding to this effect is nonetheless manifested by the way in which the 
action is modulated by the aim and knowledge of the means. 
It is worth adding that there are many actions that are indisputably done for a reason though the 
agent does not consciously think,  ‘This action will achieve that end’. Suppose that following a 
routine of heading home from work around a certain time, I switch off my office lights, and leave 
my office, and walk in a certain direction. I need not consider, in any ordinary sense of ‘consider’, 
why I am doing these things. Yet I am doing them for a reason—I am taking steps towards going 
home, knowing what I am doing, and why. 
Commitments and practices
When he turns to consider my view of commitments incurred through participation in practices, 
Noordhof charges  me with taking practices  too seriously (p.  59).  My account  of practices  was 
intended to treat them with no more seriousness than they deserve. 
A practice is an essentially rule-governed activity or cluster of such activities. Some practices 
are deliberately instituted with explicitly formulated rules. Others grow without design.  Certain 
ways of proceeding come to be understood as the thing to do. These understandings are manifested, 
not only through mutual expectations of conformity, but also through critical reactions to breaches 
of  the  rules,  and  the  recognition  that  failure  to  conform demands  explanation,  justification  or 
excuse. Recall that the commitments incurred by beliefs and intentions are quite independent of 
whether the belief or intention is reasonable. The commitments are, so to speak, what you sign up to 
by forming the belief or forming the intention, for good or ill. Similarly, the commitments incurred 
through participation in a practice are independent  of the reasonableness of participating in the 
practice.  They are what you sign up to by participating in the practice,  for good or ill.  To take 
practices too seriously would be to suppose that participating in them obliges one to follow their 
rules.  I  explicitly  set  myself  against  any such view. It  seems to  me that  we do not  take them 
seriously enough if we deny that it  is constitutive of practices that participating in them incurs 
commitments to following their rules. 
Some might be attracted by the idea that the rules of a practice do not generate any normative 
commitments beyond those incurred by aiming to participate. If we ask what reason is there for 
players of a game of football to follow the rules, the answer by this account would be, ‘Because 
they intend to play the game and could not do so without following the rules at least  to some 
extent’. On this way of thinking the only normativity we need to acknowledge in connection with 
rule-governed activities is instrumental—following the rules to some extent is what you have to do 
if you are to play.  The rules have no normative force; it’s just that you won’t count as playing 
unless  by-and-large  you  conform to them.  If  this  is  right  there  need  be  nothing  wrong with a 
football player’s being in breach of a rule. Flouting a rule evidently need not be at odds with being a 
player and so does not put one in breach of the commitment incurred by intending to play the game
—the commitment to doing what is necessary to that end. All we have is a clash between what the 
player has done and what some rule prescribes. I do not think that this is satisfactory.  There is 
something wrong about being in breach of a rule and this is reflected in the fact that breaches of the 
rule are subject to legitimate criticism. Of course, in the professional game, players try to get away 
  85
with as much as they can. But criticism is still appropriate, based on what is called for if one plays 
this game. I suggest that to explain this we need the notion that it is in the nature of rules governing 
a practice that those who participate in the practice incur a (normative) commitment to following 
the rules. Behaviour that flouts a rule is open to being criticised because it is in breach of that 
commitment. Incurring this commitment does not entail that you ought to follow the rules. There 
can be games so appalling that no one ought to play them and therefore no one ought to follow their 
rules.  By my account it  remains true that if you play such a game you incur a commitment  to 
following the rules. The commitment amounts to this: you ought to avoid becoming a player, or 
continuing as a player, and not follow the rules, unless there are countervailing considerations. (On 
the latter, see Understanding People, p. 86.)
Noordhof asks, ‘[W]hat is wrong with playing along, and hence participating in the practice, and 
yet eschewing the practice-relative commitments as not applying to you?’ (p. 59). I should say first 
that the commitments incurred by participating in a practice are practice-relative only in the sense 
that one incurs them through participation, not in the sense that the commitments only count as such 
from the perspective of the practice. Whether one is a participant or not one is obliged to avoid 
being (or becoming) a participant while not following the rules, unless there are countervailing 
reasons. This obligation is unconditional and arises from the nature of a practice in general. One 
may be indifferent to the obligation since one might not be a participant and there might be no live 
issue as to whether to become one. The obligation would come into play if one were a participant 
since, absent countervailing reasons, it would in that case be incumbent upon one either to follow 
the rules or withdraw from the practice. That is what incurring the commitment to following the 
rules amounts to. There might be nothing wrong—indeed, there might be something right—about 
playing along within a practice, while thinking that there ought not to be this practice with those 
rules.  Maybe  this  ought  to  be  the  attitude  of  the  police  officer  in  a  police  force  with  corrupt 
practices. But it is incoherent to suppose that one can both view oneself as a participant in a practice 
and not view the rules as applying to one. And to view the rules as applying just is to view oneself 
as having to follow them, as one might put it in ordinary speech. If in the midst of a board game I 
said, ‘I am playing this game alright but this carries with it no obligation relating to how I treat the 
rules’, my fellow players would find this astonishing. No doubt a component of their astonishment 
would be directed at how I could expect them to continue playing with me. But it seems to me that 
part of their astonishment would be an inchoate recognition that it makes no sense to suppose that 
one can continue playing while remaining indifferent to what the rules require. Noordhof’s example 
of the hunters of humans does not force a different  treatment  any more than the commitments 
incurred by crazy beliefs and intentions compels us to suppose that these attitudes are not genuinely 
commitment-incurring. Part of what you sign up to by participating in a practice is  following its  
rules. You might not follow some of the rules while remaining a player because you can cheat 
covertly, or cheat openly and take the consequences. Or you might flout the rules, as whistleblowers 
do, to subvert the practice from within, while remaining a participant for some time. But you have 
still signed up to following the rules. The metaphor of signing up might suggest that if you are at 
fault  at  all  for flouting the rules  it  is  because you have broken an implicit  or  explicit  contract 
requiring you to follow the rules. That is not what I mean to suggest. We need the idea of a genuine 
commitment in order to make sense of the criticisms that would be appropriate on breaches of the 
rules. The commitment need have nothing to do with morality. Morality might dictate that either 
you withdraw from the practice or subvert it from within. It could be that morally you ought not to 
carry out this or that commitment. Nonetheless, it is your having incurred the commitment that 
demands  that  there  should  be  a  good  reason  for  neither  carrying  it  out  nor  discharging  it  by 
withdrawing from the practice. Somewhat similarly, the fact that there is overwhelming evidence 
against some implication of what you believe dictates that you should not accept that implication. 
But it is the commitment to accepting it that requires you, in that case, to give up the belief that 
incurred it. (In this case there is no room for the option of sticking with the commitment-incurring 
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belief yet not accepting the implication despite acknowledging it to be an implication.)
Dispositionalism about belief and intention
A key part of my case against dispositionalism about the attitudes is that we cannot adopt a purely 
contemplative attitude to our own current beliefs and intentions. In recognising that I intend such-
and-such or believe such-and-such, I endorse that intention or belief,  as the case may be.  It is, 
therefore, not an open question whether having the belief or intention has normative import for me 
(commits me to further beliefs or to a certain course of action). Noordhof attributes to me the view 
that ‘if we currently intend to do A but do nothing to ensure the implementation of  A, we don’t 
really have an intention at all’ (p. 61)’. He also attributes to me the corresponding view concerning 
belief. On this basis he thinks that my view of the normative dimension of belief and intentions—
that  believing  and  intending  are  essentially  commitment-incurring—does  not  help  with 
understanding why we cannot adopt contemplative attitudes to our current beliefs and intentions. 
Noting  that  I  compare  believing  and intending  with promising,  Noordhof  suggests  that  on my 
conception of promising it would be possible to adopt an external attitude to the fact that I have 
made a promise, even though since I have made a promise I have incurred a commitment to doing 
what I promised.  I would be adopting an external attitude if I  were indifferent to doing what I 
promised or just curious to see whether I will end up keeping the promise or breaking it. This, he 
thinks, is suggestive of a problem for my conception of belief and intention.
… if the normative character of our beliefs and intentions involves commitments which are 
simply  the  result  of  constitutive  aims  and  principles  grounded  in  the  nature  of  these 
attitudes—just as the practice of promise-keeping has certain constitutive rules concerning 
the practice-relative commitments of a promisee—then we should expect that it is possible 
to adopt the external perspective to our intentions and beliefs as well. (p. 61) 
There are issues here that need separating out. 
(i) There is no problem with the idea that it is possible to take a contemplative (external) attitude to 
one’s  own promises.  That  is  because,  recognising  that  one  has  made  a  promise,  does  not 
implicate  an endorsement  of  the  promise.  Belief  and  intention  are  unlike  promising  in  this 
respect. You might exploit the practice of promise-keeping in order to deceive others. In doing 
so you would distance yourself from the commitments you have incurred. You can distance 
yourself from beliefs or from intentions you have had by wondering whether you should retain 
those beliefs and intentions. But as I see it, when you do this, the beliefs and intentions are, so to 
speak, suspended. What you cannot do, I claim, is distance yourself from a belief and intention 
that  you recognise that  you now have.  Accordingly,  you cannot  distance yourself  from the 
commitments incurred by these beliefs and intentions, though you might, of course, overlook 
them. Noordhof, I suspect, takes me to press the analogy between beliefs and intentions, on the 
one hand, and promising, on the other, further than it will go. There is nothing in the story about 
beliefs and intentions that corresponds to the rules of a practice. The rules of a practice exist 
only because those participating treat them as rules. Part of treating them as rules is recognising 
that so long as one participates one is normatively committed to following them. (Whether one 
is committed in the psychological sense is a different matter.) The implication-commitments of 
beliefs  are  the resultants  of  the contents  of  those beliefs  and the attitude  of  believing.  The 
means-end commitments of intentions are the resultants of facts about what is necessary to carry 
out those intentions and the attitude of intending. 
(ii) I do not hold, as Noordhof supposes, that it  is a necessary condition of my intending to do 
something that I do something to carry it out. Such a view would make it impossible to make 
sense of lapsed intentions—intentions we do not carry out but do not give up. We clearly can 
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have lapsed intentions. I might, for instance, forget a dentist’s appointment though I intended to 
keep the appointment and at  no point changed my mind about doing so. The contemplative 
attitude of which I speak would be one in which I recognise that I believe this or intend that and 
yet do not view this as having any normative import for what else I believe or what I do.
Noordhof  at  one  point  suggests  that  the  component  of  my  story  that  does  the  work  is 
endorsement not the account of commitments. It is true that someone might be attracted by the idea 
that recognising that one believes this or intends that involves endorsement of what one believes 
and  intends,  while  not  yet  viewing  this  as  having  any  implications  concerning  the  normative 
dimension  of  believing  and intending.  However,  I  envisage opponents  agreeing  that  when you 
believe or intend something you incur commitments, while denying that this establishes anything 
about  the  (intrinsic)  normative  dimension  to  believing  and  intending.  I  take  it  that  if  these 
opponents  acknowledge  the  point  about  endorsement,  then  they  should  see  that  endorsement 
involves taking on board the commitments incurred. The question for them is how to explain why 
this should be so on a purely dispositionalist account on which incurring the commitment is not 
intrinsic to the attitude.  In he book I point to a difficulty about attempting to deal with this by 
invoking covering general principles. 
A  further  problem  for  dispositionalism  relates  to  the  role  of  beliefs  and  intentions  in 
rationalizing explanation (Understanding People, pp. 125-31). Dispositionalism is suggestive of the 
idea that rationalizing explanations are dispositional in that they explain belief-formation and action 
in  terms  of  the  triggering  of  the  dispositions  that  characterise  the  attitudes  invoked  in  the 
explanation.  I  argue  that  this  is  unhelpful  since  we  have  very  little  idea  of  what  dispositions 
characterise believing and intending. 
My conception of the normative dimension of believing and intending is meant to supply an 
alternative picture that addresses these problems. According to the account, there is no ‘logical gap’ 
between believing or intending and incurring the appropriate commitments. In viewing someone as 
believing this or intending that we are thereby committed to viewing them as incurring the relevant 
commitments. This is why endorsing our own beliefs and intentions and signing up to whatever 
commitments they incur go together. We have no clear grasp of how an agent will be disposed in 
virtue of having this or that belief or intention which is expressible in terms of non-normatively 
characterised dispositions. Our grasp of how an agent is likely to behave in virtue of having this or 
that  belief  or  intention,  and  being  in  this  or  that  circumstance,  are  thoroughly  imbued  with 
normative considerations. Roughly speaking, we think of what it would make sense to think or do 
in the specified circumstances,  given the belief  or intention in question.  That involves thinking 
about what there is reason to think or do, and what one would be committed to thinking or doing. 
There is a disposition in the picture: we treat people as being disposed to do what would make 
sense,  or what would seem to make sense to them,  given what they believe or intend and the 
circumstances in which they are placed. 
Noordhof suggests that, for all I have established, it could be that the causal role of a belief 
admits  of  a  ‘fully  adequate  non-normative  characterisation’  (p.  62).  I  do  not  claim  to  have 
established  that  no  such  characterisation  is  possible.  However,  (i)  the  history  of  gestural 
descriptions,  and  sketchy  Ramsifications,  bearing  on  how one  would  be  disposed  if,  say,  one 
believed that it was raining, do not encourage hope, and (ii) there is no evident reason to suppose 
that such characterisations would have, or do have, any role in our actual thinking about belief and 
intention—the thinking that, in my picture, pins down what the states of believing and intending 
are.
The high conception of belief and intention
In the book (chapter  5) I  defended the view that there  is  a  certain  reflexivity  to believing  and 
intending.  I suggested that a characteristic role of intention is to get us to do things by way of 
carrying out those intentions. I claimed that when we carry out an intention we know that we have 
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that intention and know that doing the thing in question is by way of carrying it out. Similarly, a if I 
fail  to  act  because  I  forgot  my  intentioncharacteristic  role  for  belief  is  to  provide  us  with 
assumptions that form or contribute to our reasons for belief and action. I claimed that when what 
we believe serves this reason-constituting role we know that the assumptions in question are things 
we believe and that we are relying on them. (See Understanding People, p. 138.) In the present state 
of philosophy of mind, these are controversial claims. They call for closer attention than I gave 
them in the book or can give here. 
Noordhof’s first concern about my view is that it ‘does not seem sensitive to the distinction 
between being conscious that one has a certain propositional attitude and knowing or believing that 
one does’ (p. 65). I recognise that knowing or believing that p need not be conscious, if by that is 
meant being in a state that involves thinking to oneself that p (so that it is before one’s mind that p). 
Noordhof claims that with this concession I am ‘no better off’ (p. 65). Expanding, he says, ‘if I fail 
to act because I forgot my intention, then the action is not secured by the equally forgettable belief 
that I have the intention’ (p. 65). Indeed so, but the importance of the reflexivity of intentions lies 
not in securing that our intentions will be carried out—nothing is going to secure that. It lies in the 
fact that when we do carry out our intentions, as opposed to doing things caused by our intending, 
we do not act blindly—we know what we are aiming at and that means knowing what we intend.
Noordhof’s second worry about reflexivity is a regress problem: ‘there will be some states that 
play  their  role  in  the  absence  of  beliefs  about  them,  for  example,  the  higher  order  beliefs 
themselves’ (p. 65). I think it important to recall here that where beliefs are concerned the role on 
which my discussion focused was that of supplying us with assumptions that form or contribute to 
our reasons for action. As I write, I believe that I intend to go to a seminar in Edinburgh next week. 
This belief will, I hope, be brought to mind in the meantime, making me aware of a reason I have to 
plan for going and to avoid taking on any projects incompatible with going. Here a higher-order 
belief has the potential to play the reason-providing role of belief. It plays this role by making its 
content available for reasoning. That role does not require me to have a further belief to the effect 
that I believe that I intend to visit Edinburgh next week. But, of course, should the question arise 
whether I have this further belief, I would answer in the affirmative, though with some puzzlement 
that the question was raised. 
Noordhof’s third problem for  reflexivity  is  whether  it  solves  the problem of deviant  causal 
chains. I did not take myself to have solved the problem. The point of the example of the nervous 
climber was to give some (tentative) support for Searle’s view that the content of intention is self-
reflexive. I am rather doubtful that the problem of deviant causal chains can be solved. But my 
scepticism is linked to a suspicion that it need not be solved. If one is in the business of providing a 
reductive analysis of intending to Φ then it becomes pressing to provide conditions that will screen 
out deviant cases come what may. It is becoming increasingly doubtful that this is the business we 
should be in. The absence of such an analysis is not an obstacle to recognising that the climber did 
not carry out his intention to let go of the rope: if he had done he would have intentionally let go of 
the rope, but he didn’t intentionally let go of the rope; it was his nervousness that made him drop it. 
The explanatory relevance of normative
The problem of explanatory relevance that I address arises within the realm of the mental.  The 
problem is that ‘if …the explanatory insight provided by rationalizing explanations is causal, and 
tied to appropriate generalizations, then it is not clear what the provision of the rationalization adds’ 
(Understanding  People,  p.  192).  I  do  not  claim  to  have  tackled  the  problem  of  explanatory 
exclusion, which concerns how the mental can be causally explanatory. (For some tentative remarks 
in that direction see, my response to Mario de Caro). I take for granted that propositional attitudes 
are causally relevant to the formation of other attitudes and the performance of actions. The task is 
to explain how the fact that attitudes rationalize a belief or action can be relevant to the explanation 
of why the agent forms that belief or performs that action. This can be conceived as an issue about 
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integration, as Noordhof suggests, but I do not view it as an issue about integrating the mental with 
the physical, or integrating mentalistic explanation with physical explanation. Noordhof thinks this 
is  a  lacuna,  but  unless  one  thinks  there  is  a  real  doubt  as  to  whether  the  mental  is  causally 
efficacious, it’s not clear to me that it is. 
I  observed  in  the  book  that  the  dispositionalist  approaches  to  the  problem  of  explanatory 
relevance that I consider are unsatisfactory because they attempt to solve the problem ‘without 
reference to the stance that agents have on their own reasons’ (Understanding People, p. 199). Let 
us suppose that the consideration that q is a reason for me to believe that p. For all these accounts 
tell  us, it  might be the case that I believe that  p, for the reason that  q, though the fact that the 
consideration that  q  is a reason to believe that  p  has nothing to do with why I believe that  p. 
Echoing a point about acting from duty made by Kant, we should distinguish between believing that 
p in conformity to reason (to what there is reason for me to believe), and believing that  p  from 
reason (on account of there being a reason for me to believe. The accounts I am criticising do not 
explain what it is for me to believe that p for the reason that q.
My approach to the problem was to identify a type of case in which it is tolerably clear that the 
agent believes something for a certain reason and to suggest that the farther removed from this type 
of case we go,  the less clear  it  will  be that  we have a case admitting  of genuine rationalizing 
explanation. The feature of the case that mattered was that the agent takes the consideration that 
constitutes the relevant reason to be a reason for the belief in question. Noordhof (p. 68). responds 
by saying, in effect, that if taking the consideration that q to be a reason to believe that p just means 
that the subject is disposed to respond in the appropriate way, then we are no further forward. That, 
he thinks, is because we lack a story of how the commitment-inducing properties of taking the 
consideration that q to be a reason to believe that p ‘have an explanatory impact’ (p. 68). 
My account was an attempt to do justice to a plausible—I think irresistible—idea that would 
hardly be in doubt but for the mistaken view that an adequate conception of belief and intention 
must not take these attitudes to be inextricable from reflective capacities. The idea is that believing 
something, or doing something, for a reason involves having an understanding of one’s reasons as 
reasons. If I believe that my wife has already arrived home for the reason that, approaching our 
house,  I  see her  car in the driveway,  I  not only understand what  it  is  for her car to  be in the 
driveway and what it is for her to have already arrived at home, I also understand that the fact that 
her car is in the driveway is a sign, and thus a reason to think that, she has already arrived at home. 
There may be variations  in how such an understanding is  articulated.  Not everyone wields the 
vocabulary of reasons and justification with the ease of philosophers. The understanding would be 
manifested, for instance, if I were to explain or justify thinking that my wife is already at home. 
How does this help with the problem of explanatory relevance? Because in believing that my wife 
has already arrived home, I am responding to the fact that her car is in the driveway qua reason for 
thinking that she has arrived home. 
Noordhof focuses attention on my taking it that the fact that my wife’s car is in the driveway is a 
reason to think she has already arrived home. How, he asks, can this belief have explanatory impact 
in  virtue  of  it  commitment-incurring  and  reason-giving  properties.  Perhaps  I  have  not  fully 
understood Noordhof’s point. It seems to me that as so far stated the answer is straightforward and 
unthreatening. The answer is, ‘In the same way as any other belief’. If the higher-order belief comes 
into play in such a way that its content becomes my reason to believe something, or directs me to 
some commitment of so believing, then I shall be responding to this content as constituting a reason 
or as responsible for a commitment.
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